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OUTSOURCING ANNOUNCEMENTS AND MARKET VALUE 
Information System and Manufacturing Outsourcing Contracts
Objectives of The objective of this study is to examine the impact of information system (IS) or
the Study electronic manufacturing services (EMS) outsourcing announcement on the capital 
market value of both the outsourcer and contractor. Specifically, I will try to answer 
to two main questions: (1) Do outsourcing announcements affect the market value of 
the signing firms in terms of producing abnormal stock returns? (2) What factors 
explain the observed variance in the market reaction to outsourcing announcements? 
This study contributes to the current stream of outsourcing event studies in several 
ways. Firstly, it provides a large enough sample size to test the impact of several firm 
and event characteristics that have not been tested before. Secondly, it expands the 
scope by studying also the market reaction of the contractor, not just the outsourcer. 
Finally, this study will investigate also electronic manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in addition to information system outsourcing.
Data and The dataset is based on 316 outsourcing announcements between 1996 and 2004. The
Methodology sample is obtained by using key word search from various Internet news services and 
outsourcing contractors’ web pages. The accounting and return data has been 
collected from Thomson Financial database. The study utilizes event study 
methodology to examine the excess returns for 316 outsourcing announcements in 
both univariate and multivariate settings to examine the market reaction to 
outsourcing announcements and the impact of different firm and event characteristics 
both for outsourcer and contractor. Various event windows prior, after and around 
the announcement day have been used, although the study focuses on a three day 
event window starting at the announcement day
Results: Evidence presented in this study indicates that outsourcing is a price sensitive event.
Research findings indicate a positive but insignificant market value gain for 
outsourcers (0,21% and 0,46% for large and reduced sample respectively) and a 
significant positive value gain for contractors (1,30% and 1,63%) using three day 
event window starting at the announcement day. The combined entity of outsourcer 
and contractor experience a positive but insignificant gain (0,33% and 0,53%). 
Additionally, there appears to be a strong size effect in the percentage returns leading 
to negative dollar returns for outsourcers (-$270 million) and only slightly positive 
dollar return for contractors ($18 million) over the same three-day period.
Empirical evidence in this study suggests that outsourcing is not value adding per se, 
particularly for outsourcer, but depends on several firm and event characteristics. 
This is consistent with the main findings from the previous studies on this topic. 
Outsourcers’ market reaction is heavily conditioned on the size, profitability and 
industry of the outsourcer. Specifically, large and unprofitable companies as well as 
financial institutions appear to have a weaker market reaction. The statistically 
significant effects observed in this study are explained by the existence of 
information asymmetry in the capital markets for smaller firms, by the short-term 
motives of outsourcing for unprofitable firms and by the adverse effects of 
outsourcing core competencies for financial institutions. Similarly, contractors’ 
market reaction depends on the size of the contractor, and the size and structure of 
the contract. Small contractors and large and alliance based contracts appear to be 
rewarded by investors. The significant effects for contractors are explained by the 
information asymmetry for small firms, stronger dependency of outsourcer in large 
deals and by the strategic importance of alliance based outsourcing contracts.
Keywords Outsourcing, Information System, Electronic Manufacturing Services
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
As fairly new and growing phenomena, outsourcing provides fertile ground for academic 
research. As a management practice it has been in existence for hundreds of years, but it was 
the Eastman Kodak deal in July 1989, in which Eastman Kodak Co. handed over the 
management of its data centers to IBM Corp., that suddenly pushed outsourcing into the 
spotlight. During, the last 15 years outsourcing has developed to both an important business 
approach and a very popular strategic management initiative together with the growing 
interest of academics as well as other groups such as consultants and industry forums.
Recently published market surveys unanimously report outsourcing to be the bright spot in IT 
services for the years to come. Market research firm Gartner Group for example estimates the 
worldwide market for IT outsourcing to grow from 160 to 230 billion USD (from 2002 to 
2007) and the market for business process outsourcing to expand even stronger from 110 to 
175 billion USD in the same time frame (Caldwell and Young 2003). Also academics share 
this view (Lancelotti et al. 2003; Willcocks et al. 2004) and support the case of a market 
which is large and growing (Lancellotti et al. 2003), still requiring more research.
1.2. Related research
Outsourcing can be framed as a “make-versus-buy” decision facing a firm. In its generic form 
it has been studied in several settings. Outsourcing research traditionally addresses three 
major questions: (1) why a corporation should employ outsourcing as a strategic tool, (2) 
what to outsource and (3) how outsourcing should be conducted (e.g. contractual or 
relationship matters). The most current area of interest is the discussion of the possible 
implications of outsourcing.
However, the impact of outsourcing on the market value of the contracting companies has 
received only limited investigation. These event studies aim to extend the existing knowledge 
by adding the component of a neutral referee, the capital market. Furthermore, investigating
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The first serious academic event study related to the market reaction of outsourcing 
announcements was conducted by Hayes et al. (2000), who examined the market reaction of 
outsourcer to 77 IS outsourcing announcements between 1990 and 1997. They found a 
statistically significant positive market reaction for small and service firms but not for the 
whole sample. Since that there appears to have been only a few studies examining the market 
reaction of outsourcing announcements using event study methodology. These studies are 
often limited by small sample size, IS outsourcing focus, and narrow set of explanatory 
variables. The results reported by previous event studies have been mixed. Some have found a 
positive and significant association, while most have found a positive but insignificant 
relationship between outsourcing announcement and the market value of the outsourcer. 
Contractors’ market reaction has been examined only in two studies that are covered in this 
paper and the results are somewhat inconsistent. Gao (2005) found a statistically significant 
positive market reaction for contractors using the largest sample size so far, whereas Gellrich 
and Gewall (2005) found negative but insignificant reaction, when they studied outsourcing 
by financial institutions.
the market’s reaction to outsourcing related issues is critically important to business
managers, as protecting and increasing firm value is one of their key performance criteria.
1.3. Objective and contribution
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of announcing an agreement to outsource all 
or a portion (major) of a firm’s information system (IS) functions or electronic manufacturing 
services (EMS) on the capital market value of both the outsourcer and contractor. The current 
study complements and extends extant IS and manufacturing outsourcing research, as it 
integrates efficient market and capital market theory into ongoing investigations aimed at 
identifying the underlying determinants and implications of outsourcing decisions. Using an 
event study methodology, this Thesis investigates the abnormal market returns associated 
with information system and electronic manufacturing outsourcing announcements. 
Specifically, I will try to answer to two main questions: (1) Do outsourcing announcements 
affect the market value of the signing firms in terms of producing abnormal stock returns? (2) 
What factors explain the observed variance in the market reaction to outsourcing 
announcements?
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This study will contribute to the current stream of outsourcing event studies in at least three 
ways. First, the sample size of this study is significantly larger than in most of the previous 
studies, making it possible to test new variables and hypothesis potentially explaining the 
market reaction on outsourcing announcements. Secondly, I will study also the market 
reaction of the contractor, not just the outsourcer. Additionally I will test whether the 
combined entity (outsourcer and contractor) show statistically significant market reaction on 
outsourcing announcement in order to assess if the outsourcing is on a whole a positive or not, 
independent on the way the benefits are distributed between the two parties. Finally, this 
study will investigate also electronic manufacturing outsourcing announcements in addition to 
IT outsourcing and thus further expand the scope from the previous studies.
Evidence presented in this study indicates that outsourcing is a price sensitive event, 
particularly for the contractor, who experiences a significant wealth gain (percentually) from 
outsourcing. Accordingly, shareholders of the outsourcing firm experience only a small 
wealth gain (0,21 % to 0,46%) from outsourcing during the three-day period starting at the 
announcement day, whereas the shareholders of the contractors experience a much greater 
wealth gain (1,30% to 1,63%). Additionally, there appears to be a strong size effect in the 
percentage returns leading to negative dollar returns for outsourcers (-$270 million) and only 
slightly positive dollar return for ($18 million) contractors over the same three-day period. 
Therefore, it is concluded that outsourcing is not value adding per se but depends on the size 
of the outsourcer and contractor in addition to several other firm characteristics. These results 
are in line with earlier studies reporting positive but insignificant market reaction for the 
outsourcer (Hayes et al. 2001; Gao 2005). Additionally, Gao (2005) reported statistically 
significant positive reaction for contractor consistent with the findings of this study.
Significant differences exist with regard to the capital market’s reaction to outsourcing 
announcements among both outsourcers and contractors. Based on the statistical evidence it is 
concluded that investors appear to distinguish between the various deals and base their 
evaluation of the newly formed partnership on the deal characteristics rather than on general 
considerations regarding outsourcing. Consequently, the market value of outsourcing firms 
announcing electronic manufacturing and information systems outsourcing contracts is 
conditioned on the size, profitability and industry of the firm. Based on the statistical 
evidence, there is strong empirical support for the significance of these three variables. For
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smaller firms, market values are significantly positively impacted by the decision to outsource 
manufacturing or information technology, whereas for larger firms the impact is weaker. 
Outsourcing firms with high profitability appear to have better stock market reaction when 
compared to companies with lower profitability. Additionally the market values of financial 
institutions are more negatively affected by the outsourcing deal when compared to other 
firms. In addition to these three firm characteristics also the deal size and firm risk appeared 
to have an effect on the market reaction, although the empirical support is less consistent and 
somewhat mixed. The size effect found in this study supports the hypothesis that the value of 
the outsourcing deal is conditioned on the degree of information asymmetry existing in the 
market. According to this study the capital market placed a higher value on outsourcing 
announcement information for higher asymmetry firms (i.e. small firms). Similar size effect 
has been reported also by Hayes et al. (2001) and Gao (2005). The impact of outsourcing 
firm’s profitability on the market reaction has not been studied before and therefore the 
statistically strong result found in this study provides new insights into the capital markets 
reaction on outsourcing announcements. The hypothesis that higher agency costs of 
outsourcer would lead to more positive market reaction to outsourcing announcements does 
not receive any empirical support. Finally, the hypothesis related to the rationale for 
outsourcing, growth opportunities, type of announcement and contractor experience were not 
supported by the empirical evidence.
Similarly to the outsourcers, also among contractors there exist significant differences with 
regard to the capital market’s reaction to outsourcing announcements. Based on the statistical 
evidence the market reaction of contractor of information technology or electronic 
manufacturing outsourcing deal is strongly conditioned on the size of the outsourcer and on 
the size and structure of the outsourcing deal. The empirical support for the significance of 
these three variables is strong. The reliability of these findings is reinforced by the fact that 
the relationship between market reaction and contractor size and deal size were statistically 
highly significant both in Gao’s (2005) and in this study. The impact of outsourcing structure 
has not been studied earlier and therefore the significant positive impact of alliance structure 
found in this study is an interesting result warranting additional research to understand better 
the underlying mechanisms for this result.
This study also has limitations, which should be considered when interpreting the results and 
drawing conclusions. Some of these limitations are related to the event study methodology
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and some to the data gathering. One of the main challenges in applying event study 
methodology is the different information release possibilities as a result of rumours and 
varying disclosure patterns. This is particularly challenging when examining outsourcing 
announcements since there are no mandatory rules covering the disclosure of outsourcing 
contracts. For this reasons several event windows have been used. Main challenge with the 
data is that it will naturally be biased towards bigger deals due to the reliance on publicly 
available data and different news services. Nevertheless, these limitations are not considered 
to significantly undermine the value and applicability of the findings.
1.4. Structure of the study
The balance of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review of the most 
relevant empirical and theoretical research on outsourcing and make or buy decision. Chapter 
3 reviews the hypotheses that are examined in this thesis. Chapter 4 provides an overview of 
the data and methodology. Chapter 5 presents the results of the empirical work and analyses 
the interpretations of the findings. Chapter 6 concludes the paper with an overview of the 
central results and suggests potential avenues for further research.
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2. Literature review
2.1. Introduction to outsourcing
Outsourcing occurs when activities such as information technology (IT) management, finance 
and accounting services or manufacturing are switched from internal provision to provision 
by external contractor (Juma’h and Wood 2003). Usually outsourcing involves a long-term 
service contract that is less permanent than total disposal of an activity (Juma’h and Wood 
2003) According to Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) outsourcing, in its most basic form, can be 
conceived as the purchase of a good or service that was previously provided internally. 
Finally, according to Gellrich and Gewald (2005) outsourcing is generally defined as the 
transference to external parties the performance of functions otherwise administered in-house. It is 
an agreement in which one company contracts a part of its ongoing activity to another company.
What renews the interest especially in IS outsourcing and demands the attention today is the 
dramatic change in the scope. For example, early forms of IS outsourcing involved single 
system contracts comprising a small portion of the IS budget - payrolls, insurance processing, 
credit cards or mailing lists. Outsourcing has recently grown to span multiple systems; it now 
represents a significant transfer of assets, leases, and staff to a vendor that assumes profit and 
loss responsibility. A typical outsourcing arrangement of this type works like this: the vendor 
charges a fixed fee for a prespecified number of services know as the baseline. The customer 
is guaranteed that its IS costs for this baseline will be fixed over the contract duration, 
typically five to ten years. During the contract period services not included in the baseline 
may be purchased form the vendor for an excess fee. Deals are often sweetened with financial 
incentives, such as stock purchases, loans at low interest rates, and postponed payments. At 
the outset these deals may be extremely attractive, especially to an organization that suffers 
financially (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993).
2.2. Theories and Hypothesis in Connection with the 
Outsourcing Decision
Outsourcing can be framed as a “make-versus-buy” decision facing a firm. In its generic form 
it has been studied in several settings. Researchers have used interviews and questioners to 
study managers’ perceptions and motivations of outsourcing, what they choose to outsource
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and why they choose to outsource (McLellan et al. 1994; McLellan et al. 1995). There are 
also several purely theoretical papers discussing the possible determinants of outsourcing or 
vertical integration decision and these papers suggest several different economic and strategic 
reasons why firms outsource their operations. Some studies analyse specific outsourcing 
cases, such as the one of Continental Bank (Huber 1993). Some studies have used publicly 
available data regarding IS outsourcing announcements in order to test a model of the 
determinants of information technology outsourcing (Loh and Venkatraman 1992a; Loh and 
Venkatraman 1992b; Smith et al. 1998) whereas others have used information obtained by 
interviews and questioners in order to test the determinants of the manufacturing outsourcing 
(Lyons 1995; Walker and Weber 1984; Monteverde and Teece 1992; Lieberman 1991). The 
theoretical base of much of the research rests on Williamson’s models of transaction costs 
(Williamson 1979; 1985; 1989; 1991) and this theoretical structure has been used in a number 
of above-mentioned empirical studies exploring the characteristics of the companies choosing 
outsourcing (or in-house production). The Williamson’s model is explained later along with 
the introduction to its empirical testing. There appears to be only a few studies examining the 
market reaction on outsourcing announcements using event study methodology. These studies 
are often limited by small sample size, IT outsourcing focus, and narrow set of explanatory 
variables.
The studies on outsourcing can broadly be divided into four groups (Lee et al. 2000; Roy and 
Aubert 2002): the ones with an economic view, such as the Williamson’s transaction cost 
approach, the ones with social view, the ones with strategic management orientation and 
finally the ones with resource based view. Furthermore, one can classify the research 
according to the methodology, that is to say, the research can be divided into qualitative and 
quantitative studies. Economic, strategic and resource based views are presented in this study 
due to their use in the hypothesis formulation. In addition to the theory of vertical integration 
and outsourcing, two theories from the field of behavioural finance, sunk cost bias and hubris 
theory, are presented and linked to the outsourcing decision and later to hypothesis 
formulation. Behavioural finance introduces a new view to the discussion on outsourcing as 
the other views assume managers to always act rationally.
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2.2.1. Economic view
The issues surrounding outsourcing have been most frequently studied with the tools provided 
by organizational economics (Lyons 1995; Walker and Weber 1984; Monteverde and Teece 
1992; Lieberman 1991; Grossman and Hart 1986; Vining and Globerman 1999). These 
studies are based at least partially on the works of Williamson (Williamson 1979; Williamson 
1989). The main idea of these studies is that firms are more likely to outsource activities that 
are predictable and easy to measure. They also indicate that activities, which require the use 
of specific assets, should be managed in-house, in order to avoid the risk of lock-in with the 
supplier. The studies in this group are mainly concerned with the factors, which could lead to 
increased transaction costs i.e. contractual problems and reduce market efficiency. It is 
assumed that market i.e. outsourcing is the default position and if the market efficiency is 
reduced and the cost of using market (i.e. the cost of outsourcing) increase too much, the 
organization should vertically integrate. These approaches omit the strategic motivations and 
unique internal production considerations.
2.2.1.1. Transaction cost paradigm (Williamson’s model)
This section first introduces the transaction cost paradigm and then the empirical research 
related to this theory is presented. Finally, some extensions and contradicting or 
complementing views to Williamson’s model are presented.
Williamson (1979, 1985, 1989) develops so called ‘heuristic’ model for understanding the 
vertical boundaries of the firm i.e. the level outsourcing. His simplified model examines the 
make-or-buy decision for a fixed output of a component used in fixed proportions and made 
with a technology of exogenous asset specificity (k). Williamson’s model contains two 
different cost components, namely, governance cost difference (AG) between the bureaucratic 
costs of internal governance and the corresponding governance cost and the economies of 
scale or scope advantage (AC) of outsourcing as compared with in-house production. 
According to the model these two variables are both dependent on asset specificity (k). The 
governance cost is considered first. In the absence of specific assets (k=0), Williamson argues 
that market based organization is favored because high powered profit incentives, necessary 
to minimize costs and optimize innovation, cannot be fully preserved within a unified firm. 
On the other hand, if k>0, then assets are specific and, once such investments have been
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made, suppliers leave themselves vulnerable to opportunistic recontracting. As Williamson 
(1985, p.91) puts it: ‘market procurement is the preferred supply mode where asset specificity 
is slight - because of the incentive and bureaucratic disabilities of internal organization in 
production and cost control respect. But internal organization is favored where asset 
specificity is great, because a high degree of bilateral dependency exists in those 
circumstances and high-powered incentives impair the ease with which adaptive, sequential 
adjustments to disturbances are accomplished’. Although writing complex, contingent, long­
term contracts can mitigate this opportunism, this will be prohibitively costly in the presence 
of uncertainty (Williamson 1979). In addition to the cost of writing these contracts, hard 
contracting may well give rise to veridical disputes as changes in the states of world as 
ambiguous and not all contingencies for which adaptations are required can be anticipated 
(Williamson 1979). This may result in risk premium added to the price, or a failure to make 
the appropriate investments. Either way, as the costs of using the market rise, the 
organizational balance is moved in favor of in-house production. Thus AG is decreasing 
function of asset specificity, positive where asset specificity is low and negative where asset 
specificity is high.
A second line in Williamson’s argument is that market is able to aggregate demands, and so 
achieve economies of scale or scope, which are unavailable within the firm (Williamson 
1979; Williamson 1989). Importantly, this advantage for the market is also related to the asset 
specifity (k). Again, in the absence of specific assets, there is no constraint on the demand 
aggregation and this gives external production a considerable edge in achieving lower 
production costs. As technologies come become more specific, the aggregation of demands 
from different firms generates fewer savings. This analysis begs the question of why firms do 
not produce in-house and sell their excess supplies into market. However, the problem is that 
the market consists, at least partly, of downstream rivals, who fear opportunistic manipulation 
of their supplies (Lyons 1995). Thus AC, defined as the unit production cost difference for a 
given demand by the downstream firm, is a positive, decreasing function of k, asymptotically 
approaching zero.
Finally, the net cost of in-house production in the presence of economies of scale or scope is 
AG+AC and the critical level of asset specificity determining the make-or-buy decision, rises 
to kA, where AG+AC equals to zero.
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The basic implications of Williamson’s transaction cost theory have been tested in several 
settings. There is body of US evidence supporting the hypothesis that specific production 
technology correlates with in-house production (Anderson 1986; Monteverde and Teece 
1982). Lieberman (1991) assesses both transaction costs and demand variability as factors 
jointly deciding whether companies integrate backward or not. Walker and Weber (1984) 
tested transaction costs and two types of variability, demand and technological as possible 
factor affecting the make-or-buy decision. Finally, Lyons (1995) tests the interaction of 
economies of scale and specificity as a factor explaining the outsourcing decisions.
Both Anderson (1986) and Monteverde and Teece (1982) found empirical support for the 
transaction cost approach to the study of vertical integration. Andersen (1986) showed that 
high asset specificity, uncertainty, and their interaction were associated with the decision to 
sell through internal sales force rather than through independent marketing representatives. 
Monteverde and Teece (1982) studied component production by General Motors and Ford 
and found strong effect, in the predicted direction, of asset specificity on backward 
integration. They hypothesized that assemblers will integrate vertically when the production 
process, broadly defined, generates specialized nonpatentable know-how and are therefore 
exposed to the possibility of opportunistic recontracting. These two studies are focused on the 
asset specificity that is the degree to which the value of investment is tied to continuing trade 
between a particular pair of traders. The asset specificity is the key factor that makes 
transaction theory testable. Given that bounded rationality prevents the writing of complete, 
contingent contracts, in-house production may be the only way to protect transaction specific 
investments from opportunistic behaviour due to the lock-in effect. This focus on asset 
specificity, however, ignores a second important characteristic relevant to make-or-buy 
decision, namely, economies of scale or scope. The trade-off between asset specificity and 
economies of scale or scope is central to the transaction cost theory of vertical integration. 
Lyons (1995) studies the effect of economies of scale and scope in addition to asset 
specificity using interview data from 102 different UK engineering firms i.e. using cross- 
sectional data. He also studies the interaction between asset specificity and economies of 
scale. He finds out that the probability of buying-in specialised inputs is higher if the 
production technology is non-specific, but only if there are economies of scale or scope. 
Furthermore, the effect of economies of scale or scope is reduced in the presence of specific 
assets. These findings were consistent with Williamson’s transaction cost theory.
Walker and Weber (1984) tested the influence of transaction costs on the make-or-buy 
decision indirectly through the effects of supplier market competition and two types of 
uncertainties, volume and technological. In addition to these, the decisions were hypothesized 
to be predicted by both buyer production experience and the comparative production costs 
between buyer and supplier. Their data consisted of 60 decisions made in component division 
of a large U.S. automobile manufacturer over a period of three years. The results showed that 
comparative production costs are clearly the strongest predictor of make-or-buy decision and 
that both volume uncertainty and supplier market competition have small but significant 
effects. They used a structural equation system model and the direct effects of competition 
and buyer experience on make-or-buy decisions were proxies for the influence of transaction 
costs due to variations in asset specificity. Economies of scale was one of the main 
components explaining the comparative production costs. In general, the effect of transaction 
costs on make-or-buy decision was substantially overshadowed by comparative production 
costs.
Lieberman’s paper (1991) considers both the transaction costs and demand variability as 
possible factors affecting the make-or-buy decision at the level of individual plants and firms. 
His data consists of 34 US producers of chemical products. His results are consistent with the 
transaction cost theories and demand variability model, suggesting that both transaction costs 
and demand variability are both important determinants of integration in the chemicals 
manufacturing sector. Lieberman tested three hypotheses in relation to the likelihood of 
integration as implied by the transaction cost theory. The results support the hypothesis that 
firms integrate to avoid problems of lock-in that may arise from large sunk investments and 
the hypothesis that the larger the fraction of total cost represented by the input, the higher the 
probability of backward integration. Of the three demand variability hypothesis, only the one 
derived from the Carlton (1979) model was supported by the data: firms integrate backward 
when they encounter substantial variability in the input market that is uncorrelated with 
fluctuations in their own downstream market.
2.2.1.2. Extension on the transaction cost theory
Vining and Globerman (1999) provide a theoretical framework to be used in real and 
potentially complex firm’s outsourcing decisions. Their framework extends some of the key
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concepts of the Williamson’s transaction cost theory by further analysing the costs that arise 
with outsourcing and is therefore presented here. Vining and Globerman (1999) argue that 
three types of costs are relevant in the choice between internal production and outsourcing: 
production costs, bargaining costs, and opportunism costs, with the latter two being costs of 
governance (compare to transaction costs).
Production costs are either the costs of internal production or the direct purchase price. 
Bargaining costs are further divided into four categories: costs arising from negotiating 
contract details per se, the costs of negotiating changes to the contract in the post-contract 
stage due to unforeseen circumstances, the costs of monitoring the performance of the vendor 
and the costs of disputes which arise if neither party wishes to utilize pre-agreed resolution 
mechanisms. These bargaining costs arise when both parties are acting with self-interest, but 
in good faith (Williamson 1985; Vining and Globerman 1999). Since bargaining within 
organizations can also be costly (e.g. wages or internal transfer prices) it is the incremental 
bargaining costs of outsourcing that are relevant. Opportunism differs from bargaining costs, 
since opportunism costs arise when at least one party acts self-interestedly, but in bad faith. 
Opportunism is any behaviour by a party to a transaction designed to change the agreed terms 
of a transaction to be more in its favour. Opportunism is more likely in outsourcing contexts 
than in transactions within organizations, since the distribution of profit is more relevant in 
dealings between organizations. However, opportunism can also occur within organizations 
and therefore it is the incremental opportunism costs of outsourcing that are relevant. 
Furthermore, opportunism is usually considered to be more likely after the outsourcing.
Vining and Globerman (1999) argue that production costs may be lower with outsourcing for 
a number of reasons. This is consistent with Williamson’s model. First, it is argued that 
outside vendors could better achieve quality adjusted minimum efficient scale by selling to 
multiple outsourcing buyers. This is supported also by McLellan (1995) who found out that 
major rationale for the significant degree of IS outsourcing in banks is the inability to achieve 
minimum efficient scale in either installing, updating, or managing these systems. Second, 
there is a tendency for internal production units to act like monopolists and this reduces the 
comparative performance benchmarks for internal customers and the likelihood of efficiently 
priced goods (Vining and Globerman 1999). Third, firms can experience diseconomies of 
scope in management of multiple firm activities. This is linked to the idea of focusing on core 
competences and outsourcing other activities proposed by Prahalad and Hamel (1990).
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Fourth, internal production of an input may generate significant organizational externalities 
that can be reduced or eliminated by outsourcing. Vining and Globerman (1999) also provide 
some evidence from variety of sources that outsourcing can lower production although they 
mention that relatively little of the empirical evidence comes from contexts where firms 
outsource to other firms. Empirical studies concerning governments outsourcing to private 
suppliers tend to find production cost savings in the 20-30 per cent range, especially if 
competitive bidding is used (Walsh 1991). McLellan (1995) has also found out, when 
interviewing managers of US banks, that on average, 19% reduction in IT costs was achieved 
in the first year and this was expected to increase in subsequent years.
According to the framework of Vining and Globerman (1999) there are three major factors 
that are likely to determine the sum of bargaining and opportunism costs: product/activity 
complexity, contestability and asset specificity. This idea is strongly related to the 
Williamson’s original transaction cost theory and the effect of asset specificity on transaction 
costs and economies of scale. Product or activity complexity defines the degree of difficulty 
in specifying and monitoring the terms and conditions of a transaction. Vining and Globerman 
argue that products, services or activities can be divided into search goods, experience goods 
and post experience goods depending on when the price performance characteristics can be 
observed and this categorization can be linked to the product/activity complexity. The degree 
of product/activity complexity then determines largely: the uncertainty surrounding the 
contract, the potential for information asymmetry and the probability that there will be 
externalities that will affect the firm’s other activities, which are all factors that can raise both 
the bargaining and opportunism costs. As an example of empirical evidence of this effect 
Masten (1984) found that in the aerospace industry the more complex the components are the 
more likely they are produced internally than to be outsourced.
A contestable market is one where only a few firms are immediately available to provide any 
given service but many other firms would quickly become available if the price paid by the 
outsourcing firm exceeded the average cost incurred by contractées. The degree to which the 
activity being outsourced is contestable affects opportunism costs. If the market for the 
activity is contestable, opportunism is reduced at the contract stage and potentially also at the 
post-contract stage. Vining and Globerman (1999) also point out that contestability is also 
dependent on the capability of the firm to bring back the service back in-house if necessary.
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Asset specificity was the third determinant of the level of bargaining and opportunism costs 
and it has already been discussed earlier when Williamson’s model was presented. As already 
mentioned there is also extensive evidence suggesting that asset specificity reduces the degree 
of outsourcing.
In summary, the framework of Vining and Globerman (1999) complements and extends 
Williamson’s transaction cost theory by categorizing the transaction costs into bargaining and 
opportunism costs and by providing additional determinants (in addition to the asset 
specificity) on the level of these two components of transaction costs.
2.2.2. Strategic view
The studies with strategic view provide information on the strategic impact of outsourcing 
and how outsourcing can help firms reach their strategic goals. These studies consider the 
strategic implications of the outsourcing decisions, and their long-term impact on the firm. 
While the economic view, and especially the transaction cost theory, suggests that firms’ 
outsourcing decisions should be driven by singular focus on reducing the total cost of the 
activity, which is dependent on the economies of scope and transaction costs, the strategic 
view takes into account a broader set of factors.
McLellan et al. (1995) studied the motivations behind IS outsourcing and especially focused 
on the observation that IS outsourcing is taking place also within firms and industries where 
the IS functions have been considered core to the success of business. They argue that 
according to the popular alliance theories such as transaction cost theories and joint-venture 
alliance theory the firms should not outsource an activity if core competency would be lost. 
Therefore, they argue that several strategic motivations are needed to explain the management 
decision to outsource IS (in the contradictory stance of outsourcing core competency) even 
when it is considered core. More precisely, they found out that in addition to financial 
motivations the firms were undertaking IS outsourcing in order to gain competitive 
advantage, change the organizational boundaries, to restructure, to mitigate technological risk 
and uncertainty as well as to get access to new technologies, to manage IS departments better 
and to link business and IS strategy. Their sample consists of seven large outsourcing 
alliances in the banking industry, which they study using an in-depth case method and
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interviews. The banking industry was chosen since the contradictory stance of releasing core 
competency has been observed particularly in that industry (McLellan et al. 1995; Roy and 
Aubert 2002)
The results of McLellan et al. study showed that in addition to strategic motivations financial 
motivation definitely existed for firms which explored IT outsourcing as the financial 
motivation was expressed very strongly by all parties involved in the case studies. The 
financial savings in an outsourcing relationship represented a significant decrease in costs for 
the outsourcing company. On average, McLellan et al. found a 19% reduction in IT costs in 
the fist year. IT is very important skill in the financial sector, and therefore also an important 
expenditure, as it represents more than 8% of the non-interest costs of the studied companies. 
The average cost savings realized form the outsourcing arrangements were therefore 
estimated to result in an average profitability increase of more than 10%, which can be 
considered significant.
The strategic rationale for information technology outsourcing has also been studied 
empirically, using publicly available financial data, at least by Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) 
and Smith et al. (1998). In the following, a brief description of both is provided.
A major piece of work by Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) begins to offer an empirically 
supported framework for understanding why companies enter into IT outsourcing. They 
develop a model of the determinants of IT outsourcing and tested their model based on a 
sample of 55 companies (all large users of IT). Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) hypothesize 
that IT governance and outsourcing is dependent on the structural characteristics of the user 
organization, particularly business competence (business cost structure and business 
performance), business governance (financial leverage) and IT competence (IT cost structure 
and IT performance). Furthermore, they posit that lower IT and business competence lead to 
more IT outsourcing activities. The empirical results provided general support for their 
research model. Specifically, they found out that more IT outsourcing was occurring in 
organizations that had higher business costs, higher IT costs and lower IT performance. They 
also hypothesized that business performance and financial leverage might prompt companies 
to undertake IT outsourcing but did not find that these two factors were significantly related 
to more outsourcing activities.
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Smith et al. (1998) classified the drivers of IS outsourcing into five categories: cost reduction, 
focus on core competence, liquidity needs, IS capability factors and environmental factors. 
They seek empirical support for these key drivers by comparing the financial characteristics 
of firms that enter into large-scale IS outsourcing agreements with those of other firms in their 
respective industry prior to outsourcing. Their sample included only 29 outsourcing contracts 
between 1988 and 1994, which limits the reliability of the results. Their results indicate that 
outsourcing firms differ from their industry counterparts in two major ways. First, outsourcing 
firms have a significant cost focus, typically associated with high debt burden, declining 
growth rates and lower overhead expense ratio. Second, they have a greater need to generate 
cash, mainly due to high and maturing debt (future cash payments) and lower cash reserves. 
Based on these findings, Smith et al. (1998) concluded that firms enter into large-scale IS 
outsourcing announcements primarily to reduce costs and to generate cash. Furthermore, they 
found no evidence that outsourcing was a part of larger organizational effort to focus on core 
competencies.
The above mentioned empirical studies on the characteristics of outsourcing firms both 
conclude that firms having greater need to reduce costs are more prone for IS outsourcing. 
However, the individual findings are completely contrary. Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) 
found a positive and statistically significant relationship between cost structure (cost of goods 
sold and selling, general and administrative expenses divided by net sales) and the level of 
outsourcing, whereas Smith et al. (1998) found out that companies, which have outsourced 
their IS typically have lower overhead cost structure. Smith et al. explained that the lower 
overhead cost structure to be a direct evidence of cost focus. On the other hand, Loh and 
Venkatraman (1992a) state that a high level of business cost structure motivate a firm to 
review its overall cost structure, including the cost of its IS infrastructure. Both studies also 
examined the impact of financial leverage. Smith et al. (1998) found a positive correlation 
between the leverage of the company and outsourcing activity, whereas Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992a) did not. Other propositions and variables that were tested differed between these 
studies and thus further comparisons are not possible. All in all, it appears that these empirical 
studies support traditional economic considerations, i.e. cost reduction, as the major drivers of 
outsourcing decision, whereas more strategic and long-term objectives, such as focus on core 
competence were not supported. However, the results are not particularly reliable and 
extensive due to limited sample size and number of characteristics studied. Furthermore,
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many firm characteristics that may shed light on the motivations for outsourcing were only 
described indirectly, as the studies rely on publicly available financial data.
In another study, Venkatraman et al. (1992b), investigated the diffusion of IT outsourcing at 
an organizational level by using longitudinal data on the patterns of diffusion among 
outsourcing announcements. They found out that since the Kodak announcement to outsource 
the communication topics within the social system of the industry and the mimicking 
behaviours appeared to be increasing the rate and level of adoption of IT outsourcing.
2.2.3. Resource based view
The resource based (Roy and Aubert 2002) view on make-or-buy decision looks at the 
resources required to perform the activities and at the strategic value of these resources. It 
considers specific constraints associated with acquiring and maintaining strategic resources. 
The resource-based view provides an explanation to understand why firms do obtain strategic 
advantage and are able to keep it although in the world of perfect competition, there should be 
no competitive advantage. They give a framework to assess whether an activity should be 
kept within the firm or given to a supplier by focusing on the strategic resources that firms 
develop and nurture. The key elements on which this framework of resource-based theory is 
constructed are deviations from the perfect market environment. Resource based theory 
argues that, in many situations, three hypotheses of a perfect market are not met: the firms are 
constrained by their past choices (history matters), the resources are not perfectly mobile, and 
expertise is not easy to reproduce or imitate. Roy and Aubert argue that information systems 
sourcing decisions can be explained in relation to the resources the firm has in its possession 
and the strategic value of those resources as measured by the strategic value of the system 
itself. They theorized that it is the interplay between these two factors that will best explain 
why, under certain circumstances, a company will choose to keep the development of a highly 
strategic system in-house and why, under another set of circumstances, it will seek outside 
assistance. In a general way, from the perspective of the resource-based approach, the less the 
appropriate resources are present within the firm, the more the firm will seek to overcome this 
weakness by calling upon external expertise. External partners may be the only way to have 
access to the expertise, because of the relative immobility and the difficulty to imitate, as 
discussed above. On the other hand, the lower the strategic value of these resources, the more
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the company is justified in parting with them through outsourcing. Thus, Roy and Aubert 
argue that interactions between these two factors (presence of appropriate resources and 
strategic value), depending on whether they simultaneously take values located on a high-low 
continuum, should have a foreseeable impact on the sourcing mode chosen. Therefore their 
framework complements the economic view by introducing new non-economic, resource- 
based, dimensions to the make-or-buy decision. Roy and Aubert also argue that especially IT 
applications developed in banks are more likely to have strategic value, which is closely 
related to the view of McLellan et al. (1995, р.ЗОО) who argue that ‘the strategic reasons 
explain the contradictory stance of releasing a ‘core’ competency, which has been observed in 
the banking industry’ in their discussion of IS outsourcing. Furthermore, McLellan et al. 
theorized that alliance governance structure that is the base of many of the most 
comprehensive IT outsourcing relationships in banks made it possible to outsource IT even 
when it is considered core skill. This idea is fairly consistent with the framework of Roy and 
Aubert, since according to them, IT applications developed in financial institutions are more 
likely to have strategic value and should therefore be governed through partnership (i.e. 
outsourced in close co-operation with the outside supplier), in the case of low or medium 
presence of these resources.
2.2.4. Sunk cost bias
Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) present an idea that managers are inappropriately sensitive to 
the sunk costs inherent in most real-life outsourcing decisions, and may therefore 
underengage in outsourcing. They argue that in practice, outsourcing is not a make-or-buy 
decision, but involves a switch from internal production to external production. Due to this 
prior commitment to internal procurement the willingness to outsource is systematically 
reduced, relative to pure make-or-buy decision. They conducted a field experiment with 
managers of 156 health care organizations in Belgium, which supported their hypothesis.
According to standard investment analysis, any historical investments in a current make 
activity are to be treated as sunk costs since they incurred in the past, are not changed by 
today’s alternative actions, and should therefore be ignored. Only future and relevant cash 
flows should be taken into account. Research psychology, however, demonstrates that 
individual decision makers are not immune to sunk cost biases (Arkes and Blumer 1985).
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Sensitivity to these sunk costs often lead to perseverance or even escalation of normatively 
inappropriate courses of actions. These effects have been shown in tasks that are related to 
various business functions (Bazerman et al. 1982; Garland and Newport 1991). Therefore, 
Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) propose that presence of a sunk historical investment in the 
current make activity reduces the likelihood for outsourcing.
There are several potential reasons for the reluctance to engage in outsourcing. First, it has 
been recognized that the inclusion of sunk costs in a decision can result from information 
asymmetry within an organization where middle managers possess privately held information 
and have incentives to shirk (Harrell and Harrison 1994; Harrison and Harrell 1993; Kanodia 
et al. 1989). Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) argue that outsourcing decisions can be postponed 
for similar reasons: managers may have incentive to withhold or distort information that 
would favour outsourcing, thereby threatening their own power base within organization. 
Some reasons for the sunk cost bias are based on the individual psychology of the decision 
maker. Managers who have been responsible for the past make decisions may avoid 
outsourcing simply because it would create the appearance that they are trying to correct a 
prior mistake. These managers would be reluctant to create such an impression, either because 
they see it as a threat to their perceived competence by the other members of the organization 
(Brockner et al. 1981) or even because it would constitute a threat to their self esteem. 
Finally, Arkes and Blumer (1985) provide another different explanation to the sunk cost bias. 
Based on their empirical results, they hypothesized that many sunk cost biases may be 
explained by the mere desire not to be wasteful.
In summary, while some accounting researchers have argued that companies are overly 
committed to outsourcing and underestimate potential drawbacks that occur due to the 
transaction costs (Chalos 1995), Roodhooft and Warlop provide a different perspective since 
according to their results managers do take asset specificity into account and that they are 
even more conservative than they should be, by incorporating sunk costs as well.
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2.2.5. Hubris theory
In a classic study, Roll (1986) introduces the hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. In his 
study, Roll (1986) found that acquiring companies often perform worse than the market after 
a deal, and that the motivation for the purchase thus could not rationally be stock price 
appreciation. The hubris hypothesis is advanced as an explanation of corporate takeovers. 
According to Roll (1986) hubris on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms 
can explain why bids are made even when a valuation above the current market price 
represents a positive valuation error. Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much 
for their targets. This is a result of the fact that the exact amount of cost advantages and 
synergies are not known in advance of the deal but rather management estimations are 
distributed around the true amount. The ones that overestimate the savings and synergies are 
likely to bid more than others and even more than would be rationale. Therefore, part of the 
deals that come true are a result of upward bias by the decision makers of bidding firms, thus 
explaining the weak stock market performance after the deal.
In a similar way, companies and managers that decide to outsource do so partly as a result of 
upward bias in their estimates. Exact amount of outsourcing costs and benefits is difficult to 
assess in advance and therefore estimates can be considered to have a distribution around the 
true value. Again, managers and companies, that have overestimated the benefits from 
outsourcing are more likely to outsourcer their operations. Thus, part of the announced 
outsourcing contracts are a result of upward bias by the decision makers and not based on the 
true cost and other benefits, having implication on the market reaction. I assume that markets 
overall consider outsourcing to be value adding, when discussing the implications on the 
market reaction. If markets anticipate this type of hubris to exist, then the overall market 
reaction to outsourcing announcements should be less positive (or even negative) compared to 
case without hubris. In case markets do not anticipate hubris to exist, the market reaction at 
the announcement event will not be impacted by possible irrational behaviour of companies 
and managers but rather the performance of the outsourcer after the deal will depend on the 
true economics of the contract.
It could be argued that the same hubris applies also to the contractors and their management. 
In a similar way, contractors try to assess the costs and revenues of the potential outsourcing
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deal before committing to it. If they underestimate the costs of the deal they may assign too 
low price for their services thus benefiting the outsourcer. In a way, hubris on contractors’ 
side offsets outsourcers’ hubris. However, contractors are likely to possess informational 
advantage over the outsourcers, when assessing the true costs of the outsourcing deal. The 
assessment of outsourcing related costs and designing outsourcing contracts is contractor’s 
main business and they have a lot of experience from these activities. Additionally, 
contractors are assessing the costs of functions/operations that are core to them, whereas in 
many cases outsourcers consider these to be support functions. As a result contractor’s 
estimates are likely to have lower standard deviation compared to the outsourcer. 
Consequently, I assume that outsourcers’ hubris is dominant.
2.2.6. Summary of theories explaining the make or buy decision
The above section describes earlier studies related to the question, why firms outsource. The 
discussion starts with the description of the classic Williamson’s transaction theory. His 
simplified model examines the make-or-buy decision by focusing on reducing the total cost of 
the activity, which is dependent on two variables: the economies of scale and scope and 
transaction costs. Next, empirical tests supporting Williamson’s theory are presented. After 
this, some complementing and to some extent contradicting views to Williamson’s model are 
discussed. Firstly, the paper by Vining and Globerman (1999) is presented as it extends 
Williamson’s transaction cost theory by categorizing the transaction costs into bargaining and 
opportunism costs and by providing additional determinants on the level of these two 
components of transaction costs. Then, resource based view on outsourcing decision is 
introduced. Roy and Aubert (2002) developed a framework, which complements the 
economic view by introducing new non-economic, resource-based, dimensions to the make- 
or-buy decision. Finally, two theories from the field of behavioural finance are presented and 
linked to the outsourcing decision. The basis for behavioural finance theories is the 
assumption that managers and corporate decision makers are not always rational, thus 
impacting their decision making process. Therefore, behavioural finance introduces a new 
view to the discussion on outsourcing as the other views assume managers to always act 
rationally. First, sunk cost bias and its implications to the decision to outsource is discussed. 
This discussion is based on the ideas of Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) saying that managers 
are inappropriately sensitive to the sunk costs inherent in most real-life outsourcing decisions,
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and may therefore underengage in outsourcing. Secondly, hubris theory by Roll (1986), which 
was originally used to explain corporate acquisitions, is presented. Hubris theory has not 
previously been discussed as a driver of outsourcing. Nevertheless, the main idea of hubris 
applies to any major corporate decision with uncertain benefits and costs and is thus discussed 
here in connection with outsourcing decision. These theories are later used when developing 
hypothesis on the overall market reaction of outsourcing announcement. Additionally, they 
are used to formulate more specific hypothesis related to the magnitude of the market 
reaction.
2.3. Studies with evidence on shareholder wealth effects
There appears to be only a few studies examining the market reaction of outsourcing 
announcements using event study methodology. Additionally, these studies are often limited 
by small sample size, IS outsourcing focus, and narrow set of explanatory variables. 
Typically, these studies have focused on two questions: (1) Do outsourcing announcements 
affect the market value of the firm in terms of producing abnormal stock returns? (2) What 
factors explain the observed variance in the market reaction to outsourcing announcements? 
With respect to the first question, the results reported by previous event studies have been 
mixed. Some have found a positive and significant association, while others have found an 
insignificant relationship between outsourcing announcement and the market value of a firm. 
The second question typically attempts to explain the inconsistent impact of outsourcing 
announcements on investors’ reactions. In the following I highlight the most important ones 
and give a brief summary of their key findings and conclusions.
Hayes et al. (2000) examine the market reaction to 77 IS outsourcing announcements between 
1990 and 1997. Their study provides evidence that the market values of firms are positively 
affected by IS outsourcing announcements. In their study they had two main hypotheses. 
First, they hypothesized that the impact of IS outsourcing announcements will have a greater 
positive impact on the market values of smaller firms than on the market values of larger 
firms, due to the information asymmetry between these two groups of firms. Announcements 
made by small firms are expected to yield a greater market response because of the bigger 
surprise they generate. Small firms tend to be followed less closely by the media and analysts 
than are large firms, so there is less public information available about small firms. Second,
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the impact of IS outsourcing announcements will have a greater positive impact on the market 
values of service firms than on the market values of non-service firms. According to Hayes et 
al. the two reasons for this are information asymmetry between service and non-service firms, 
due to the inability of the financial-reporting systems to capture many factors important to 
service industry, and the fact that service firms allocate a higher proportion of their resources 
to information technology. Therefore, they argue that the market should place greater values 
on outsourcing announcements related to service firms. Hayes et al. (2000) do not give a 
detailed explanation on the reasons why higher proportion of IS investments should lead to 
stronger positive reaction to outsourcing announcements. However, they mention greater 
economies of scale and scope offered by IS outsourcing as one of the factors. 
Counterhypothesis for this could be that since service firms typically allocate a higher 
proportion of their resources to information technology, they have less to gain from 
outsourcing, e.g. due to larger existing internal economies of scale. Additionally, they do not 
include deal size into their regression model, although this could potentially have an impact 
on the size and sign of the market reaction. Since service firms allocate higher proportion of 
their resources to information technology they are likely to have larger outsourcing contracts. 
Therefore, it is possible that the service firm dummy that Hayes et al. (2000) use acts as a 
proxy for the deal size, at least partly explaining the results obtained.
Their study provides evidence that the market values of firms are positively affected by IS 
outsourcing announcements, although this reaction is dependent on the size and industry of 
the firm. For a one-day window, including only the day after the announcement day, there are 
statistically significant positive abnormal stock returns for both small firms and service firms 
but not for the whole sample. For a two-day event window, including the announcement day 
and the next day, there is no statistically significant stock price changes of outsourcers for the 
whole sample, but weakly significant positive stock returns for small firms exists. Finally, 
their multivariate regressions provide further support of the size and industry impact on 
outsourcer’s announcement period abnormal returns.
A more recent study by Juma’h and Wood (2003) examines the sample of 84 business service 
outsourcing announcements made by UK quoted companies between 1991 and 1997. They 
hypothesized that the market reaction of business process outsourcing announcements should 
be positive as a result of two main factors. Firstly, business service outsourcing 
announcements are one of the few signals a management can give to demonstrate that
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activities failing to cover their opportunity cost will be eliminated. Secondly, as outsourcing 
announcements are increasing rapidly, the contractors are continuously building scale and 
scope advantages to increase their competitiveness against in-house production. In their study, 
Juma’h and Wood (2003) concluded that initial announcements tend to enjoy positive and 
significant reaction based on significant excess returns for most time windows before the 
announcement (including the announcement day), consistent with the findings of Hayes et al. 
(2000). They also studied the effect of multiple announcements and found out that the mean 
excess returns across the total sample and most event windows were positive, though 
insignificant.
Juma’h and Wood (2003) also tested if the stock market reaction is influenced by the size of 
the outsourcer and the industry classification. Specifically, they divided the data into larger 
and smaller companies and found out that the larger companies in the sample show a more 
positive reaction than smaller companies. In this respect, their findings were contradictory 
with the findings of Hayes et al. (2000). They hypothesized the difference to be due to two 
reasons. Firstly, investors react more favourably to the outsourcing announcements of larger 
companies, since these companies have more power when negotiating with the service 
suppliers and are therefore able to obtain better contract. Secondly, outsourcing 
announcements of larger companies include more detailed information that may also increase 
the investors’ positive reaction to these outsourcing announcements. They did not found solid 
indication that stock market reacts differently for financial and non-financial outsourcing 
companies announcements.
Juma’h and Wood (2003) also draw interesting conclusions on the signalling effect of the 
outsourcing announcements based on comparison of the market reaction and deal value. They 
found out that market reaction (in percentages of the market value) is higher than the total size 
of the deal in most of the event windows before the announcement. According to Juma’h and 
Wood (2003) this supports the intuition that outsourcing announcements signal to 
shareholders that shareholder value maximization is overriding managerial objectives related 
to firm size and employment.
Oh and Gall ivan (2003) examined the market reaction to 97 IT outsourcing announcements 
between 1998 and 2001. Their study uses stock market reactions to assess various risks 
associated with IT outsourcing. They also studied the overall market reaction to IT
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outsourcing announcements. Specifically, they test the extent to which sources of IT 
outsourcing transaction risks, including asset-specificity, resource dependency, technological 
discontinuity and performance monitoring, influence investors’ reactions to IT outsourcing 
announcements. They used deal size as a proxy for the resource dependency and deal length 
for technological discontinuity. Asset specificity is based on the transfer of patented 
technologies or other proprietary innovations. They also assumed that outsourcing decisions 
aiming to cut costs or improve operational efficiency is relatively easier to monitor relative to 
outsourcing decisions based on revenue enhancing opportunities.
Their results provided only weak evidence (at the 10% significance level) with respect to 
investors’ positive reaction to IT outsourcing announcements using two-day event window 
(including announcement day and the day after that). Further analysis revealed that asset 
specificity and the size of the contract are negatively correlated with investors’ reactions as 
measured by cumulative abnormal returns of the stock price. However, contract duration and 
cost cutting focus were not significantly associated with the market reaction.
Gao’s (2005) study of outsourcing transactions has so far the largest sample size of all the 
outsourcing event studies. Gao (2005) examined the market reaction of 341 outsourcing 
transactions of US firms between 1990 and 2003. Contrary to the most of the previous 
studies, he examined also contractors’ market reactions to outsourcing announcements. 
Furthermore, he included also other types of outsourcing transactions in addition to the IT 
outsourcing transactions, which have been the focus in all the above mentioned studies.
The results from Gao’s (2005) study are consistent with his hypothesis, i.e. for outsourcers as 
a group, there are no statistically significant value changes around event announcement days. 
However, when the outsourcers are grouped into sub samples statistically significant 
abnormal returns are found. Specifically, Gao (2005) divides outsourcers into high Q and low 
Q groups, and found out that there is statistically significant positive abnormal returns of 
1.21% for the low Q client firms at the 5% level on contract announcement day, and 1.28% 
positive abnormal returns at the 5% significant level around the two-day window, whereas 
high Q client firms do not experience significant value changes. This result suggests that the 
stock market is surprised at the contract announcements of low Q firm sub-sample, which is 
consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. These findings are consistent with Hayes et al. 
(2000), who did not find statistically significant market reaction for the full sample as well.
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Gao (2005) also used multivariate regression analysis to test whether the size of the 
outsourcer, contractor, deal or the year are associated with the market reaction. He found out 
that that the outsourcer’s size is significantly negatively related to the excess returns, again 
consistent with the findings of Hayes et al. (2000). The other variables did not show any 
significant results.
Additionally, Gao (2005) studied the impact of outsourcing transactions on the contractor 
firm. He hypothesized that the outsourcing announcements have a positive impact on the 
market value of the contractor, since winning an outsourcing contract is a sign of contractor’s 
competitiveness and can also indicate rise in future profits. Consequently, contractors of 
finalized deals experienced significantly positive excess returns. And these value gains were 
significantly positively related to the size of the deal and negatively related to the size of the 
contractor. According to Gao (2005), these findings provide evidence that signing an 
outsourcing contract generates value gains for the contractor.
Gellrich and Gewald (2005) analyze a sample of 162 outsourcing transactions between 1997 
and 2004 in order to investigate the drivers of excess returns to shareholders of outsourcers 
and contractors in the global financial services industry. However, the sample size in the 
multivariate cross sectional regression analysis is only 60, due to difficulties in obtaining 
financial data of the companies. They focus on the financial services industry and extend their 
sample to the full scope of strategic outsourcing options also including application 
maintenance or business process outsourcing. Similar to Gao (2005) they study the impact of 
the outsourcing announcement on both the outsourcer and contractor. According to their 
study, shareholders earn, on average, slightly negative (but mainly no significant) returns in 
most of the analyzed event windows for both the outsourcers and contractors. These results 
differ from above mentioned related findings, which mainly report positive cumulated 
abnormal returns. However, the results are not fully comparable due to the industry focus and 
extension of outsourcing type.
Similar to Oh and Gall ivan (2003), Gellrich and Gewald (2005) also examined the 
relationship of several outsourcing risk related factors and the market reaction. These factors 
are: deal size, deal length, deal complexity (multi-vendor relationships), experience of the 
service provider, transaction focus and financial reliability of the outsourcer. Their results 
support two of the initial hypothesis. First, for the deal length their analysis yields a
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significant negative coefficient for the outsourcers. It appears that for outsourcers, investors 
do not approve long deals, in line with their expectations of higher risk with long contracts. 
Second, outsourcers engaging in partnerships with experienced service providers are 
significantly rewarded by capital markets. This result supports their hypothesis that 
experience, counted as number of past deals, can be viewed as an appropriate proxy for risk- 
reducing qualities and abilities. This implies that the stock markets react in a conservative 
way if it comes to large and risky projects such as outsourcing engagements. These results are 
both unique as these variables have not been tested in other studies and/or no significant 
relationship have been found.
There are also non-academic studies that relate outsourcing to shareholder values. For 
example, Classman (2000) examined 27 companies which undertook large information 
technology outsourcing initiatives between 1993 and 1999. Focus of this study was on IT 
mega deals as deals were included if their contract value was worth at least 2% of the 
company’s market value prior to the press release. He found an average excess return of 5.7 
per cent over the general market trend from two months prior to two months after the 
announcement. Classman concluded that outsourcing creates value to shareholders as 
outsourcing has become a management technique that can reduce risk and increase flexibility 
by making costs variable. Albright (2003) built on the study provided by Classman. The 
research timeframe was extended to cover a data set of 45 mega deals from 1993 to 2002. 
Similar to the Classman’s study, Albright concluded that outsourcing has a positive effect on 
shareholder value. Additionally, he concluded that selective outsourcing is the superior 
strategy. The fact that the event windows were fairly long in these studies, impairs the 
reliability of the results as there can be several other transactions and events having impact on 
the market value besides the outsourcing announcement.
There has been only a few other event studies on outsourcing besides the ones described 
above and all of these studies had very limited sample size. The results of these studies are 
mostly consistent with the positive excess returns associated with the outsourcing 
announcements. McLellan (1994) analysed the stock market reaction of 30 outsourcing 
announcements during 1985 to 1990 by US companies and found a substantial positive excess 
return on the day of the outsourcing announcement but with no excess returns before or after 
the announcement day. The positive stock market reaction was confirmed by Loh (1992), in 
the examination of stock market reactions to information system announcements in a sample
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of 55 US companies. He applied a 10-day window to examine the market reaction, reflecting 
the uncertainty on the time when the outsourcing news was actually received by the market. 
However, contrary to the above mentioned studies, Peak (1994) examined the effects of 14 
US Fortune-500 announcements of information system outsourcing and found negative 
cumulative abnormal returns. In addition they found out that the implied volatility in stock 
option prices showed increased volatility subsequent to the announcement.
Following table 1 summarizes the key hypothesis and findings of the previous event studies 
on outsourcing announcements.
Table 1. Summary of prior outsourcing announcement event studies
This table summarizes previous event studies related to outsourcing announcements. The 
table lists the authors, focus and main findings of the study as well as the explanatory 
variables used in the study showing both hypothesis and actual results for each variable.




outsourcers on Statistically significant positive reaction for small 
firms and service firms but 
not for the whole sample





service firms (1) vs. 
others (0) Statistically not significant






positive reaction for the 
whole sample (using initial 
announcements), large 
companies had stronger 
positive reaction
Size of the outsourcer + Statistically significant




Market reaction of Only weak evidence with 
respect to investors' positive 
reaction on outsourcing
Asset specificity, specific 
(1) vs. non-specific (0) Statistically significant
Deal size - - Statistically highly significant2003 announcements of IT 
outsourcing Deal length
- + Statistically not significant
Cost focus, cost focus (1 ) 
vs.others (0) + Statistically not significant
Outsourcer Positive but 
statistically insignificant Size of the outsourcer Statistically significant
Market reaction of 
outsourcers and
reaction for the whole 
sample, low Q firms had 
statistically significant 
positive reaction
Size of the contractor + Statistically not significant
contractors on Deal size + Statistically not significant
Gao 2005 announcements of 
all types of 
outsourcing
Year Statistically not significant
Contractors: Statistically 
significant positive reaction 
for the whole sample
Size of the outsourcer - Statistically not significant
Size of the contractor - Statistically highly significant
Deal size + Statistically highly significant
Year - Statistically not significant
Deal size - + Statistically weakly significant
Deal length - - Statistically weakly significant
Outsourcer: Slightly negative 
but insignificant reaction for 
the whole sample
Deal complexity, multi- 
vendor (1) vs. single 
vendor (0) Statistically significant
Service provider 
experience (number of 
deals) Statistically significant




non-core (1) vs. core (0) + Statistically not significant
Gellrich and
Financial performance of 
contractor + + Statistically not significant
Gewall 2005 announcements of IT 
or business process 
outsourcing
Deal size - - Statistically weakly significant
Deal length - + Statistically not significant
Contractor: Slightly negative 
but insignificant reaction for 
the whole sample
Deal complexity, multi­
vendor (1) vs. single 
vendor (0) Statistically not significant
Service provider 
experience (number of 
deals) Statistically weakly significant
Non-core outsourcing,
non-core (1) vs. core (0) + + Statistically highly significant
Financial performance of 
contractor + ♦ Statistically not significant
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3. Hypothesis
The structure of the hypotheses part of this study follows the structure of the methodology. In 
summary, the methodology is the following. First, the event-study method is used to obtain an 
assessment of the outsourcer’s and contractor’s market reaction to an announcement to 
outsource all or portion of firm’s IT or electronic manufacturing functions. Second, in order to 
gain further insight into the nature of the capital market response to the outsourcing 
announcement, a set of sub-samples based on various characteristics associated with the 
outsourcing event and the outsourcing or contracting firm are constructed. Finally, the effect 
of these characteristics on the market reaction is considered simultaneously by using 
multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis of the announcement period returns. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis to be developed and tested is that the cumulative abnormal 
return in a given window is significantly different from zero for the outsourcer, contractor and 
combined entity separately. After that, in the following paragraphs the different hypotheses 
on the effect of the firm and outsourcing event characteristics on the market reaction are 
developed and presented. The hypotheses are developed and presented separately for 
outsourcer and contractor (and combined entity).
3.1. Aggregate sample hypotheses
The first hypothesis to be developed and tested is that the cumulative abnormal return in a 
given window is significantly different from zero for the outsourcer, contractor and combined 
entity separately. There are several different factors already covered (at least partly) in the 
earlier part of this study that indicate that the outsourcing creates value. The most consistent 
of these factors are economies of scale and scope, importance of core competencies, 
flexibility, and cost reduction. These factors are documented in the literature as sources of 
value creation in outsourcing and most of them are typically explicitly stated as a reason for 
outsourcing in the announcements studied for this study. The above mentioned benefits of 
outsourcing are directly linked to the costs and revenues of the outsourcer and thus the effect 
on the market value is explicit. There is, however, also a signalling value embedded in the 
outsourcing announcement, which further increases the likelihood that the outsourcing 
announcement is taken as positive news by the markets. Since outsourcing announcement are 
one of the few direct signals a management can give to demonstrate to shareholders that they
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are maximizing the firm value by disposing activities failing to cover their cost of capital, the 
announcements are expected to have strong signalling value. Although companies are 
expected to systematically structure their activities in view of comparisons of internal costs 
with an equivalent supply from an external vendor, agency and managerial objectives arise 
and thus shareholders cannot be certain that such an assessment has taken place until 
outsourcing event occurs. In addition to all the above mentioned factors and theories also the 
sunk cost bias, discussed in the literature part of the study, indicate that the outsourcing is a 
value creating event. Since most of the determinants of IT and manufacturing outsourcing 
have the potential to create value for the firm, the outsourcing decision should be salient to 
the market. Furthermore, because IT and manufacturing outsourcing agreements are not 
reflected in historical accounting information, the announcements of such outsourcing 
decisions should bring new information to the market.
There are, however, some factors and theories that challenge the value adding role of an 
outsourcing decision, such as the hubris theory, already discussed in the literature part. Firms 
may also use outsourcing simply to realize resources that allow them to maintain existing 
value reducing activities. Furthermore, since there are no mandatory rules covering the 
disclosure of outsourcing announcements the date of a voluntarily outsourcing announcement 
at best sets the last date at which information became public and it is possible that some 
information regarding the outsourcing event has already earlier been delivered to the market. 
For these reasons it is expected positive relationship (if any) of the outsourcing announcement 
and market value reaction is going to be rather weak for the outsourcer. Therefore two-tailed 
tests have been used. However, for the contractor the positive market reaction is anticipated to 
be stronger than for the outsourcer, due to the fact that many of the factors challenging the 
value-adding role for the outsourcer favour the contractor (e.g. hubris theory).
Based on the above discussion, following is hypothesized:
HI (outsourcer): The mean cumulative abnormal return for the aggregate sample of 
outsourcing firms is significantly different from zero
HI (contractor): The mean cumulative abnormal return for the aggregate sample of 
contractors is significantly different from zero
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Hl (combined entity): The mean cumulative abnormal return for the aggregate sample of 
combined entities is significantly different from zero
3.2. Firm and event characteristics related hypotheses
In the following paragraphs the different hypotheses on the effect of the firm and outsourcing 
event characteristics on the market reaction are developed and presented. The hypotheses are 
presented separately for outsourcer and contractor. As already discussed, the investor reaction 
to IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements might vary according to the context due 
to differences in firm and/or outsourcing event characteristics. In another words, cost, revenue 
and signaling effect implications of the outsourcing announcement may differ depending on 
the context, due to firm and/or outsourcing event characteristics. Cost, revenue and signaling 
effect are three separate mechanisms through which the outsourcing announcement will affect 
the market value of a firm. Depending on the characteristic in question, it may have an effect 
on the market reaction through one, two or all of these mechanisms, making it in some cases 
difficult to distinguish what the true underlying reason is. In order to consider various firm 
characteristics several firm characteristics have been chosen. The characteristics have been 
chosen for various reasons based on previous studies or theories developed in this study and 
presented later in this chapter. Also market-to-book ratio and firm risk (approximated by the 
variability of daily stock returns) have been chosen as Fama and French (1992) have found 
that stock markets returns are influenced by these factors. These variables are widely accepted 
in finance and accounting to represent key firm characteristics that mediate market reactions. 
In addition to the firm characteristic variables, we consider several outsourcing event 
characteristic variables based on the extant literature and theories developed in this study in 
order to more precisely determine their impacts on market reaction. The firm and outsourcing 
event characteristic variables are articulated and hypotheses developed in the following 
paragraphs.
Table 3 provides a summary of the hypothesis by listing them together with the corresponding 
variables that are used for testing.
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Profitability of the outsourcer
One determinant of information technology or manufacturing outsourcing is the immediate 
reduction of costs to remain competitive. While reducing costs might positively impact a 
firm’s value in the short-term, it may not enhance firm value in the long term, especially if the 
outsourcing strategy is solely aimed at reducing costs (Bettis et al 1992; Dess et al. 1995; 
Quinn et al. 1990). The rationale behind this conclusion is that the drive to cut costs may 
cause a firm to indiscriminately outsource information technology or manufacturing 
functions. In another words, the firm is less likely to separate nonvalue-added functions from 
value-added core competency functions that should remain in the firm. Consequently, if the 
market determines that the firm is outsourcing IT or manufacturing function as a way to 
immediately reduce costs and deems that this tactic will not have a positive impact on the 
cash flows on a long term basis, it is unlikely that the market value will be positively affected. 
Additionally, it is hypothesized that firms profitability will correlate with the probability that 
a company is outsourcing IT or manufacturing solely to immediately reduce costs. That is to 
say, companies with low or negative profitability are more likely to outsource functions in 
order to immediately reduce costs than companies with high profitability. Therefore, the 
profitability level of a company should have a significant effect on how the market reacts to 
an outsourcing announcement by the company. Based on the above discussion following is 
predicted:
H2: The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have better impact on the market values of firms that have high 
profitability than on firms with low or negative profitability.
Outsourcing deals are often sweetened with financial incentives, such as stock purchases, 
loans at low interest rates, and postponed payments (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). At the 
outset these deals may thus be extremely attractive, especially to an organization that suffers 
financially. This can increase the likelihood of financially weak companies deciding on deals 
based on its short-term implications with less emphasis in long-term value enhancement. This 
would be an additional supporting argument for the hypothesis developed above.
A possible counter-hypothesis for H2 is based on an idea that companies with low or negative 
profitability are more likely to have IT and manufacturing functions that are not optimally
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managed and thus not cost competitive. This would therefore indicate that the lower the 
profitability of the firm is the more potential there is to reduce the cost by outsourcing the 
high cost functions. On the other hand it could also be argued that a company that is already 
very efficient is more likely capable to harvest the maximum benefits from an outsourcing 
decision, while an inefficient company has more potential for the contractor.
Size of the outsourcer/contractor
According to capital market theory, an efficient market attaches value to a firm based on 
publicly available information. Therefore, when information is not available, the valuation of 
the firm becomes more difficult and costly process. Furthermore, prior research indicates that 
the amount of publicly available information is not equal for firms of all sizes. Consequently, 
uneven costs and information asymmetry are imposed between large and small firms. Past 
research indicates that financial accounting information is more value-relevant for small firms 
than it is for large firms due to the information asymmetry (Atiase 1985 and Grant 1980). As 
a result of closer following by media and analysts, there is more public information about 
large companies than small companies between releases of financial accounting reports. 
Similarly to financial accounting information, it is expected that also nonfmancial forward 
looking information having the potential to impact future cash flows will be more available 
for large firms than small firms. As a result, announcements made by small firms that might 
impact future cash flows are expected to yield greater market reaction since such 
announcements have more value for investors valuing the small firm stocks. Furthermore, 
before making IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements available to public, it is likely 
that managers of large firms have already informed analysts that they are investigating the 
outsourcing option (Hayes et al. 2000). Based on this information asymmetry argument, 
related to firm size, following is predicted:
H3 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have greater impact on the market values of smaller firms than 
on the market values of larger firms
H3 (contractor): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have greater impact on the market values of smaller contractors 
than on the market values of larger contractors
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A secondaiy factor, which would also support hypothesis 3, is related to the relative size of 
the outsourcing announcement. Given that there are both a small and a large firm committing 
to outsource a similar function of similar size, the market may perceive that the relative 
magnitude of the direct benefits available to the small firm is greater than in the case of the 
large firm due to the fact that the long-run percentage of costs saved or revenue increased will 
be greater for the small firm.
Similarly, supporting argument for the hypothesis 3, is the fact that smaller firms should have 
more to gain from outsourcing as the economies of scale that the contractor can provide 
should benefit the small firm more than a large firm.
A counter-hypothesis for H3 could be that larger firms may have more power in negotiating 
with the contractors and therefore obtain a better contract than smaller companies. This would 
lead to inverse relationship compared to what is hypothesized above.
Size of the contractor
Larger contractors are able to negotiate a larger share of potential savings than small 
contractors due to more power in negotiating with outsourcer and may therefore obtain a 
better contract than smaller companies. Following this rationale of relative negotiation power, 
it is expected that:
H4 (outsourcer): The market’s reaction to IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements 
will be inversely related to the size of the contractor
Industry classification
Prior research indicates that service firms and especially financial service firms allocate a 
higher portion of their resources to information technology than do non-service firms (Gordon 
et al. 1993; Roach 1988). Study by Quinn and Baily (1994) found that the compound annual 
growth rate for IT investments by the service industry was 14 percent during the decade of the 
1980 and for financial service firms that figure was even significantly higher, averaging 29.5 
percent annually. Furthermore, Bureau of Economic Analysis data show that approximately
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60 percent of all computer equipment investments are made by the service sector (Hayes et al. 
2000). Approximately 42 percent of capital investments in the financial service industry were 
for information technology assets in 1998 (Reynolds 1999). Finally, as already discussed in 
the theoretical part, McLellan et al. (1995) showed IT is a very important skill in the financial 
sector, and therefore also an important expenditure, as it presents more than 8% of the non­
interest costs of the studied companies. Additionally, Roy and Aubert (2002) argue that 
especially IT applications developed in financial service firms are more likely to have 
strategic value, which is closely related to the view of McLellan et al (1995). Therefore, it 
could be argued that IT represents a core activity in the financial service firms rather than 
being a support function (at least to a larger extent than in other companies). In essence, this 
industry variable serves then as a proxy for a firm’s degree of information intensity. 
Consequently, it is expected that IT outsourcing will have a greater effect on the cost structure 
and revenues of a financial service firm compared to other firms due to the higher degree of 
information intensity in financial service firms. Based on the above discussion following is 
anticipated:
H5 (outsourcer): The announcement to contract all or portion of a firm’s IT functions will 
have a greater impact on the market values of financial service firms than on the market 
values of other firms
A secondary factor, which would also support hypothesis 5, is related to the information 
asymmetry. Flannery (1986) indicates that relatively greater information asymmetry exists 
among investors for financial institutions and other industries with poor external 
documentation. Therefore, the announcement of forward-looking strategic information for 
firms in the financial services industry has the potential to decrease information asymmetry 
and allow for proper market valuation.
Outsourcing type
Since outsourcing is one of a few direct signals a management can give to demonstrate to 
shareholders that activities that are not able to cover their cost of capital will be disposed, the 
signalling effect of such an announcement is expected to be significant. Furthermore, this 
signalling effect is predicted to be the stronger the closer to the core the outsourced activities 
are since then the signal related to the lack of agency costs is higher as is likely to be the
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impact of the outsourcing on the bottom line. In this study it is assumed that following 
Porter’s (1985) value chain concept, the manufacturing function is a core activity, whereas in 
many industries information technology is regarded a support function. Therefore, 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements should carry a stronger signalling value compared 
to IT outsourcing announcements. Thus, following is predicted:
H6 (outsourcer): The announcement to contract all or portion of a firm’s manufacturing 
functions will have a better impact on the market value compared to the announcement to 
contract all or portion of a firm’s IT functions
Deal size
The monetary size of the contract is expected to play a role in determining the level of 
dependency between the outsourcing firm and contractor. Intuitively, as the size of the 
contract increases, the client tends to lose control over its internal resources and becomes 
more dependent on the contractor. Barki et al. (1993) show that the size of IT projects 
determines one dimension of the risk profile, identifying a positive relationship between 
project size and the level of risk, due to task uncertainty. Furthermore, the size of the contract 
is also positively correlated with the level of switching costs required to substitute another 
vendor. In addition, the cost associated with monitoring the supplier increases as the contract 
size increases. Consequently, due to increased dependency and the substantial monitoring 
cost, investors are anticipated to react negatively to larger IT or manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements. Therefore, the following is expected:
H7 (outsourcer): The market’s reaction to IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements 
will be inversely related to the size of the contract
A secondary hypothesis either supporting or contradicting H7 could be that large deals have 
more impact on the bottom line of the companies involved and therefore should result in 
greater impact on the market value of the outsourcing firm. Whether the impact on market 
reaction in total is positive or negative will define if this counter hypothesis leads to positive 
or negative correlation between deal size and market reaction.
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However, for the contractor opposite reaction is expected due to the increased dependency 
and the substantial monitoring cost. Therefore, the following is expected:
H7 (contractor): The market’s reaction to IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements 
will be positively related to the size of the contract
Deal length
The duration of the contract is an important factor in many IT or manufacturing 
announcements. Especially, when the business environment in which the firm operates is 
uncertain and difficult to predict, contracts of longer duration become less attractive for the 
outsourcer. In addition to the business environment uncertainty also technological uncertainty 
plays a role in IT and manufacturing announcements by creating a potential for technological 
discontinuities. Taking into account the business environment, technological risk and the 
speed of change signing a long-term contract with an IT or manufacturing service vendor may 
be risky. Hence, a long-term commitment to particular contractor is likely to be less cost- 
effective, and may reduce the client’s ability to leverage cost-saving technologies in the 
future. In addition to the cost factors, long-term contracts tend to limit a firm’s strategic 
flexibility. Being legally obligated to one vendor for a long period of time may prevent the 
client from assessing the newest technologies and from combining best-of-breed innovations 
available in the marketplace. Therefore it is predicted that a longer deal is less attractive for 
the outsourcer but more attractive to the outsource contractor (vendor). Based on the 
discussion following is expected:
H8 (outsourcer): The market’s reaction to IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements 
will be inversely related to the proposed duration of the contract
H8 (contractor): The market’s reaction to IT or manufacturing outsourcing announcements 
will be positively related to the proposed duration of the contract
Performance
A company that is evaluated as a success by the capital markets is in a stronger position to 
negotiate a good deal than a company that is regarded as a failure. Strong performance of a
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firm is expected to have a positive impact on the market reaction as it increases firm’s 
negotiation power. On the other hand, a firm that has a poor performance in terms of its 
market value has weaker position when negotiating a deal as it may act under pressure. Based 
on the relative negotiation power between outsourcer and contractor the following is 
predicted:
H9 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have better impact on the market value of a firm that has 
performed strongly in the capital markets compared to a firm with poor performance
H9 (contractor): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have better impact on the market value of a contractor that has 
performed strongly in the capital markets compared to a contractor with poor performance
Level of agency costs
Since outsourcing announcement are one of the few direct signals a management can give to 
demonstrate to shareholders that they are maximizing the firm value by disposing activities 
failing to cover their cost of capital, they are expected to have strong signalling value. 
Although companies are expected to systematically structure their activities in view of 
comparisons of internal costs with an equivalent supply from an external vendor, agency and 
managerial objectives arise and thus shareholders cannot be certain that such an assessment 
has taken place until outsourcing event occurs.
There are various explanations why firms may engage value-destroying activities. Jensen 
(1986) implies that managers have incentives to grow their firms beyond the optimal size 
since growth increases manager’s power by increasing the resources under their control. In a 
similar fashion, Stulz (1990) argue that managers might benefit from a diversification policy 
because of the power and prestige associated with managing larger firm. Furthermore, Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) argue that managerial compensation is related to firm size, which thus 
encourages corporate strategies that generate asset growth. According, to Jensen (1986) the 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over the payout policies are 
especially severe when firm generates substantial free cash flow, whereas large amounts of 
debt reduces the agency costs of the free cash flow.
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In another words, outsourcing announcement resolves agency issues. Therefore, it is expected 
that companies that are more likely to suffer from the agency costs (substantial free cash flow 
and/or low debt) should benefit more from sending signal to the market. Hence it is 
hypothesized:
H10 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact on the market values of firms that have 
high agency costs compared to firms with low agency costs
Reason for outsourcing
Several objectives have been identified for why firms outsource their IT or manufacturing 
resources, including cost saving, improved quality, access to new technologies and the ability 
to focus on the core competencies. These objectives can be broadly divided into cost saving 
and additional revenue related objectives. Cost reduction is an internal matter and measuring 
the impact of IT or manufacturing outsourcing decision on cost reduction has traditionally 
been easier than quantifying the impact on revenue-growth, which is to large extent 
determined by numerous external factors. Therefore, the impact of IT or manufacturing 
outsourcing on revenue generation is expected to be extremely difficult to detect and assess. 
Furthermore, enhancing revenues through outsourcing may require a longer horizon and is 
thus more difficult to measure. When the relatively lower measurability of revenue side 
objectives is combined to the service providers temptation to behave opportunistically by 
shirking (or otherwise not doing optimal work for the outsourcer) the following is predict:
Hl 1 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions driven by long-term cost reduction objective will have better impact 
on the market value of the firm than announcement driven by revenue side objectives
Hl 1 (contractor): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions driven by long-term cost reduction objective will have worse impact 
on the market value of the contractor than announcement driven by revenue side objectives
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This hypothesis is not contradictory to hypothesis 2 (profitability) since Hl 1 highlights the 
negative impact of short-term cost reduction objectives that override the long-term value 
maximization of the firm, whereas this hypothesis concentrates on long-term cost reduction 
objective that does not have to be inconsistent with the long-term value maximization 
strategy.
The different objectives for outsourcing can be classified in another manner according to their 
strategic role for the firm. Following Schein’s (1989) and Dehning’s et al. (2003) 
conceptualisation IT investments can either automate business processes or they can have a 
more transformational role, where IT is used to transform the firm by fundamentally 
redefining business and industry processes and relationship in order to position themselves in 
an advantageous way to their competition. When IT investments are transformational, the 
changes are predicted to be disruptive rather than incremental, and therefore promises high, 
sustainable returns if the investments are successful (Dehning et al, 2003). Following this 
logic, it is expected that firms announcing transformational IT or manufacturing outsourcing 
deals are more likely to experience greater abnormal returns than firms making non- 
transformational investment announcements. Following is therefore anticipated:
H12 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions driven by transformational objective will have greater/better impact 
on the market value of the firm than announcement driven non-transformational objectives
Type of the announcement
The market reaction to IT or manufacturing announcements should reflect the degree to which 
they provide new information to investors regarding the expected cash flows and risk of the 
outsourcer (or contractor). However, if the market considers the announcement to be only a 
routine decision that is part of already expected and discounted strategy the market reaction 
should not be as significant. Similarly, if the market has already earlier been informed about 
the potential outsourcing deal and the new announcement in question only contains some 
details as new information the impact is predicted to be less significant than in the case of 
initial announcement. Therefore, when companies first announce that they are in the process 
of negotiating an outsourcing deal with an outside vendor the market reaction should be 
higher since most of the new information is then given, whereas when companies later
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announce that they have signed a definitive contract and they disclose some additional details 
(e.g. the actual deal size and length of the contract) of the deal only part of that information is 
new to the market and thus the reaction is expected to be smaller. In addition to disclosing the 
details of the deal, a multiple announcement informing on definitive agreement increases the 
probability that the outsourcing deal will actually take place in the future and therefore has 
some additional value to the investors. Hence, following is predicted:
H13 (outsourcer): The initial announcement to contract all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a greater impact on the market value of the firm compared 
to the multiple announcements
H13 (contractor): The initial announcement to contract all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a greater impact on the market value of the firm compared 
to the multiple announcements
Firm risk
Variability of daily stock returns is often used to measure risk as perceived by market 
investors, indicating the extent of uncertainty about future firm cash flows. This uncertainty is 
comprised of two elements, which are systematic risk and unsystematic risk. According to a 
view by Hartman (1972), Abel (1983) and several other economic researchers the marginal 
value of capital investments is convex in the stochastic variable and thus the uncertainty can 
have a positive effect on a firm’s profitability. Therefore according to this view, 
announcements of capital investments, such as IT or manufacturing investments, may produce 
a positive market reaction when a firm is facing greater uncertainty.
In addition to the above view, there is another view that is specific to IT investments and does 
not relate to manufacturing decisions. According to this view, (Galbraith 1977; Gurbaxani and 
Whang 1991) IT investments play a significant role in reducing uncertainty by helping firms 
react more actively and responsively to both external and internal risks. This viewpoint thus 
asserts that IT related capital investment announcements are likely to decrease the level of 
uncertainty for a given firm and increase the firm’s potential to stabilize. Furthermore, much 
of a firm’s uncertainty is caused by technological uncertainty, which can be reduced by 
investments in technology (McGrath 1997). Although, the above viewpoints are related to
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capital investments and it is questionable if they apply as such to outsourcing situations, in 
this study in is anticipated that markets will react positively to announcements of both IT and 
manufacturing investments, mainly due to their potential to reduce the level of uncertainty. In 
many cases the outsource contractor is a global firm specialising in either IT or manufacturing 
and therefore in better position to invest in the relevant technologies than the outsourcing 
firm. Based on the above discussion following is predicted:
H14 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact on the market value of firm’s with high 
uncertainty
A possible counter-hypothesis for H14 is based on an idea that decision to outsource IT or 
manufacturing functions is a source of uncertainty rather than a solution to it. According to 
this perspective, the majority of IT or manufacturing outsourcing decisions embody inherent 
risks of failure and are therefore likely to increase uncertainty. The results obtained by Peak et 
al. (1994) support this since they found out that the implied volatility in stock option prices 
showed increased volatility subsequent to the announcement. However, their sample size was 
very limited and thus the results are not especially reliable. Furthermore, one perspective 
suggests that because of the uncertainty surrounding risk aversion, incomplete markets 
(Nickell 1977; Craine 1989), and irreversibility of investments (Pindyck 1988), investment 
spending is depressed in firms. The high uncertainty associated with the outsourcing decisions 
may thus aggravate the situation. Consequently, rational investors will likely react negatively 
to IT or manufacturing announcements made by firms with high uncertainty.
Growth opportunities
There are several studies in finance and accounting demonstrating the role of a firm’s growth 
prospect in the market reaction to corporate announcements. Using proxies based on various 
accounting measures, such as market-to-book (MB) ratio and Tobin’s Q, this variable 
represents a firm’s potential for growth prospects; a high ratio means that investors believe 
the firm has high growth potential, and vice versa. A firm’s growth opportunity is a key 
determinant of market reaction since it is also a key determinant of firm’s market value - 
firm’s market value is determined by a combination of both assets in place and future growth 
options (Fama and French 1992; Dewan, Michael and Min 1998; Chatterjee et al 2002).
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Traditionally, the relationship between a firm’s growth options and the market reaction has 
been studied in various contexts, including new capital investment (Chan, Gau and Wang 
1995; Chatterjee et al. 2002), new equity financing (Pilotte 1992), dividends (Lang and 
Litzenberger 1989), and asset sales (Lang, Poulsen and Stulz 1995).
Most of these studies reveal a positive relationship between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
market reactions. According to these results, the market generally perceives that high-growth 
firms have better management capability than do low-growth firms to turn capital investments 
into positive net present values. However, the fact that outsourcing is not directly comparable 
to capital investment complicates the formulation of the hypothesis related to the firm’s 
growth opportunities. Based on this reasoning the following is anticipated:
H15 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact on the market values of firms with high 
growth opportunities compared to firms with low growth opportunities
Outsourcing structure - alliances
There are several ways to organize the complex relationship between the outsourcer and the 
contractor. According to Roy and Aubert (2002) IT applications having strategic value should 
be governed through partnership (i.e. outsourced in close co-operation with the outside 
supplier), in the case of low or medium presence of these resources. Furthermore, McLellan et 
al. (1995) theorized that alliance governance structure, that is the base of many of the most 
comprehensive IT outsourcing relationships, facilitates the outsourcing of IT even when it is 
considered core skill. Therefore, it is expected that the outsourcing deals, where the 
outsourcer and contractor form an alliance are more likely to be strategically important and 
will have higher probability of success. Consequently, the following is hypothesized:
H16 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions in an alliance will have a better impact on the market value of firm 
compared to announcements with normal outsourcing structure
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Experience of contractor
Transactions are expected to be more successful if the contractor has a track record. In 
addition to the historical information on successful deals, which may lower the perceived risk, 
a contractor with substantial track record is likely to have larger economies of scale. 
Therefore, following is predicted:
HI 7 (outsourcer): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact on the market value of firm when the 
contractor has a track record
H17 (contractor): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact on the market value of the contractor when 
the contractor has a track record
Hl 6 (contractor): The announcement of a contract to outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or
manufacturing functions in an alliance will have a better impact on the market value of the
contractor compared to announcements with normal outsourcing structure
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4. Description of the methodology and data
The basic sample of outsourcing announcements consists of 316 initial and multiple 
information system (IS) and electronic manufacturing services (EMS) announcements during 
the January 1999 - December 2004. However, various smaller sub-samples are used in the 
study due to lack of comprehensive data on all the events. The outsourcing announcements 
come from all the major markets, so no geographical restrictions have been applied when 
gathering the announcement data.
4.1. Definition of Outsourcing
When deciding what constitutes an outsourcing announcement the definition by Juma’h and 
Wood (2003) is applied. According to Juma’h and Woods (2003) outsourcing occurs when 
activities such as information technology management, finance and accounting services or 
manufacturing are switched from internal provision to provision by external contractor. They 
also add that to the definition that usually outsourcing involves a long-term service contract 
that is less permanent than total disposal of an activity. There are, however, a few occasions 
when the definition of outsourcing requires further explanation. In some cases the ownership 
of the outsourcing company’s assets and employees is not transferred fully to the outsourcing 
contractor and instead the outsourcer retains a stake in the newly created entity owned 
together by the outsourcer and the contractor. In this study these are included as outsourcing 
announcements provided that the outsourcer’s share in the new entity is less than 50% and 
that the new entity’s main purpose is to serve the outsourcer’s internal needs instead of selling 
its services to third parties. There are, however, only 12 events that belong to the above- 
mentioned category of announcements.
4.2. Observation of the event and stock exchange data
The sample is obtained from the various Internet based databases by using key word search. 
Most of these databases were either IS or manufacturing specific news services or outsourcing 
contractors (vendors) web pages. The sample is presented in appendix 1. Due to the nature of
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the data source the search was done for period January 1997 to December 2004. The 
keywords were carefully selected based on a combination of terms describing IT or electronic 
manufacturing services and a set of action verbs (e.g., award, outsource, purchase, sign, 
contract, etc.). Because many outsourcing arrangements occur in the form of partnerships or 
more complicated multivendor arrangements also other phrases such as partnership and 
alliance were used to identify these current practices. Several thousands of news articles and 
press releases were initially filtered from which 412 proved to be relevant for this study. After 
the initial filtering, another filtering process was conducted in order to eliminate events that 
have any other compounding news released around the announcement day. It is important to 
note that extraneous events, such as profit announcements, joint ventures, and mergers or 
acquisitions, any of which might confound the market reaction around the event date, were 
eliminated during this “filtering” process (McWilliams and Siegel 1998). Altogether, 41 
events were eliminated due to compounding news released. Finally, 55 more events were 
eliminated due to difficulties in getting the share price information or financial information 
(firm characteristics). The final sample for outsourcers contains thus 316 events from the 
period January 1997 to December 2004, being larger than most of the previous studies and 
thus making it possible to test several hypotheses simultaneously (see Appendix 1 ). The final 
sample for outsourcers, however, contains several events for which deal details such as deal 
size and deal length (84 events) were not announced or for which some firm characteristic 
was not found (9 additional events). The corresponding figures for the sample size of the 
contractor are smaller since some of the announcements did not disclose the contractor: 305 
(final sample size), from which 68 events do not have data on the deal size and length and 
further 15 do not have data on some other firm characteristic.
Due to the key word search technique the sample will be biased towards bigger outsourcing 
announcements, that is to say, to ones that will make news. This is not assumed to be a 
significant problem since already the nature of the event study requires that the outsourcing 
announcement are large and important enough so that there will be statistically observable 
stock market reaction. Furthermore, most of the databases can be used to search for the IT 
outsourcing announcements only. However, since the number of possible vendors (due to 
economies of scale) for both major IT and manufacturing outsourcing contracts is limited, the 
web pages of the major outsourcing vendors can be used as primary data source. This is 
especially true in the case of the manufacturing outsourcing announcement.
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The stock market and financial information is obtained from the ‘Thomson Financial’
database, containing access to several other databases, from which ‘Datastream International’
was the most often used.
4.3. The event: Outsourcing event window
Choosing appropriate event window is one of the most difficult and important factors in this 
study. There is trade-off when choosing proper event window since too short window may 
mean that some part of the announcement effect is omitted whereas too long window results 
in diluting the announcement effect by distributing it to too many days and also by increasing 
the chance of some other material events occurring, which will be mixed with the outsourcing 
announcement effect. Furthermore, some outsourcing deals have multiple possible dates, 
which could be interpreted as the date of the announcement. As will be explained in following 
parts of the Thesis, the announcement may consist of several announcements: announcement 
that the outsourcing company is negotiating an outsourcing deal with external vendor, the 
announcement that the outsourcing company and vendor have signed a contract, the 
announcement when the actual contract be in effect or in the case of joint venture the new 
entity will began operations. The bigger the outsourcing deal the longer usually is the time 
between these different announcements and this will probably result in the weakening of the 
announcement effect on the announcement day as the information will be diffused into 
markets gradually. In the case of smaller or medium sized deals this is usually not as big of a 
problem. One additional source of complexity is the fact that in the case of big deals there 
might be rumours concerning the possible negotiations between outsourcing company and the 
vendor, which may furthermore dilute the announcement day effect and thus make it more 
difficult to obtain significant market reaction on the announcement day (or in the 
announcement event window). In order to reflect the different information release possibilities 
associated with each event several event windows are inspected before and after the 
outsourcing announcement date (t=0). As already mentioned short event window limits the 
possibility of extraneous noise affecting the results and is appropriate when researchers 
believe they have identified the date when information has been released (Fama 1991). 
Furthermore, narrow windows help to ensure that the price change around the announcement 
is due to information in the announcement. Prior studies that have used a two-day window 
have focused on either the day before announcement and the day of the announcement, or the 
day of the announcement and the day after the announcement. Hayes et al. (2000) argues that
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since they used primarily wire services in their sample they expect that the market either 
impounded the information on the day it was released or on the subsequent day, since 
announcements often appear in wire stories a day prior to newspaper publication. Also three- 
day windows have been used (Berger and Ofek 1995). However, Juma’h and Wood (2003) 
used several windows ([-20,0] ; [-5,0] ; [0,+5] ; [0,20]), which were significantly longer than 
the above mentioned event windows, when they examined the market reaction to business 
service outsourcing in UK, due to various disclosure patterns that seem possible. They also 
used windows that extended to several days after the announcement. Due to the uncertainty 
about the precise timing of outsourcing announcement effect (e.g. due to rumours) and variety 
of disclosure patterns range of event windows is used based on the earlier studies and on the 
observed disclosure patterns. Furthermore, in the regression analysis a dummy variable is 
used as an explanatory variable to distinguish between the initial announcements and multiple 
announcements. All the used windows are presented in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Summary of event windows
This table presents the event windows used in this study. Start day column indicates the 
starting day of the event window to calculate excess returns, whereas end day column 








































4.4. Methodology, testing significance of abnormal returns
In this study well-founded event study methodology has been applied, which relies on the 
market model based approach suggested by Fama et al. (1969) and perpetuated by Brown and 
Warner (1985). The structure of the statistical testing is the following. First, the event-study 
method is employed to obtain an initial assessment of the outsourcer’s and contractor’s stock 
market reaction to an announcement to outsource all or portion of firm’s IT or electronic 
manufacturing functions. Second, in order to gain further insight into the nature of the capital 
market response to the outsourcing announcement, a set of subsamples based on various 
characteristics associated with the outsourcing event and the outsourcing or contracting firm 
are constructed and tested. Finally, due to the limitations in univariate analysis caused by the 
high number of different factors having an effect on the market reaction, the effect of these 
factors is considered simultaneously by using multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis 
of the announcement period returns. In addition, in each of these steps several different event 
windows, standardization of excess returns and two alternative risk adjustment proxies have 
been employed in order to enhance the reliability of the results. In the following the 
methodology of these three different analysis is further discussed.
4.4.1. Aggregate sample methodology
Following Brown and Warner (1980) (1985), the following definitions with respect to sample 
companies returns (Rj) and market returns (Rm) are used.
(1)
R. = ,J (2)
where,
Pj t and Pj t-i are the price of the security (j) at time (t) and (t-1); 
Pm t and Pm>t-i are the price of the market portfolio at (t) and (t-1); 
Dj t are dividends received on security (j) during period (t); and
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Rj t and Rm t are the logarithmic returns on security (j) and the market index.
The null hypothesis (Ho) to be tested is that the mean excess returns (MERt) in a given 
window is equal to zero against the alternative hypothesis (Hi) that they are significantly 
different from zero. The excess return of a stock j in the event window is the difference 
between the observed return for that period and the expected return for that period. Excess 
returns (ER) were calculated using two alternative proxies to get more robust results.
Market adjusted excess return (MAR): MA(ERjf = Rjit- RmJ (3)
Market risk-adjusted excess return (MRAR): MRA(ERjt) = RJ t - (af ßjRmt) (4)
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is applied to estimate the risk-adjusted 
model parameters for each individual stock j. The parameters are estimated during a period of 
170 trading days starting 200 trading days prior to the announcement day. In another words, a 
buffer of 30 trading days was left between the announcement day and the period from which 
the parameters are estimated. For market return a country market index (calculated by 
Datastream International) corresponding to the main stock exchange of the firm’s shares is 
employed in order to take into account the variations of the different geographical areas.
Test statistic at the event day for outsourcer and contractor
Following Brown and Warner (1985) the announcement day is labeled as (to). The test 
statistic at the event day (to) following Brown and Warner (1985) is the ratio of the mean 
excess returns for j announcements (MERt) relative to its estimated standard deviation 
[S(MERt)].














A(MER) = ------- (8)
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Tex/ statistic over multi-day intervals for outsourcer and contractor
In order to test the excess return interval of T-days, the test statistic is the ratio of the 
cumulative mean excess return (MCER) to its estimated standard deviation.





The above test statistic is conditional on excess returns being jointly normally distributed, 
with a zero conditional mean, which is likely to be satisfied with an adequate estimation 
period. The longest event window consists of 41 days following the methods of Juma’h and 
Woods (2003). This window is [-20,20], where t=0 denotes the announcement day. Within 
this event window several periods are studied reflecting the different information release 
possibilities associated with each event.
Test statistics for the combined entity
Weighted average of outsourcer CER and contractor CER has been used as an empirical 
measure of the total percentage gains created by the jth outsourcer and the jth contractor. This 
is based on the methodology proposed by Bradley et al. (1988). The combined entity CER is 
thus a market value-weighted average of the outsourcer and contractor CERs. Otherwise the
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methodology follows the methodology presented in the aggregate sample analysis part of this 
study. The formulae for the cumulative excess return is shown below:




Woj and Wçj are the market values of the jth outsourcer and jth contractor
CERoj and CERq are the cumulative excess returns of the jth outsourcer and jth contractor
Test statistics for dollar returns
All the test statistics presented above are for percentage returns. However, dollar returns have 
also been calculated and tested in order to account for a size effect. The test statistics for 
dollar return are derived in a similar way than the percentage return test statistics with the 
exception that that the excess returns for firms have been multiplied by the market values of 
the firms at the time of the announcement or by the sum of market values of jth outsourcer 
and jth contractor in the case of combined entity dollar returns.
4.4.2. Analysis of a firm and outsourcing event characteristics
To gain further insight into the nature of the capital market response to the announcement to 
outsource, a set of subsamples based on various characteristics associated with the 
outsourcing event and the outsourcing or contracting firm are constructed. The methodology 
for testing these different subsampes follows the above methodology of aggregate sample 
analysis.
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4.4.3. Cross sectional regression analysis
Due to a number of different factors (hypotheses) that should be simultaneously considered in 
determining the impact of outsourcing on shareholder wealth a multivariate cross-sectional 
regression analysis has been applied to the announcement period returns. This means that in 
order to test the different hypothesis presented earlier, the cumulative excess returns for each 
firm are regressed on the variable of interest.
The estimates on the gains created by outsourcing announcements i.e. the excess returns for 
the firms have been calculated using the methodology presented earlier (equations 3 and 4). 
These excess returns are then cumulated for the event window in question to obtain the 
cumulative excess return for the firm (CERj). The formulas are presented below for market 
adjusted and market risk adjusted cumulative excess returns.
Market adjusted cumulative excess return (MCER): MCERj = ^(/?y, - Rml) (11)
Market risk-adjusted cumulative excess return (MRCER):
MRCER, -(«,+^J.J (12)
Several different multivariate cross-sectional regression models have been used in this study 
to examine the cross-sectional differences in the excess returns for outsourcer and contractor. 
Several models have been used mainly due to the difficulties caused by the high number of 
explanatory variables. First, the high number of explanatory variables reduces the statistical 
significance of the tests and therefore the variables applied are changed between the models 
by eliminating variables that do not appear to have any explanatory power. Secondly, 
different models have been tried in order to minimize the effects of multi-collinearity between 
some of the explanatory variables that have high correlation. Following is an illustration of 
the typical model (for market risk-adjusted cumulative excess return) and it does not contain 
all the explanatory variables.
MRCERj = yo + yiVARj + y2VARj + y3VARj + y4VAR, + y5VARj + y6VAR¡ + y7VARj (13)
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Finally, also an additional model is used where all observations are standardized i.e. the 
cumulative excess returns are divided by the standard deviation of the firms’ returns 
following Fades et al. (1984) to account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the data. 
This way the events with higher standard deviation are given less weight in the regression.
4.5. Regression variables
In the previous part of this study it was argued that the stock market reaction on outsourcing 
announcement varies contingent on the different firm and outsourcing event characteristics. 
Related to this, different hypotheses on the relationship between the stock market reaction and 
the firm and event characteristics were developed and presented. These hypotheses are tested 
employing a multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis, where the cumulative excess 
returns for each firm is regressed on the variable of interest. In the following paragraphs the 
variables that represent the different firm and outsourcing event characteristics are discussed. 
The issue of multicollinearity has been addressed by choosing variables so that the 
correlations between them are minimized. Table 3 provides a summary of the variables by 
listing them together with the corresponding hypothesis and classifies them into firm 
characteristic or event characteristic variables.
All the data for firm characteristic variables were obtained from the Thomson Financial and 
the data for outsourcing event characteristic variables from the press releases and news 
articles that were used to in the data gathering.
Profitability of the outsourcer
Net income-% and earnings before interest and taxes-% have been used as the alternative 
variables describing the profitability of the firm. Percentages have been used in order to avoid 
the potential multicollinearity with the revenue of the firm. Since better results were 
constantly obtained using net income, this is used as the main variable in the regressions 
reported later. This variable is called NET INCOME.
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Size of the outsourcer
Consistent with previous studies (Hayes et al. 2000; Juma’h and Wood 2003; Gao 2005) both 
natural logarithm of revenue and market capitalization have been used as variables describing 
the size of the outsourcing firm. The results do not differ significantly depending on the 
metric used and revenue has been chosen as the primary proxy for the firm size consistent 
with previous study by Hayes et al. (2000). This variable is called OUTSOURCER 
REVENUE.
Size of the contractor
Both natural logarithm of revenue and market capitalization have been used as proxies for the 
size of the outsourcing firm. The results do not differ significantly depending on the metric 
used and revenue has been chosen as the primary proxy for the firm size, being consistent 
with the choice of proxy for the size of the outsourcing firm. This variable is called 
CONTRACTOR REVENUE.
Industry classification
A dummy variable has been defined to account for the industry classification. This variable is 
called FINANCIAL INSTITUTION and it assumes a value of one for financial institutions 
and a value of zero otherwise. Industry classification is based on the industry codes of 
Datastream and on author’s own judgement. This definition differs somewhat from the 
definition used by Hayes et al. (2000), where the industry dummy assumed a value of one if 
the company was a service firm.
Outsourcing type
A dummy variable has been defined to describe the type of outsourcing in question. This 
variable is called MANUFACTURING and value of one is assigned to EMS outsourcing 
events and a value of zero to IT outsourcing events.
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Deal size
Natural logarithm of the value of the deal in dollars divided by the length of the deal in years 
has been used as a proxy for the size of the deal. Natural logarithm of the value of the deal per 
year has been chosen for multicollinearity reasons, since the natural logarithm of absolute 
deal value is naturally highly correlated with the length of the deal, which is also one of the 
explanatory variables. This differs from the variable used by Oh and Gallivan (2004) and Gao 
(2005), since they employed the absolute deal size in dollars. An alternative proxy for the deal 
size has also been employed, that is to say, deal value per year divided by the revenue of the 
outsourcer or contractor. The rationale for this is that there are two possible hypotheses 
explaining the inverse relationship of the size of the outsourcer and the market reaction. One 
of these hypotheses argues that due to the relatively smaller size of the deal larger companies 
should experience smaller market reaction than smaller companies if both firms outsource a 
similar size function. Therefore, the relative deal size variable helps to explain whether the 
larger firm has worse market reaction due to informational asymmetry or purely due to the 
fact that the relative size of the deal is smaller. These variables are called DEAL SIZE and 
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE.
Deal length
Consistent with the previous research by Oh and Gallivan (2004) and Gao (2005) the length 
of the deal in years has been used as natural proxy for the deal length. This variable is called 
DEAL LENGTH.
Performance
Cumulative share price performance compared to the corresponding country index (calculated 
by Datastream) from the period starting 200 days before the announcement date and ending 
20 days before the announcement date has been used a proxy for performance. The variable is 
called PERFORMANCE.
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Level of agency costs
Several variables have been used as a proxy for the level of agency cost of the outsourcer. 
According, to Jensen (1986) the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over 
the payout policies are especially severe when firm generates substantial free cash flow, 
whereas large amounts of debt reduces the agency costs of the free cash flow. Therefore the 
amount of cash and short term investments divided by the total assets of the firm is used as a 
proxy for the level of agency cost. An alternative proxy that has been used is the total amount 
of debt divided by the total assets of the firm. The amount of the cash and debt have been 
divided by the total assets due to potential multicollinearity with the size variable. In addition 
to these two alternative proxies, also a third proxy, for the level of agency cost is used, 
namely, the shares owned by the managers of the firm. This variable has been chosen since a 
high ownership stake in the firm by the managers should align their motives with the 
shareholders’ motives and thus reduce agency costs. However, it was not possible to obtain 
direct measure of managers’ ownership in the firm but instead a Datastream data item called 
Closely Held Shares was used. This data item describes the percentage of shares owned by the 
managers in addition to some other blocks of shares and is thus not a perfect proxy. The 
variables are called CASH, DEBT and INSIDER OWNERSHIP respectively.
Reason for outsourcing
Two dummy variables have been defined to describe the reason for outsourcing. The first 
variable is called COST FOCUS and it assumes a value of one for announcements where cost 
savings have been explicitly mentioned and quantified and zero otherwise. Another dummy 
variable is TRANSFORMATIONAL ROLE that has been assigned a value of one for 
announcements, where revenue side transformational objectives have been mentioned as the 
primary reason for the outsourcing and zero otherwise. Judging, which announcements are 
transformational by their nature is somewhat subjective as there are no mandatory rules 
covering the disclosure of outsourcing contracts. There are, however, certain phrases that are 
commonly used when outsourcing contract is announced that have been used as a sign of 
transformational nature e.g. announcements where ‘ increased speed to market’ has been stated 
as the primary strategic objective of the outsourcing contract have been classified as 
transformational.
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Type of the announcement
Three different dummies have been used to describe the extent to which new information is 
released to the market. These variables are used to account for the different value of 
announcements to the investors due to the varied degree of new information in the 
announcements. The first variable is called INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT and it assumes a 
value of one for outsourcing announcement that is the first announcement of a particular 
outsourcing contract and value of zero for multiple announcements after the initial 
announcement. Alternative variables called PRE ANNOUNCEMENT and POST 
ANNOUNCEMENT have also been employed. Variable PRE ANNOUNCEMENT is 
assigned a value of one when the announcement is not an announcement of actual contract but 
rather announcement of signing of memorandum of understanding or letter of intent related to 
the outsourcing contract and zero for all other announcements. Variable POST 
ANNOUNCEMENT assumes a value of one when the announcement confirms the fact that 
the already signed contract has actually been implemented e.g. the assets and employees have 
been transferred to the contractor. The different variables for the type of announcement have a 
rather high correlation and thus the use of them at a same time has been restricted in the 
models due to the multicollinearity reasons.
Firm risk
Consistent with the previous study by Oh and Kim (2004) as well as with Fama and French 
(1992) the standard deviation of daily stock returns from period starting 200 days before the 
announcement date and ending 20 days before the announcement date has been used as a 
proxy for firm risk. The variable is called STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY.
Growth opportunities
Consistent with Oh and Kim (2004) as well as with Fama and French (1992) market to book 
ratio has been used as a proxy for the growth opportunities of the firm. The variable is called 
MARKET TO BOOK.
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Outsourcing structure - alliances
A dummy variable has been defined to describe the type of outsourcing structure. This 
variable is called ALLIANCE and it assumes a value of one if the outsourcer will retain a 
positive but less than 50% equity ownership in the outsourced entity (and if the new entity’s 
main purpose is to serve the outsourcer’s internal needs instead of selling its services to third 
parties).
Experience of contractor
A dummy variable has been defined to account for the experience of contractor. This variable 
is called CONTRACTOR EXPERIENCE and it assumes a value of one if the contractor 
belongs to a group of firms that have subjectively been chosen as the most experienced in the 
market. The judgement is based among other things on the size (revenue) of the contractor 
and on the number of deals that the contractor has announced. For IT contractors IBM, CSC, 
EDS, HP and Accenture are deemed as contractors having the most experience, whereas for 
EMS contractors the group consists of Flextronics, Sanmina, Sanmina-SCI, Celestica and 
Solectron. This variable is, however, highly correlated with the revenue of the contractor and 
for multicollinearity reasons not used in many of the models.
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Table 3. Summary of explanatory variables and corresponding hypothesis
This table describes all the variables used in the regression model and links these variables
into the hypothesis developed in Chapter 2. Expected sign for outsourcer and contractor
denote the expected sign of the explanatory variable coefficients in the regression models for
outsourcer and contractor excess returns respectively.
Variable Hypothesis Expected sign for outsourcer
Expected sign 
for contractor Description
OUTSOURCER REVENUE Size of the outsourcing firm - Firm characteristic
OUTSOURCER NET INCOME Profitability of the outsourcing firm + Firm characteristic
CONTRACTOR REVENUE Size of the contractor - - Firm characteristic
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION Industry classification + Firm characteristic
MANUFACTURING Outsourcing type + Event characteristic
DEAL SIZE Deal size - + Event characteristic
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE Deal size - + Event characteristic
DEAL LENGTH Deal length - + Event characteristic
SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE Performance + + Firm characteristic
CASH Level of agency cost + Firm characteristic
DEBT Level of agency cost - Firm characteristic
INSIDER OWNERSHIP Level of agency cost + Firm characteristic
COST FOCUS Reason for announcement + - Event characteristic
TRANSFORMATIONAL ROLE Reason for announcement - Event characteristic
INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT Type of the announcement + + Event characteristic
PRE ANNOUNCEMENT Type of the announcement Event characteristic
POSTANNOUNCEMENT Type of the announcement Event characteristic
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY Firm risk + Firm characteristic
MARKET TO BOOK Growth opportunities + Firm characteristic
ALLIANCE Outsourcing structure - alliances + + Event characteristic
CONTRACTOR EXPERIENCE Experience of contractor + + Firm characteristic
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4.6. Description of the sample
The sample is described in the following. All announcements are concerned with distinct and 
separate contracts and care was taken to avoid including repeated or duplicated 
announcements of the same outsourcing events unless they provide new information to the 
market.
Appendix 2 shows the correlation between the different variables in the sample. These 
correlations indicate the likelihood for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity and the 
corresponding measures to avoid it have been discussed by variable in the previous section. 
There are also a few interesting observation that can be made based on the correlation 
between the different variables. Firstly, outsourcing structure, i.e. alliances, appear to have an 
effect on the rationale for outsourcing. Transformational role is used as a justification for the 
outsourcing more often for alliances compared to normal outsourcing. This is in line with 
what is hypothesized, since alliances are assumed to be used as a vehicle particularly for 
strategically important outsourcing deals. Additionally, outsourcing contracts in alliances 
seem to be larger and longer compared to other outsourcing contracts. Secondly, according to 
the correlation analysis, financial institutions have stronger cost focus compared to other 
companies, when justifying outsourcing decisions. In another words, financial institutions 
quantify the expected cost savings from outsourcing more often than other companies, which 
could indicate that they are more cost conscious or experienced in outsourcing.
Yearly distribution of the outsourcing announcements
Figure 1 gives the distribution of the IS and EMS outsourcing announcements by year. The 
dominance of recent years in the sample may reflect more the difficulties in obtaining data for 
the years before 1999 rather than accurately reflecting the true occurrence of outsourcing in 
the market. The number of information systems outsourcing increases fairly steadily during 
the years, whereas the number of EMS outsourcing peaks in 2002 and then falls radically.
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Figure 1. Yearly distribution of IS and EMS outsourcing announcements
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing
announcements that are included in the sample in each year for period 1996-2004.
Yearly distribution ofinformation systemsand manufacturing 
outsourcing announcements
Year
■ Information systems outsourcing о Manufacturing announcements
Contract value
Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of the total contract values and contract values per 
annum (total contract value divided with the length of the contract) separately for IS and EMS 
outsourcing announcements. Overall, contract sizes are fairly large in comparison with the 
revenues or market capitalization of the outsourcers and contractors, although there is large 
variation between IS and EMS outsourcing deals and also within these categories. The 
disclosed total contract values in the sample range from 10 to 30000 million euros and 
contract values per annum from 3 to 6000 million euros. The average total value of the 
contract is approximately 1550 million euros and the contract value per annum approximately 
283 million euros. EMS outsourcing deals appear to be typically significantly larger and 
shorter in nature compared to IS outsourcing deals. For EMS outsourcing contracts the 
average total value is 2170 million euros compared to 1220 million euros for IS outsourcing 
contracts. Furthermore, the average value of contract per year is 520 million euros for EMS 
outsourcing contracts, compared to only 153 million euros for IS outsourcing contracts. The 
value of the average outsourcing contract per annum is equivalent to 3,0% of the total annual 
revenue of the outsourcers and 3,6% of the total annual revenue of contractor. Similarly, the 
value of the average outsourcing contract per annum is equivalent to 4,7% (median contract 
value is 1,0%) of the market capitalization of the outsourcer at the time of the announcement
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and 5,2% (median contract value is 0,9%) of the market capitalization of the contractor. It can 
thus be concluded that the outsourcing deals included in the sample are significant enough to 
result in statistically significant market reaction, although there is a large variation in the 
absolute and relative size of the deals. There does not appear to be any trend between the 
contract size and the year.
Figure 2. Distribution of outsourcing contract value (total)
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in six different categories based on the reported total contract value (in 
million $).
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Figure 3. Distribution of outsourcing contract value per annum
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in seven different categories based on the reported annual contract value (in 
million $ per year). Annual contract value is calculated by dividing the total contract value 
with the contract length.
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« 30
0 ---- 1
<50 50-100 100-200 200-500 500-1000 1000-2000 >2000
Contract value per annum (mill. €)
■ IS outsourcing □ EMS outsourcing
Contract length
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the contract length for both IS and EMS outsourcing 
contracts. Similar, to the contract size, there does not appear to be any trend between the 
contract length and the year. As was already mentioned above, IS outsourcing contracts are 
typically significantly longer than EMS outsourcing contracts (and smaller as well). The 
average contract length for IS outsourcing deals is 7,8 years, compared to only 4,0 years for 
EMS outsourcing contracts. This could be a sign of the fact that companies consider 
manufacturing to be closer to the core of their business and therefore mitigate the risks of 
outsourcing by committing to only short contracts. All of the EMS outsourcing contracts for 
which length is given are either three, four, or five years in duration. The length of the IS 
outsourcing contracts varies between 3 and 15 years, although vast majority of the deals were 
five, seven or 10 years in duration. This is a clear sign of outsourcers and contractors 
following typical market practices when deciding on the terms and conditions of the 
outsourcing deals.
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Figure 4. Distribution of contract length
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing
announcements in eleven different categories based on the reported contract length.
Distribution of contract length
123456789 10 More
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Industry of the information systems outsourcer
The distribution of outsourcers’ industry is shown in figure 5. All EMS outsourcing 
announcements are given by companies that operate in the information technology, 
telecommunications or engineering industries, which is natural given the nature of the 
outsourcing. IS outsourcing announcements are divided more evenly across different 
industries, although almost one third of the announcements are given by financial institutions. 
Telecommunications and engineering companies are also active in IS outsourcing. 
Transportation sector is the fourth active IS outsourcer, mainly due to several airlines 
outsourcing their information systems. According to these results, it appears that IS 
outsourcing activity is to some extent related to the information intensiveness of the industry.
Figure 5. Distribution of outsourcers’ industry
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing
announcements in fourteen different categories based on the industry of the outsourcer.




■ IS outsourcing □ EMS outsourcing
Geographical distribution of outsourcers
Figure 6 illustrates geographical distribution of the outsourcers. 41% of all the 
announcements are given by US companies (country of origin is based on the main stock 
exchange of the company). Again, this distribution may not accurately reflect the true 
distribution of outsourcing activity but rather is somewhat biased due to limited access on 
relevant data sources, e.g. the high share of Finnish and Swedish companies in the sample 
could be at least partly due to better availability of data.
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Figure 6. Geographical distribution of the outsourcers (based on home stock exchange)
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in thirteen different categories based on country of origin of the outsourcer. 
The country of origin is based on the main stock exchange of the outsourcer.
Reason for outsourcing
Figure 7 shows the different reasons for outsourcing and their frequency as disclosed by the 
outsourcers in the announcements. The reasons are mostly the same for both IS and EMS 
outsourcing deals. Cost savings and focus on core competencies are by far the most common 
rationales used by the outsourcer. All in all, the most common rationales used in the 
outsourcing announcements are in line with the previous research and theories related to the 
potential benefits of outsourcing (McLellan et al. 1995). More than half of all the 
announcements refer to cost savings as a reason to outsource (167 announcements). However, 
only in 22 announcements, the cost savings are quantified. This could imply that the 
outsourcers are not able to estimate the potential savings with sufficient accuracy in advance 
of the deal or that they are unwilling to disclose this information to the market. Furthermore, 
an interesting difference between IS and EMS outsourcing announcements is the fact that 
access to new technologies is used fairly often (altogether 42 times) as a rationale when 
justifying IS outsourcing deals, whereas in EMS outsourcing deals this rationale is used only 
in a few occasions (i.e. three times). It is somewhat surprising to find relatively many 
companies using focus on core competencies as one of the main rationales for their 
manufacturing outsourcing decision, since manufacturing is considered to be closer to the
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core of the company. On the other hand, this may be a sign of transformation in the 
telecommunications, information technology and engineering industry towards more service 
oriented business model and thus redefinition of the value adding role of these companies. As 
a result, it can still be hypothesized that the EMS outsourcing announcements result in 
stronger market reaction due to stronger signalling effect.
Another interesting observation is the relationship between some of the rationales used and 
time. Particularly, flexibility is used extensively as a reason for outsourcing from 2002 to 
2004, whereas in earlier years it has only rarely been mentioned.
Figure 7. Distribution of rationale for outsourcing
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in ten different categories based on the reported rationale of outsourcing for 
the outsourcer. The total number exceeds the sample size since multiple rationales have been 
reported in most announcements.







■ IS outsourcing □ EMS outsourcing
Size of outsourcers and contractors
Figure 8 and 9 give the revenue distribution of both the outsourcers and contractor. 
Companies making outsourcing announcements have a mean revenue of 24 493 million euros. 
Companies making IS outsourcing announcements have slightly lower average revenue of
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23728 million euros compared to 25426 million euros with companies making EMS 
outsourcing announcements. The conclusion is that announcements are dominated by large 
companies, particularly for EMS outsourcing announcements. This could simply reflect the 
greater likelihood that large companies or their contractors will announce agreements, but 
there are also other possibilities. The large international contractors who dominate the 
outsourcing market could be less interested in small contracts, since most of the transaction 
costs involved in deal search and negotiation are fixed. Additionally, small companies may 
have more internal efficiency improvement opportunities and thus outsource less compared to 
large companies that have already utilized most of these internal measures. Another difference 
between IS and EMS outsourcers is the fact that IS outsourcers’ revenue is relatively evenly 
distributed with most of the companies having fairly large revenue, whereas EMS outsourcers 
tend to be either very small (below 1000 million euros) or very large companies (more than 
20000 million euros).
Figure 8. Distribution of outsourcers’ revenue by announcement
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in seven different categories based on the revenue of the outsourcer (in 
million $) at the end of the fiscal year when the announcement is made.
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Outsourcing contractors mean revenue is 29491 million euros and it differs greatly between 
IS and EMS contractors. IS contractors mean revenue is 47198 million euros compared to 
only 7893 million euros for EMS contractors. This could imply that the EMS outsourcing
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market is less developed, smaller and the contractor base is more fragmented, compared to IS 
outsourcing market, which is clearly dominated by a few large players.
Figure 9. Distribution of contractors’ revenue by announcement
This figure reports the number of information system and manufacturing outsourcing 
announcements in seven different categories based on the revenue of the contractor (in million 
$) at the end of the fiscal year when the announcement is made.
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Juma’h and Wood (2003) examined the relationship between the size of outsourcers and 
contractors and found a strong positive correlation. They divided the contractors into two 
groups based on the number of contracts in their database. The size of the outsourcing 
company was measured by the natural logarithm of market value and this was positively 
associated with the major outsourcing contractors with a Pearson correlation of 56% 
significant at the 1% level. Juma’h and Wood (2003) thus concluded that large companies use 
large contractors. I also examine the relationship between the size of outsourcers and 
contractors but contrary to the findings of Juma’h and Wood (2003) there appears to be no 
significant correlation. Correlation coefficient is only 11% for the IS outsourcing 
announcements and 13% for the EMS outsourcing announcements when applying similar 
methodology. Furthermore, the association is even weaker when the natural logarithms of 
outsourcers and contractors are used, 9% and 1% respectively for IS and EMS outsourcing
announcements.
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5. Analysis and results
The structure of the analysis and results part of this study is the following. First, the aggregate 
sample assessment of the size of the stock market reaction to an announcement to outsource 
all or portion of firm’s IT or EMS is reported. Second, in order to gain further insight into the 
nature of the capital market response to the outsourcing announcement, the results from 
different subsamples are shown. Finally, due to the limitations in univariate analysis the effect 
of the different variables on the stock market reaction i.e. the results from the regression 
analysis are reported. In each of these steps the results for both the outsourcer and contractor 
are analyzed and reported separately. Additionally, the market reaction of the combined entity 
(market value-weighted average of outsourcer and contractor) is also analyzed and reported at 
the aggregate level. Furthermore, in each of these steps two alternative risk adjustment 
proxies and several different event windows have been employed in order to enhance the 
reliability of the results. In addition to this, some of the results are shown with standardization 
of excess returns. The results differed only when different event windows were applied, 
which increases the robustness and reliability of the results and conclusions.
5.1. Aggregate sample results
5.1.1. Outsourcer
The mean excess returns of the outsourcer are calculated using two risk adjustment proxies 
(MAR and MRAR). The results are shown in Table 4. Mean excess returns across the total 
sample and for most windows before and after the announcements are positive, though 
insignificant. Therefore, these results indicate that shareholders of the outsourcing firm 
experience a small wealth gain from outsourcing during the three-day period starting at the 
announcement day. The failure to observe significant excess returns for pre-announcement 
date windows suggests that there is little anticipation of the announcement. Similarly, the lack 
of significant returns in the longer post-announcement periods indicate that the market fully 
capitalizes the information content with the outsourcing announcement at the time of the 
announcement and during the two days after the announcement. The results are in line with 
what was hypothesized since it was expected that there might be positive, although fairly 
weak, market reaction to the outsourcing announcement. Furthermore, most of the previous
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studies have found a positive reaction to the outsourcing announcement, although the results 
have been somewhat mixed as has already been discussed.
Table 4. Mean cumulative excess returns of outsourcers
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of outsourcers for the sample of 
316 outsourcing announcements. Mean cumulative excess returns are calculated using two 
risk adjustment proxies: market adjustment (MAR) and market risk adjustment (MRAR). 
Mean cumulative excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance ip- 
value) are presented for 14 different event windows. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
MAR MRAR
MCER t-test p-value MCER t-test p-value
Announcement day
[0] 0,01 % 0,05 0,961 0,06 % 0,36 0,719
Around the announcement
[-20,20] -0,45 % -0,38 0,704 0,13% 0,12 0,904
[-5,5] 0,23 % 0,37 0,712 0,30 % 0,51 0,610
[-2,2] 0,48 % 1,15 0,251 0,41 % 1,05 0,296
M,1] 0,20 % 0,63 0,529 0,17% 0,58 0,563
Up to the announcement
[-1.0] 0,04 % 0,14 0,892 0,06 % 0,23 0,815
[-2,0] 0,02 % 0,08 0,940 0,04 % 0,12 0,904
[-5,0] -0,04 % -0,09 0,926 -0,01 % -0,02 0,980
[-20,0] 0,70 % 0,83 0,409 0,72 % 0,91 0,366
After the announcement
[0,1] 0,18% 0,67 0,503 0,18% 0,73 0,466
[0,2] 0,46 % 1,44 0,152 0,43 % 1,44 0,151
[0,5] 0,28 % 0,61 0,540 0,37 % 0,86 0,389
[0,20] -1,14% -1,35 0,180 -0,53 % -0,66 0,511
[1] 0,17% 0,90 0,369 0,12% 0,67 0,502
An interesting detail in the results is the negative return for the outsourcers in the longest
[0,20] event window. The possible explanations for this are discussed in the next sections, 
where the conclusions of the aggregate sample analysis are shown.
As can be seen, from the table 5 below the results are fairly similar also when the 
standardization of the mean excess returns is employed. The excess returns are, however, 
slightly less positive or even slightly negative at the announcement day and immediately after 
it. Furthermore, there seems to be a significant negative market reaction at the 10% 
significance level in the longest after the announcement event window, which is somewhat 
inconsistent with the results obtained without the standardization, although the excess returns 
in the longest event window are negative also in those cases.
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Table 5. Scaled mean cumulative excess returns of outsourcers
This table reports scaled mean cumulative excess returns (scaled MCER) of outsourcers for 
the sample of 316 outsourcing announcements. Scaled mean cumulative excess returns are 
calculated by dividing the cumulative excess returns by the standard deviation of the firms’ 
returns to account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the data. Scaled mean cumulative 
excess return (scaled MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance (p-value) are 
presented for 14 different event windows. ****** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
Scaled (MRAR)
Scaled (MCER) t-test p-value
Announcement day 
[0] -0,017 -0,34 0,738
Around the announcement 
[-20,20] -0,310 -0,95 0,342
[-5,5] -0,088 -0,52 0,601
[-2,2] 0,022 0,20 0,844
[-1,1] -0,011 -0,13 0,898
Up to the announcement 
[-1,0] -0,015 -0,21 0,833
[-2,0] -0,034 -0,39 0,699
[-5,0] -0,089 -0,71 0,476
[-20,0] 0,118 0,51 0,613
After the announcement 
[0,1] -0,013 -0,18 0,855
[0,2] 0,039 0,45 0,655
[0,5] -0,016 -0,13 0,896
[0,20] -0,445 -1,91 0,057*
[1] -0,058 -1,15 0,253
Thus, the preliminary analysis of the outsourcing announcements suggests that in aggregate, 
outsourcing leads to a small and insignificant value gain for the shareholders of the 
outsourcing firm during the three day period starting at the announcement day. However, 
there also seems to be small value loss during the 21 -day period starting at the announcement 
day.
In addition to the percentage returns discussed above dollar returns of the outsourcer have 
been analysed. The mean excess returns in dollars of the outsourcer are calculated using risk 
adjusted excess returns (MRAR). The results are shown in table 6 below. Mean excess returns 
across the total sample and for all the windows before and after the announcements are 
negative. The negative reactions are highly significant in most cases. The results differ from 
the results of the percentage return analysis and are quite the opposite. This disparity could be 
an indication of a size effect in outsourcing announcement excess returns caused by inverse 
correlation between the market reaction and firm size i.e. the larger the firm the worse the 
market reaction.
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Table 6. Mean cumulative dollar excess returns of outsourcers (in mill. $)
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of outsourcers for the sample of 
316 outsourcing announcements in terms of value (in million $). Mean cumulative excess 
return is calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns (MRAR). Mean cumulative 
excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance (p-value) are presented 
for 14 different event windows. ****** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%




[0] -190,3 -2,22 0,027**
Around the announcement
[-20,20] -1268,0 -2,31 0,022**
[-5,5] -444,4 -1,57 0,119
[-2,2] -282,1 -1,47 0,142
[-1,1] -270,5 -1,83 0,070*
Up to the announcement
M,0] -151,8 -1,25 0,211
[-2,0] -202,7 -1,37 0,173
[-5,0] -203,6 -0,97 0,333
[-20,0] -273,1 -0,70 0,487
After the announcement
[0,1] -309,0 -2,55 0,012**
[0,2] -269,7 -1,82 0,071*
[0,5] -431,1 -2,06 0,041**
[0,20] -1185,3 -3,02 0,003***
[1] -118,7 -1,39 0,167
Finally, the analysis of cumulative mean excess return during the 41-day event window, 
shown in Figure 10 below, also indicates that there is a small positive market reaction to 
outsourcing announcements at the announcement day and immediately after that, whereas the 
market reaction becomes negative during the 20-day period after the announcement.
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Figure 10. Mean cumulative excess return of the outsourcers during 41-day period 
around the announcement day
This figure presents the mean cumulative excess return of the outsourcers for the sample of 




The mean excess returns of the contractor are calculated using two risk adjustment proxies 
(MAR and MRAR). The results are shown in Table 7. Mean excess returns across the total 
sample and for most windows before and after the announcements are positive and 
significant. Particularly, at the announcement day the mean excess return is high and very 
significant. Moreover, the market reaction continues to be positive for the two-day period 
after the announcement and although the reaction is not significant for the individual days 
after the announcement the positive reaction has the highest t-value (and lowest p-value) for 
the [0,2] event window, instead of the announcement day. Therefore, these results indicate 
that shareholders of the contracting firm experience a significant wealth gain from 
outsourcing at the announcement day and in the following two days. The failure to observe 
significant excess returns for longer pre-announcement date windows suggests that there is 
little anticipation of the announcement. On the other hand, the fact that the excess returns for 
the two days just after the announcement are clearly positive though not significant (except 
for day +1 at the 10% significance level) suggests that the market does not fully capitalize the 
information content with the outsourcing announcement at the time of the announcement but 
instead there is a two day period after the announcement in which the adjustment continues to 
occur. This result is consistent with the findings from the outsourcing company analysis since
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for the outsourcers the market reaction also appeared during the three-day period starting at 
the announcement day. Compared to the reaction of the outsourcer, the positive reaction of 
the contractor seems to be clearly stronger than the positive reaction of the outsourcer, 
suggesting that the market reaction of the combined entity is positive. The results are 
consistent with the expectations on the sign and magnitude of the market reaction as more 
positive reaction was anticipated compared to the outsourcers. These results are consistent 
with Gao’s (2005) study, which also examined the market reaction of contractors.
Table 7. Mean cumulative excess returns of contractors
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of contractors for the sample of 
305 outsourcing announcements. Mean cumulative excess returns are calculated using two 
risk adjustment proxies: market adjustment (MAR) and market risk adjustment (MRAR). 
Mean cumulative excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance ip- 
value) are presented for 14 different event windows. ****** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.______________________________
MAR MRAR
MCER t-test p-value MCER t-test p-value
Announcement day 
[0] 0,73 % 3,83 0,000*** 0,74 % 3,96 0,000***
Around the announcement 
[-20,20] -1,16 % -0,95 0,345 -0,60 % -0,50 0,616
[-5,5] 0,79 % 1,25 0,213 0,99 % 1,60 0,112
[-2,2] 1,42 % 3,33 0,001*** 1,44 % 3,45 0,001***
[-1.1] 0,90 % 2,72 0,007*** 0,93 % 2,86 0,005***
Up to the announcement 
[-1.0] 0,64 % 2,37 0,019** 0,60 % 2,27 0,024**
[-2,0] 0,84 % 2,56 0,011** 0,80 % 2,46 0,015**
[-5,0] 0,73 % 1,56 0,119 0,79 % 1,72 0,087*
[-20,0] 0,31 % 0,35 0,726 0,28 % 0,32 0,747
After the announcement 
[0,1] 0,99 % 3,67 0,000*** 1,06% 4,03 0,000***
[0,2] 1,30 % 3,95 0,000*** 1,39 % 4,28 0,000***
[0,5] 0,79 % 1,69 0,092* 0,94 % 2,05 0,042**
[0,20] -0,73 % -0,84 0,403 -0,14% -0,16 0,873
[1] 0,26 % 1,36 0,176 0,32 % 1,74 0,084*
As can be seen, from the table 8 below the results are fairly similar, although slightly less 
significant, when the standardization of the mean excess returns is employed. Especially, the 
mean excess return at the announcement day is positive and highly significant as is the case 
without the standardization.
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Table 8. Scaled mean cumulative excess returns of contractors
This table reports scaled mean cumulative excess returns (scaled MCER) of contractors for 
the sample of 305 outsourcing announcements. Scaled mean cumulative excess returns are 
calculated by dividing the cumulative excess returns by the standard deviation of the firms’ 
returns to account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the data. Scaled mean cumulative 
excess return (scaled MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance (p-value) are 
presented for 14 different event windows. *;**5*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
Scaled (MRAR)
Scaled (MCER) t-test p-value
Announcement day 
[0] 0,188 3,71 0,000***
Around the announcement 
[-20,20] -0,165 -0,51 0,610
[-5,5] 0,256 1,52 0,129
[-2,2] 0,378 3,34 0,001***
[-1,1] 0,276 3,15 0,002***
Up to the announcement 
[-1,0] 0,185 2,58 0,011**
[-2,0] 0,224 2,55 0,012**
[-5,0] 0,210 1,69 0,092*
[-20,0] 0,044 0,19 0,849
After the announcement 
[0,1] 0,279 3,89 0,000***
[0,2] 0,342 3,90 0,000***
[0,5] 0,234 1,89 0,061*
[0,20] -0,022 -0,09 0,926
[1] 0,091 1,79 0,075*
Thus, the preliminary analysis of the outsourcing announcements suggests that in aggregate, 
outsourcing leads to a significant value gain for the shareholders of the contracting firm. An 
interesting detail in the results is the slightly negative return for the contactors in the [0,20] 
and [-20,20] event windows. Although this reaction is not significant the fact that it is 
negative is somewhat surprising. The possible explanations for this are discussed in the next 
sections, where the conclusions of the aggregate sample analysis are shown.
In addition to the percentage returns discussed above dollar returns of the contractor have 
been analysed. The mean excess returns in dollars of the contractors are calculated using risk 
adjusted excess returns (MRAR). The results are shown in table 9 below. Mean excess returns 
in dollar across the total sample and for most of the windows before and after the 
announcements are negative, though not significant. The results are thus not consistent with 
the results of the percentage returns. This disparity suggests the existence of a significant size 
effect in outsourcing announcement returns for the contractors. Furthermore, the correlation 
appears to be negative between the contractor size and the market reaction, since the mean
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excess dollar returns are simply market value-weighted averages of the percentage returns of 
individual contractors. Similar correlation was observed also for outsourcing firms.
Table 9. Mean cumulative dollar excess returns of contractors (in mill. $)
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of contractors for the sample of 
305 outsourcing announcements in terms of value (in million $). Mean cumulative excess 
return is calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns (MRAR). Mean cumulative 
excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance (p-value) are presented 
for 14 different event windows. ****** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%




[0] -22,0 -0,25 0,800
Around the announcement 
[-20,20] -741,0 -1,33 0,184
[-5,5] -375,1 -1,30 0,194
[-2,2] -110,8 -0,57 0,569
[-1,1] -28,9 -0,19 0,847
Up to the announcement 
[-1,0] -50,5 -0,41 0,681
[-2,0] -150,7 -1,00 0,317
[-5,0] -256,8 -1,21 0,228
[-20,0] -655,0 -1,65 0,101
After the announcement 
[0,1] -0,4 0,00 0,997
[0,2] 18,0 0,12 0,905
[0,5] -140,4 -0,66 0,510
[0,20] -108,0 -0,27 0,786
[1] 21,6 0,25 0,804
Finally, the analysis of cumulative mean excess return during the 41-day event window, 
shown in Figure 11 below, also indicates that there is a strongly positive market reaction to 
outsourcing announcements at the announcement day and during the following two-day 
period, whereas the market reaction over the 20-day period after the announcement is 
negative.
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Figure 11. Mean cumulative excess return of the contractors during 41-day period 
around the announcement day
This figure presents the mean cumulative excess return of the contractors for the sample of 





The mean excess returns of the combined entity are calculated using the risk-adjusted excess 
return (MRAR). The results are shown in Table 10. The sign of the mean excess returns 
across the total sample varies a lot and depends on the window used. However, consistent 
with the expectations the mean excess return during the two-day period after the 
announcement that is positive, though not significant. However, at the announcement day the 
excess return is slightly negative. The fact that the market reaction was only slightly positive 
suggests that there is a size effect in the contractors/outsourcers excess returns, so that the 
larger the contractor/outsourcer is (i.e. the more weight is assigned on it) the worse the market 
reaction. This size effect is visible, although on average contractors are larger than 
outsourcers in the sample and thus the value-weighted portfolio of these two is biased to the 
direction of the contractor. This result was expected since, due to the significant size effect in 
both outsourcing and contracting firms’ returns, the value-weighted market reaction was 
anticipated to be lower than simple average of the outsourcer and contractor returns.
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Table 10. Mean cumulative excess returns of the combined entities
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of the combined entity of 
outsourcer and contractor for the sample of 305 outsourcing announcements. Mean 
cumulative excess return is calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns (MRAR). 
Mean cumulative excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance ip- 
value) are presented for 14 different event windows. ****** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
_____________MRAR____________




-0,04 % -0,29 0,776
[-20,20] -1,47 % -1,61 0,110
[-5,5] -0,21 % -0,43 0,664
[-2,2] 0,08 % 0,25 0,801
[-1,1]
Up to the announcement
-0,22 % -0,90 0,370
[-1,0] -0,29 % -1,46 0,147
[-2,0] -0,29 % -1,15 0,250
[-5,0] -0,23 % -0,65 0,518
[-20,0]
After the announcement
-0,49 % -0,75 0,454
[0,1] 0,03 % 0,16 0,876
[0,2] 0,33 % 1,31 0,190
[0,5] -0,02 % -0,06 0,954
[0,20] -1,02 % -1,55 0,122
[1] 0,07 % 0,51 0,613
Furthermore, consistent with the earlier results the excess return in the 21-day period after the 
announcement is negative, though not significant. Thus, the preliminary analysis of the 
outsourcing announcements suggests that in aggregate, outsourcing leads to a minor value 
gain for the combined entity during the three-day period starting at the announcement day. 
However, the market reaction at the announcement day and immediately after it differs from 
the market reaction over the 21 -day period after the announcement. Final market reaction 
appears to be negative, since the returns for the combined entity in the longest event windows 
[-20,20] and [0,20] are negative. The possible explanations for the two-fold market reaction 
are discussed in the next sections, where the conclusions of the aggregate sample analysis are 
shown.
In addition to the percentage returns discussed above dollar returns of the combined entity 
have been analysed. The mean excess returns in dollars of the combined entity are calculated 
using risk adjusted excess returns (MRAR). The results are shown in table 11 below. Mean 
excess returns in dollar across the total sample and for all of the windows before and after the
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announcements are negative and in most cases highly significant. This result is consistent 
with the results of outsourcers and contractors and it supports the existence of a size effect as 
discussed earlier.
Table 11. Mean cumulative dollar excess returns of combined entities (in mill. $)
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of the combined entity of 
outsourcer and contractor for the sample of 305 outsourcing announcements in terms of value 
(in million $). Mean cumulative excess return is calculated using market risk adjusted excess 
returns (MRAR). Mean cumulative excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical 
significance (p-value) are presented for 14 different event windows. *;**;*** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
MRAR





[-20,20] -2088,5 -2,60 0,010**
[-5,5] -896,4 -2,16 0,032**
[-2,2] -407,1 -1,45 0,148
[-1,1]
Up to the announcement
-311,9 -1,44 0,153
[-1,0] -211,0 -1,19 0,235
[-2,0] -401,9 -1,85 0,067*




[0,1] -351,3 -1,98 0,049**
[0,2] -255,6 -1,18 0,241
[0,5] -599,7 -1,95 0,052*
[0,20] -1334,0 -2,32 0,021**
[1] -100,9
* Statistical significance at the 0.10 level 
** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level
-0,80 0,422
Finally, the analysis of cumulative mean excess returns during the 41 -day event window, 
shown in Figure 12 below, also indicates that there is a slightly positive market reaction to 
outsourcing announcements during the three-day period starting at the announcement day, 
whereas over the 20 period after the announcement the market reaction is clearly negative.
82
Figure 12. Mean cumulative excess return of the combined entities during 41-day period 
around the announcement day
This figure presents the mean cumulative excess return of combined entities for the sample of 
305 outsourcing announcements during 41-day period, starting 20 days before the 
announcement day.
NICER all combined entities
0,20 %
-1,20
5.1.4. Aggregate sample results with reduced sample size
In the following, the aggregate sample size is reduced by excluding announcements, where 
the deal size and the deal length are not disclosed. This is done to test the robustness of the 
findings of the aggregate sample analysis, since it is anticipated that stronger results can be 
obtained by excluding announcements that contain materially less new information than the 
majority of the announcements. The announcements that do not contain specific information 
on the deal size and deal length may also disturb the results and lead to misleading 
conclusions. The results are shown in Table 12.
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Table 12. Mean cumulative excess returns of outsourcers, contractors and combined 
entities applying reduced sample size
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of outsourcers, contractors and 
combined entities for the reduced sample of 223, 222 and 222 outsourcing announcements 
respectively. Mean cumulative excess returns are calculated using market risk adjusted excess 
returns (MRAR). Mean cumulative excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical 
significance (p-value) are presented for 14 different event windows. *,**,*** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
MRAR (outsourcer)MRAR (contractor)MRAR (combined)
MCER t-test p-value MCER t-test p-value MCER t-test p-value
Announcement day 
[0] 0,02 % 0,11 0,912 0,92 % 4,48 0,000"* 0,14 % 0,94 0,347
Around the announcement 
[-20,20] -0,10 % -0,09 0,932 1,00% 0,77 0,444 -0,69 % -0,70 0,484
[-5,5] 0,44 % 0,72 0,472 1,88% 2,78 0,006"* 0,57 % 1,12 0,265
[-2,2] 0,23 % 0,56 0,578 1,70% 3,73 0,000*" 0,42 % 1,22 0,225
[-1.1] 0,04 % 0,13 0,896 1,38 % 3,91 0,000"* 0,10 % 0,38 0,708
Up to the announcement 
[-1.0] 0,09 % 0,36 0,716 0,93 % 3,24 0,001*" 0,01 % 0,03 0,975
[-2.0] 0,04 % 0,14 0,893 0,99 % 2,80 0,006*** 0,03 % 0,12 0,902
[-5.0] 0,22 % 0,49 0,625 1,50% 3,01 0,003*" 0,42 % 1,13 0,259
[-20,0] 1,24 % 1,48 0,141 1,79% 1,92 0,057* 0,83 % 1,19 0,236
After the announcement 
[0.1] -0,03 % -0,13 0,900 1,36% 4,72 0,000*** 0,24 % 1,10 0,275
[0,2] 0,21 % 0,65 0,517 1,63 % 4,60 0,000*** 0,53 % 1,99 0,048"
[0.5] 0,24 % 0,53 0,595 1,30% 2,59 0,010" 0,29 % 0,77 0,444
[0,20] -1,32 % -1,58 0,117 0,12% 0,13 0,894 -1,38 % -1,96 0,051*
[1] -0,05 % -0,29 0,773 0,45 % 2,19 0,030" 0,09 % 0,61 0,546
The results are quite similar compared to the results with larger sample size. There are, 
however, some differences in the sizes of the market reactions. Firstly, the positive market 
reaction of the outsourcers is smaller during the three-day period starting at the announcement 
day and even slightly negative at the announcement day. Furthermore, the positive market 
reaction of the contractor at the announcement day and immediately after that is stronger 
compared to the larger sample. As a result of these the excess return of the combined entity 
becomes positive at the announcement day and statistically significant for the three-day 
period starting at the announcement day. The negative excess return during the 21 -day period 
after the announcement remains the same for the outsourcers and the combined entities, 
whereas for the contractors the excess return becomes slightly positive, though not significant.
5.1.5. Conclusions of the aggregate sample analysis
The results of the aggregate analysis indicate that shareholders of the outsourcing firm 
experience only a small wealth gain (0,21% to 0,46%) from outsourcing during the three-day 
period starting at the announcement day, whereas the shareholders of the contractors 
experience a much greater wealth gain (1,30% to 1,63%) from outsourcing during the same
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period. Furthermore, the percentage excess returns for outsourcers are not statistically 
significant, whereas for contractors they are highly significant. Additionally, there appears to 
be a strong size effect in the percentage returns leading to negative dollar returns for 
outsourcers (-$270 million) and only slightly positive dollar return for ($18 million) 
contractors over the same three-day period. Due to the size effect the combined entity of 
outsourcer and contractor experience only a small wealth gain (0,33% to 0,53%) from 
outsourcing when percentage returns are employed. However, due to the size effect the mean 
excess return of the combined entities is clearly negative (-$256 million). Size effect is 
expected, due to the information asymmetry hypothesis. However, if the size effect is caused 
by information asymmetry only, larger firms should have less positive (or negative) market 
reaction compared to smaller firms but not negative as the results imply. For this reason, the 
findings from the aggregate hypothesis do not fully support the information asymmetry 
assumption, although there clearly is a size effect. The conclusion is that outsourcing is a 
price sensitive event, particularly for the contractors, who experience a significant wealth gain 
(percentually) from outsourcing. Outsourcing does not appear to be a zero-sum game, since 
both parties and the combination experience on average a percentually positive market 
reaction, although for outsourcer and combined entity this effect is not statistically significant 
and therefore this conclusion is not fully supported by the empirical evidence. However, due 
to the size effect the combined market reaction is negative if measured in absolute dollars. 
Therefore, it is concluded that outsourcing is not value adding per se but depends on the size 
of the outsourcer and contractor.
The failure to observe significant excess returns for pre-announcement date event windows 
suggests that there is little anticipation of the announcement. Similarly, the lack of significant 
returns in the longer post-announcement periods indicate that the market fully capitalizes the 
information content with the outsourcing announcement during the three-day period starting 
at the announcement day. However, although the positive market reaction for contractors is 
clearly largest and statistically significant at the announcement day the results suggest that the 
market does not fully capitalize the information content with the outsourcing announcement at 
the announcement day.
The results for the outsourcers are in line with what was hypothesized earlier since it was 
expected that there might be positive, although fairly weak, market reaction to the outsourcing 
announcement. Furthermore, most of the previous studies have found a significant positive
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market reaction to the outsourcing announcement for outsourcers, and thus the results of this 
study are somewhat inconsistent with the earlier studies since the positive market reaction 
found in this study is rather weak and not statistically significant. The results for the 
contractors is consistent with the findings of Gao (2005) but contrary to the findings of 
Gellrich and Gewald (2005) as they found negative, though not significant market reaction for 
contractors during the three-day period starting at the announcement day. However, Gellrich 
and Gewald (2005) studied only financial institutions so the results are not fully comparable.
Finally, an interesting detail in the market reactions is that the market reactions of 
outsourcers, contractors and combined entities appear to be two-fold. In another words, the 
market reactions at the announcement day and immediately after it differs from the market 
reaction over the 21-day period after the announcement. Most of excess returns during the 21- 
day [0,20] and 41 -day [-20,20] event window are negative. Although the reactions are not 
significant the fact that they are negative is somewhat surprising especially when compared to 
the clearly positive market reaction of contractors at the announcement day and immediately 
after that. There are at least three possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, it can be 
that the market does not fully capitalize the information content with the outsourcing 
announcement at the time of the announcement or even during the two-day period after that 
but instead there is a longer period during which the adjustment continues to occur. 
Furthermore, the initial market reaction seems to be positive and highly significant, whereas 
the final market reaction appears to be negative, though not significant. This implies that at 
first the outsourcing announcement is regarded as good news for the outsourcer/contractor but 
after a longer time has elapsed the market reaction becomes negative. Second possible 
explanation could be that, since roughly one fourth of the outsourcing events used in the 
sample of this study occurred during the time period of relatively high growth (1999-2000) of 
stock indices due to the high-tech ‘bubble’ and since the companies in the sample are not 
necessarily considered as high-tech (especially the outsourcers), the excess returns may be 
biased to be negative since the stock market performance of the outsourcers and contractors 
are compared to that of the overall country indices affected by the stock market hype. 
However, the fact that the market reaction (MCER) is significantly more negative during the 
20 days after the announcement compared to the 20 days before the announcement is not 
consistent with the latter explanation. Finally, it is also possible that the results for the longest 
event windows are simply results of extraneous noise caused by other sources of information. 
The last explanation is assumed to be the most relevant in this study due to strong results at
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the announcement day and during the three-day period after that for contractors. Furthermore, 
previous studies have not reported significant negative market returns for the 21 -day period 
after the announcement.
5.2. Sub-sample results
The role of the different firm and outsourcing event characteristics is checked in the following 
by splitting the sample into two sub-samples according to the characteristic in question. 
Specifically, the role of outsourcing type, industry classification, and size of the outsourcer is 
examined to the market reaction of outsourcing firms. For contracting firms, the role of the 
outsourcing type, industry classification, size of the contractor, and outsourcing structure are 
examined.
Table 13 summarizes the results of the sub sample analysis using three day event window 
starting at the announcement day. Results from the sub-sample analysis indicate that the size 
of the market reaction of outsourcers is conditioned on the industry of the outsourcer, whereas 
the size of the market reaction of contractors is conditioned on the outsourcing type and 
structure as well as on the size of the outsourcer. Results and analysis for other event 
windows are reported in Appendix 3.
The results of sub-sample analysis does not clearly support the existence of size effect for the 
outsourcer. The three-day announcement period [0,2] mean excess return for smaller sized 
outsourcers is 1,50%, whereas for larger sized companies the mean excess return for same 
period is 0,12% when the full sample is used. This would indicate similar size effect that was 
found in the aggregate analysis. However, using the reduced sample these differences 
disappear since the excess returns for the same period are 0,22% and 0,23% respectively for 
smaller and larger sized firms.
For the contractor, the empirical evidence indicates strong size effect similar to that reported 
in the aggregate analysis. For smaller sized contractors the mean excess return during the 
three-day announcement period [0,2] is 2,56% compared to 0,95% for larger contractors. The 
same effect was found when the reduced sample was used, i.e. excess returns for the same 
period are 3,09% and 1,21% respectively for smaller and larger sized contractors. The
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differences are statistically significant and also consistent with the findings from the 
aggregate sample analysis regarding the size effect.
The industry of the outsourcer appeared to have an effect on the size of the market reaction of 
outsourcers, i.e. the market reaction of financial institutions appear to be clearly weaker 
compared to other outsourcers. The three-day announcement period [0,2] mean excess returns 
for financial institutions are -0,87% and -1,01% (full and reduced sample respectively), while 
for other outsourcers the excess returns are 1,12 % and 1,07% (full and reduced sample 
respectively). The differences between these two groups are clearly statistically significant. 
For contractors the differences between the two groups are not statistically significant.
The outsourcing type appeared to have an effect only on the market reaction of the contractor. 
The three-day announcement period [0,2] mean excess returns of contractors for electronic 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements are 2.19% and 3.04% (full and reduced sample 
respectively), while for IS outsourcing announcements they are 0.75% to 0.95 % (full and 
reduced sample respectively). These differences are clearly statistically significant.
The outsourcing structure has a clear and significant impact on the market reaction of the 
contractor. The three-day announcement period [0,2] mean excess returns of contractors for 
outsourcing deals based on alliance structure are 5,38% and 5,38% (full and reduced sample 
respectively), while for other structures they are 1,19% and 1,39% (full and reduced sample 
respectively). These differences are clearly statistically significant, though the sample size is 
fairly low for alliance based outsourcing deals.
The results suggesting that there is a strong size effect in the market reactions of contractors, 
whereas for outsourcers the results are not as consistent. This is in line with what was 
hypothesized earlier for contractors. The observed size effect for contractors is also consistent 
with the earlier findings of aggregate sample analysis as well as with the previous study by 
Gao (2005). Also the positive impact of alliance structure on the market reaction of 
contractors is consistent with the hypothesis developed earlier. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
outsourcers’ market reaction is clearly weaker for financial institutions compared to other 
firms is inconsistent with what was hypothesized earlier based on the higher informational 
intensity of financial institutions. This is also somewhat inconsistent with the results of Hayes 
et al. (2001). On the other hand, this result is consistent with the findings of Juma’h and
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Wood (2003) for financial institutions. Finally, it was hypothesized that the manufacturing 
outsourcing announcements would have stronger market reaction than IS outsourcing 
announcement for the outsourcers. However, based on the sub-sample analysis this is true 
only for contractors, which was not anticipated.
Thus it seems that significant differences exist with regard to the capital market’s reaction to 
outsourcing announcements. Based on the above statistical evidence it appears that investors 
distinguish between the various deals and base their evaluation of the newly formed 
outsourcing deal on the deal characteristics rather than on general considerations regarding 
outsourcing.
Table 13. Mean cumulative excess returns for different sub-samples
This table reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of outsourcers and contractors for 
different sub-samples. Sub-samples are based on two different samples: full sample with 316 
(outsourcers) and 305 (contractors) outsourcing announcements and reduced sample with 223 
(outsourcer) and 222 (contractor) outsourcing announcements. Mean cumulative excess 
returns are calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns (MRAR). Mean cumulative 
excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance (p-value) are reported 
for 8 different sub-samples. ****** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively using two-tailed tests.
Outsourcer's mean cumulative excess return Contractor's mean cumulative excess return
Full sample MCER t-test p-value MCER t-test p-value
Smaller sized firms 1,50% 1,96 0,052* 2,56 % 3,87 0,000***
Larger sized firms 0,12 % 0,41 0,685 0,95 % 2,82 0,005***
Financial institutions 41,87 % -2,01 0,046** 1,02 % 1,61 0,109
Other firms 1,12% 2,45 0,015** 0,62 % 1,60 0,112
Electronic manufacturing outsourcing 0,38 % 0,76 0,450 2,19 % 3,83 0,000***
Information system outsourcing 0,48 % 1,44 0,152 0,75 % 2,21 0,029**
Alliances 5,38 % 4,22 0,000***
Other structures 1,19% 3,63 0,000***
Reduced sample
Smaller sized firms 0,22 % 0,32 0,746 3,09 % 3,85 0,000***
Larger sized firms 0,23 % 0,68 0,497 1,21 % 3,28 0,001***
Financial institutions -1,01 % -2,08 0,039** 1,40 % 2,10 0,037**
Other firms 1,07 % 2,41 0,017** 0,75 % 1,90 0,060*
Electronic manufacturing outsourcing -0,21 % -0,35 0,728 3,04 % 3,75 0,000***
Information system outsourcing 0,43 % 1,22 0,224 0,95 % 2,76 0,006***
Alliances 5,38 % 4,22 0,000***
Other structures 1,39 % 3,84 0,000"“
5.3. Regression results
Due to the limitations in univariate analysis the effect of the different variables on the stock 
market reaction around the announcement day is simultaneously examined using multivariate 
cross-sectional regression analysis. Several different multivariate cross-sectional regression 
models have been used in this study to examine the cross-sectional differences in the excess
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returns for outsourcer and contractor. The objective is to test whether the explanatory 
variables support the corresponding hypothesis on their effect on the market reaction. In 
addition models have been chosen so that the effects of multi-collinearity are minimized. 
Furthermore, two alternative risk adjustment proxies and several different event windows 
have been employed in order to enhance the reliability of the results. Finally, some of the 
results are also shown with standardization of excess returns.
5.3.1. Outsourcer
Table 14, 15 and 16 present the findings from the regression analysis of the announcement 
period excess returns of outsourcers. The results of model 1 show that the revenue, net 
income (%) and industry of the outsourcer and the deal size are the only statistically 
significant variables.
OUTSOURCER REVENUE is negative and statistically highly significant. Consistent with 
earlier findings from both the aggregate and sub-sample analysis and with the hypothesis 
developed this result suggests that the market reaction is weaker for larger firms compared to 
smaller firms. Moreover, OUTSOURCER REVENUE variable is negative in all the models 
tested and statistically highly significant in most of the models. Based on this statistical 
evidence, there is strong empirical support for the existence of the size effect for outsourcer. 
The result is also consistent with the findings of Hayes et al. (2001) and Gao (2005).
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION variable is also negative and statistically significant. This result 
is consistent with the findings from the sub-sample analysis suggesting that the market 
reaction of financial institutions is worse compared to other firms. Furthermore, FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION variable is negative in all the models tested and statistically significant in 
most of the models. This relationship is, however, contrary to the hypothesis developed 
earlier based on the higher informational intensity of financial institutions. The result is also 
contrary to the findings of Hayes at al. (2001) for the service firms, although the results of 
Juma’h and Wood (2003) for financial institutions were consistent with the results obtained in 
this study.
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The results from model 1 also show that NET INCOME is positive and statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis developed earlier and suggests that 
companies with high profitability have greater stock market reaction compared to companies 
with lower profitability. Reliability of the result is enhanced by the fact that NET INCOME 
variable is positive in all the models tested and statistically significant in most of the models.
Finally, according to the results of model 1 also DEAL SIZE is positive and statistically 
significant. This result is contradictory with the hypothesis developed earlier and thus 
supports the counter-hypothesis, suggesting that larger deals have larger impact on the market 
values of the outsourcers compared to smaller deals. Furthermore, this result is also 
inconsistent with the findings of Oh and Gall ivan (2004). This variable is positive in all the 
models and statistically significant in all the announcement day models using MRAR excess 
returns.
All the other variables were not statistically significant when two-tailed test at 0,10 
significance level was used. However, if one-tailed test had been used, both CONTRACTOR 
REVENUE and TRANSFORMATIONAL ROLE would have become significant. 
CONTRACTOR REVENUE is positive and thus inconsistent with the hypothesis developed 
earlier, whereas TRANSFORMATIONAL ROLE is negative and consistent with the 
hypothesis developed earlier.
Models 2 and 3 are used to study the firm characteristics and outsourcing event characteristics 
separately, mainly due to potential multi-collinearity reasons. The results from these models 
support the above conclusions. Furthermore, model 2 with firm characteristics seems to have 
clearly higher explanatory power compared to model 3 with event characteristics.
In model 4 some of the variables that appear not to be significant based on the earlier 
empirical results are excluded due to multi-collinearity reasons. This also makes it possible to 
use larger sample size, since fewer events have to be removed due to lack of information on 
firm characteristics. Additionally, a new variable RELATIVE DEAL SIZE is included in the 
model in order to distinquish between the effects of the absolute deal size and relative deals 
size (deal size relative to the revenue of the firm). RELATIVE DEAL SIZE is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that announcements with larger relative deal size have worse 
impact on the market values than relatively smaller deals. This is opposite when compared to
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the variable DEAL SIZE and inconsistent with what was hypothesized. However, the fact that 
in model 4 variable OUTSOURCER REVENUE is negative and still statistically highly 
significant implies that the effect of the size of the outsourcer is based on the differences in 
informational asymmetry as hypothesized earlier and not merely on the relative deal size.
In model 5 a slope dummy variable FINANCIAL INSTITUTION*REVENUE is specified 
and included. Results from model 5 show that this variable is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that the effect of the size (revenue) of the outsourcer is dependent on 
the industry of the outsourcer. In another words, there appears to be clear negative correlation 
between the excess returns and the size (revenue) of the outsourcer. However, the size effect 
is different for financial institutions and other firms. For financial institutions the size effect 
appears to be clearly smaller than for other firms. Furthermore, adding this slope dummy 
clearly improves the statistical significance of the FINANCIAL INSTITUTION dummy.
In models 6,7, and 8 the three-day period [0,2] excess return is regressed instead of the 
announcement day excess return. On overall level, the fitted models have higher explanatory 
power (statistical significance) than the announcement day models, suggesting that the 
markets do not fully capitalize the information content of outsourcing announcements at the 
day of the announcement, which is consistent with the earlier findings. The results of these 
three models are fairly similar to the announcement day models with a few exceptions and 
thus support the conclusions made earlier in this section. However, variable DEAL SIZE is 
not statistically significant in models 6 to 8, although it is still positive. Additionally, two 
variables that previously were not statistically significant become significant, that is to say 
DEAL LENGTH and STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY. DEAL LENGTH is positive and 
statistically significant, which is inconsistent with what was hypothesized earlier. STOCK 
RETURN VOLATILITY is also positive and highly statistically significant, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis on firm risk developed earlier. Also the fact that variable 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY is positive in all other models as well, although not always 
statistically significant increases the reliability of this result.
Finally, in models 9,10,11, and 12 the same variables as in model 5 are employed. In models 
9 and 10 a different risk adjustment proxy (MAR) has been employed in calculating the 
announcement day and three-day period [0,2] excess returns. In models 11 and 12 the 
announcement day and three-day period [0,2] excess returns are scaled with the standard
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deviation of the corresponding firms’ share price. On overall level, the results are fairly 
similar to the previous models and support the main conclusions made earlier. Furthermore, 
these models have somewhat lower F-values and thus statistical significance than the 
corresponding earlier models. Variable NET INCOME is not statistically significant when 
scaling of excess returns is used and dummy variable FINANCIAL INSTITUTION is not 
statistically significant when different risk adjustment proxy (MAR) is used. However, also in 
these models the two variables would still be statistically significant at 0,10 significance level 
if one-tailed test were used.
93
Table 14. Regression analysis of outsourcer’s announcement day excess returns 
This table reports regression analysis of outsourcer’s announcement day excess returns using 
different sets of explanatory variables. Expected sign column indicates the expected sign of 
the explanatory variable coefficients based on the hypothesis developed in Chapter 2. Tests 
are conducted in a sample of 210 or 223 (depending on selected variables) outsourcing 
contracts announced between 1996 and 2004. Excess returns are calculated using market risk 
adjusted excess returns. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
T-tests conducted are two-tailed.___________________________________________________
Variable Expected _____ Outsourcer's announcement day excess return_____
_____________________________________________ Sign________ 1_________ 2_________ 3_________ 4_________ 5
Intercept
OUTSOURCER REVENUE





RELATIVE DEAL SIZE 
DEAL LENGTH









STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY +







0,00000 0,00471 0,02309 0,01308 0,04349
0 -0,22 -1,32 -0,64 (2,27)"
-0,00485 -0,00435 -0,00239 -0,00500 -0,00685
(-2,55)** (-2,35)** (-1,48) (-2,51)** (-3,07)***
0,04752 0,04529 0,02926 0,02969
(2,45)** (2,40)** (1,73)* (1,77)*
0,00323 0,00165 0,00155
-1,48 -0,98 -1,14
-0,01141 -0,01127 -0,00694 -0,06892
(-1,72)* (-1,81)* (-1,38) (-2,00)**
0,00003 -0,00226
0 (-0,44)
0,00434 0,00332 0,00376 0,00420





















0,26006 0,25988 0,20317 0,20725 0,19169
-1,26 -1,26 -1,07 -1,16 -1,07
-0,00035 -0,00039 -0,00028 -0,00039 -0,00023







210 210 210 223 223
0,014 0,022 -0,013 0,028 0,038
1,151 1,428 0,748 1,795* 2,083**
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Table 15. Regression analysis of outsourcer’s cumulative excess returns 
This table reports regression analysis of outsourcer’s cumulative excess returns using 
different sets of explanatory variables and a three day event window starting at the 
announcement day [0,2]. Expected sign column indicates the expected sign of the explanatory 
variable coefficients based on the hypothesis developed in Chapter 2. Tests are conducted in a 
sample of 223 outsourcing contracts announced between 1996 and 2004. Cumulative excess 
returns are calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. T-tests conducted are two-tailed.
Variable Expected Outsourcer’s cumulative excess return
Sign 6 7 8
Intercept 0,01777 -0,00695 -0,02045
-0,64 (-0,23) (-0,78)
OUTSOURCER REVENUE - -0,00539 -0,00484 -0,00301
(-1,67)* (-1,50) (-1,19)
OUTSOURCER NET INCOME + 0,04971 0,04505 0,04995
(2,03)** (1,85)* (2,10)**
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION + -0,09342 -0,0905378 -0,08172
(-1,87)* (-1,82)* (-1,68)*
DEAL SIZE - 0,00354 0,00389 0,00262
-1,23 -1,36 -1,06
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE - -0,06276 -0,04946
(-1,14) (-0,89)
DEAL LENGTH - 0,00229 0,00241
(2,03)** (2,14)**
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY + 0,82092 0,9025 0,90371
(3,16)*** (3,46)*** (3,47)***
MARKET TO BOOK + -0,0001 -0,00004 -0,00006
(-0,22) (-0,09) (-0,14)
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION*OUTSOURCER REVENUE 0,00852 0,00813 0,00721
(1,64)* -1,56 -1,42
Sample size 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0,065 0,079 0,08
F statistics 2,944*** 3,111*** 3,402***
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Table 16. Regression analysis of outsourcer’s announcement day and cumulative excess 
returns
This table reports regression analysis of outsourcer’s announcement day and cumulative 
excess returns using different sets of explanatory variables. Expected sign column indicates 
the expected sign of the explanatory variable coefficients based on the hypothesis developed 
in Chapter 2. Event window varies in the different models, i.e. models 10 and 12 have a three 
day event window starting at the announcement day [0,2], whereas in models 9 and 11 only 
announcement day is included. In models 11 and 12 excess returns are calculated using 
market risk adjusted excess returns, whereas in models 9 and 10 market adjusted excess 
returns have been used. Tests are conducted in a sample of 223 outsourcing contracts 
announced between 1996 and 2004. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 













Intercept 0,03773 0,00196 0,01215 0,00728
(1,83) (0,07) (1,74)* (0,73)
OUTSOURCER REVENUE - -0,00629 -0,00371 -0,00211 -0,00192
(-2,62)*** (-1,06) (-2,60)** (-1,67)**
OUTSOURCER NET INCOME + 0,04138 0,0573 0,00733 0,01206
(2,30)** (2,18)** (1,20) (1,40)
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION + -0,05256 -0,07867 -0,02021 -0,0366
(-1,42) (-1,46) (-1,65)* (-2,07)**
DEAL SIZE - 0,00334 0,00261 0,0018 0,00204
(1.57) (0,84) (2,50)** (2,01)**
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE - -0,07623 -0,02333 -0,02252 -0,01666
(-1,87)* (-0,39) (-1,62) (-0,85)
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY + 0,32457 0,91469 0,02775 0,11399
(1,69)* (3,27)*** (0,43) (1.24)
MARKET TO BOOK + -0,00032 -0,00006 -0,00017 -0,00014
(-0,91) (-0,11) (-1,39) (-0,81)
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'OUTSOURCER REVENUE 0,00522 0,0073 0,00186 0,00331
(1,35) (1,30) (1.42) (1,79)*
Sample size 223 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0,036 0,051 0,032 0,044
F statistics 2,036** 2,498** 1,912* 2,284"
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5.3.2. Contractor
Tables 17 and 18 present the findings from the regression analysis of the announcement 
period excess returns of contractors. On overall level the models employed have clearly 
higher F-values and statistical significance than the models employed for outsourcers. This 
was expected since the positive market reaction for contractors is significantly higher 
compared to outsourcers.
The results of model 1 show that the size (revenue) and profitability (net income %) of the 
contractor and the size of the deal are the only statistically significant variables, when two- 
tailed test is employed at 0,10 significance level. However, also variables PERFORMANCE, 
MARKET TO BOOK, and ALLIANCE are statistically significant at 0,10 significance level 
if one-tailed test is employed. All the other variables are not consistently statistically 
significant and are thus not discussed in more detail.
CONTRACTOR REVENUE variable is negative and statistically highly significant. 
Consistent with earlier findings from both the aggregate and sub-sample analysis regarding 
the size effect this result suggests that the market reaction is weaker for larger contractors 
compared to smaller contractors. Additionally, this result is also consistent with what was 
hypothesized earlier based on the informational asymmetry. Moreover, CONTRACTOR 
REVENUE variable is negative and highly significant in all the models tested for contractors, 
further increasing the reliability of the result. Based on this statistical evidence, there is very 
strong empirical support for the existence of the size effect for contractor.
DEAL SIZE variable is positive and statistically very significant. This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis developed earlier, suggesting that larger deals have greater impact on the 
market value of the contactor than smaller deals. There is very strong empirical support also 
for this result due to the extremely high statistical significance of this variable in all the 
models tested for contractors.
Although not predicted, regressions are also run to test for a profitability effect of the 
contractor. The results of model 1 show that NET INCOME variable is negative and 
statistically significant, although only at the 0.10 significance level. This result is not as
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consistent as the two other variables above since the NET INCOME variable is not 
statistically significant in any of the other models (except model 9) that are tested. 
Furthermore, when three-day announcement period excess returns are employed, the NET 
INCOME variable becomes highly insignificant, which thus decreases the reliability of this 
result.
ALLIANCE variable is positive but not statistically significant at 0,10 significance level 
when two-tailed test is used, which is somewhat surprising, since in the sub-sample analysis 
the mean excess return was found to be significantly higher for outsourcing deals based on an 
alliance compared to other forms of deals. The variable becomes statistically significant, 
however, when a slope dummy variable ALLIANCE*DEAL SIZE is added to the models, 
suggesting that outsourcing deals based on an alliance structure have better impact on the 
market value of the contractor than other outsourcing deals. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis developed earlier regarding the impact of alliance structure on the market reaction. 
Furthermore, the results imply that the positive relationship between deal size and the excess 
return is weaker for deals based on an alliance structure compared to other deals. The 
ALLIANCE variable is positive and statistically significant in all the models, where the slope 
dummy ALLIANCE*DEAL SIZE is present. Furthermore, the significance is higher in 
models, where three-day announcement period excess return is regressed, compared to the 
announcement day models.
According to the results of model 1 variable PERFORMANCE is negative but not statistically 
significant at 0,10 significance level if two-tailed test is used. PERFORMANCE variable is 
consistently negative in all the models but statistically significant only when three-day 
announcement period excess returns are regressed. The results suggest that weak share price 
development has positive impact on the market reaction, which is contrary to what was 
hypothesized earlier.
The results of model 1 also show that variable MARKET TO BOOK is positive but not 
statistically significant at 0,10 significance level if two-tailed test is used. MARKET TO 
BOOK variable is consistently positive in all the models but statistically significant only 
when scaled announcement day excess returns are employed. The results suggest that 
contractors with high growth opportunities have greater market reaction compared to
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contractors with low growth opportunities. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
developed earlier.
In Models 2 some of the variables that appear not to be significant based on the earlier 
empirical results are excluded due to multi-collinearity reasons. The results from this models 
support the conclusions made above regarding the significance of different variables.
In model 3 a new slope dummy variable ALLIANCE*DEAL SIZE is included in the model. 
Results from model 3 show that this variable is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the effect of the size of the deal is dependent on the structure of the deal. In 
another words, there appears to be clear positive correlation between the excess returns and 
the size of the deal. However, the size effect is different for alliance based deals and other 
deals. For alliance based deals the size effect appears to be clearly smaller than for other 
deals. Furthermore, adding this slope dummy clearly improves the statistical significance of 
the ALLIANCE dummy and the statistical significance of the whole model.
In model 4 some of the variables that appear not to be significant based on the earlier 
empirical results are excluded due to multi-collinearity reasons. This clearly improves F-value 
and statistical significance of the whole model. The individual results regarding the statistical 
significance of the different explanatory variables remain the same as in model 3.
In model 5 a new variable DEAL SIZE RELATIVE is included in the model in order to 
distinguish between the effects of the absolute deal size and relative deal size (deal size 
relative to the revenue of the firm). DEAL SIZE RELATIVE is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Two conclusions are drawn based on this. Firstly, the fact that in model 5 
variable CONTRACTOR REVENUE is negative and still statistically highly significant 
implies that the effect of the size of the contractor is based on the differences in informational 
asymmetry as hypothesized earlier and not merely on the relative deal size. Secondly, it also 
appears that it is the absolute deal size that is relevant for the size of the market reaction not 
the relative deal size.
In model 6 three-day period [0,2] excess return is regressed instead of the announcement day 
excess return using the same variables as in the model 3. On overall level, model 6 has higher 
explanatory power (statistical significance) than the announcement day model 3, suggesting
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Finally, in models 7,8,9, and 10 the same variables as in model 3 are employed. In models 7 
and 8 a different risk adjustment proxy (MAR) has been employed in calculating the 
announcement day and three-day period [0,2] excess returns. In models 9 and 10 the 
announcement day and three-day period [0,2] excess returns are scaled with the standard 
deviation of the corresponding contractors’ share price. On overall level, the results are fairly 
similar to the previous models and support the main conclusions made earlier. Furthermore, 
these models have somewhat lower F-values and thus statistical significance than the 
corresponding earlier models.
that the markets do not fully capitalize the information content of outsourcing announcements
at the day of the announcement, which is consistent with the earlier findings. The results of
this model are fairly similar to the announcement day.
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Table 17. Regression analysis of contractor’s announcement day excess returns 
This table reports regression analysis of contractor’s announcement day excess returns using 
different sets of explanatory variables. Expected sign column indicates the expected sign of 
the explanatory variable coefficient based on the hypothesis developed in Chapter 2. Tests are 
conducted in a sample of 222 outsourcing contracts announced between 1996 and 2004. 
Excess returns are calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. T-tests conducted are two-tailed.
Variable Expected
Sign
Contractor's announcement day excess return
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0,02161 0,01544 0,01403 0,00672 0,00678
(1,74)* (1,52) (1,40) (1,72)* (1,72)*
CONTRACTOR REVENUE - -1.275E-07 -1.667E-07 -1.735E-07 -1,601E-07 -1.626E-07
(-1,64)* (-2,50)** (-2,62)*** (-2,74)*** (-2,56)**
CONTRACTOR NET INCOME -0,07709 -0,07063 -0,06397 -0,0649 -0,06423





DEAL SIZE + 0,00002 1.616E-05 2.687E-05 2.645E-05 2.694E-05
(3,98)*** (4,01)*** (4,25)*** (4,35)*** (3,51)***
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE + -0,00396
(-0,10)
DEAL LENGTH + -0,00066 -0,00067 -0,00056
(-0,63) (-0,79) (-0,65)




COST FOCUS - 0,00043
(0,06)
INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT + -0,00356
(-0,68)
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY -0,09342 -0,09655 -0,14919
(-0,50) (-0,54) (-0,84)
MARKET TO BOOK 0,00095 0,00089 0,00089 0,00069 0,00069
(1.60) (1,54) (1,54) (1,26) (1.26)
ALLIANCE + 0,01181 0,01077 0,01783 0,01691 0,01676
(1.31) (1,22) (1,91)* (1,83)* (1,79)*
ALLIANCE*DEAL SIZE -1.743E-05 -1.791E-05 -1J51E-05
(-2,18)** (-2,30)** (-2,00)**
Sample size 222 222 222 222 222
Adjusted R2 0,136 0,150 0,165 0,167 0,163
F statistics 3,676*** 5,871*** 5,841*** 8,400*** 7,168***
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Table 18. Regression analysis of contractor’s announcement day and cumulative excess 
returns
This table reports regression analysis of contractor’s announcement day and cumulative 
excess returns using different sets of explanatory variables. Expected sign column indicates 
the expected sign of the explanatory variable coefficients based on the hypothesis developed 
in Chapter 2. Event window varies in the different models, i.e. models 6, 8 and 10 have a 
three day event window starting at the announcement day [0,2], whereas in models 7 and 9 
only announcement day is included. In models 6, 9 and 10 excess returns are calculated using 
market risk adjusted excess returns, whereas in models 7 and 8 market adjusted excess returns 
have been used. Tests are conducted in a sample of 222 outsourcing contracts announced 
between 1996 and 2004. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 




Contractor's announcement day/cumulative excess return
6









Intercept 0,00700 0,01531 0,00784 0,57656 0,77391
(0.36) (1.49) (0,40) (1.9D* (1.34)
CONTRACTOR REVENUE - -2.848E-07 -1.618E-07 -2.787E-07 -7.888E-06 -1.236E-05
(-2,21 Г (-2.39)** (-2,17)” (-3,97)*” (-3.24)*"
CONTRACTOR NET INCOME 0,04193 -0,06781 0,02964 -2,2944 0,32912
(0.50) (-1.54) (0.35) (-1.77)* (0,13)
DEAL SIZE + 4.630E-05 2.409E-05 4.368E-05 0.00076 0,00113
(3.76)*** (3,73)*** (3,56)*** (4,00)*** (3,10)*"
DEAL LENGTH + -0,00084 -0,00055 -0,00089 0,00256 -0,01689
(-0.51) (-0,63) (-0,54) (0,10) (-0,35)
CONTRACTOR STOCK PERFORMANCE + -0,0294 -0,00278 -0,01444 -0,23199 -0,68028
(-2.47)** (-0,44) (-1,21) (-1.27) (-1,93)*
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 0,063602 -0,18014 0,02124 -11,896 -12,713
(0,18) (-0,99) (0,06) (-2,24)" (-1,24)
MARKET TO BOOK 0,00126 0,00091 0,00158 0,03403 0,03960
(1.12) (1.55) (1.41) (1,97)* (1.19)
ALLIANCE + 0,03940 0,01948 0,04412 0,63900 1.2932
(2,17)** (2,05)** (2,44)" (2,29)** (2,41)"
ALLIANCE*DEAL SIZE -0,000008956 -0,00001668 -0,00001434 -0,00056 -0,00029
(-0,57) (-2,05)” (-0.93) (-2,34)" (-0,63)
Sample size 222 222 222 222 222
Adjusted R2 0,191 0,128 0,156 0,161 0,143
F statistics 6,797*** 4,592*** 5,527*** 5,711*** 5,083***
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5.3.3. Conclusions of the regression analysis
5.3.3.1. Outsourcer
Evident presented in this section indicates that the market reaction of outsourcers announcing 
information technology or electronic manufacturing outsourcing agreements is strongly 
conditioned on the size, profitability and industry of the outsourcer. Based on the statistical 
evidence, there is strong empirical support for the significance of these three variables. 
Moreover, there is also empirical evidence of a combined effect between these variables since 
the effect of the size of the outsourcer appears to be dependent on the industry of the 
outsourcer. In addition to these three firm characteristics also the deal size and firm risk 
appeared to have an effect on the market reaction, although the empirical support is less 
consistent and somewhat mixed. Furthermore, the size effect found in the regression analysis 
supports the hypothesis that the value of the outsourcing deal is conditioned based on the 
degree of information asymmetry existing in the market. According to this study the capital 
market placed a higher value on outsourcing announcement information for higher asymmetry 
firms (i.e. small firms). The effect of the signalling value of the outsourcing deal 
announcement is still unclear. The hypothesis that higher agency costs lead to more positive 
market reaction to outsourcing announcements did not receive empirical support. Similarly, 
the hypothesis related to the rationale for outsourcing, outsourcing type, growth opportunities, 
type of announcement and contractor experience were not supported by the empirical results. 
The regression results for outsourcer are summarized in Table 19.
Most of the findings are consistent with what was hypothesized earlier. However, the fact that 
the market reaction is clearly weaker for financial institutions compared to other firms is 
contrary to what was anticipated based on the higher informational intensity of financial 
institutions. Similarly also the positive relationship between deal size and market reaction was 
inconsistent with the hypothesis developed earlier.
Compared to previous studies the results are somewhat mixed. The size effect found in this 
study is consistent with that of Hayes et al. (2001) and Gao (2005), although contrary to what 
is found by Juma’h and Wood (2003). On the other hand the less positive market reaction of 
financial institutions compared to other firms is supported by Juma’h and Wood (2003), 
whereas Hayes et al. (2001) found a contradicting relationship. The positive relationship
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between the deal size and market reaction is consistent with the findings of Gao (2005) and 
Gellrich and Gewald (2005) and inconsistent with the findings of Oh and Gallivan (2004). A 
completely new finding that has not been reported in the earlier studies is the positive 
relationship between the profitability of the outsourcer and the market reaction. Also the 
somewhat less reliable result related to firm risk has not been reported before. Additionally, 
the combined effect of the industry and size of the outsourcer has not been reported in the 
earlier studies.
Finally, the fact that models with three-day announcement period [0,2] excess returns as 
dependent variable have consistently higher statistical significance than corresponding models 
with announcement day excess return suggests that the market does not fully capitalize the 
information content in the outsourcing announcement at the announcement day.
5.3.3.2. Contractor
Evidence presented in this section indicates that the market reaction of contractors of 
information technology or electronic manufacturing outsourcing agreements is strongly 
conditioned on the size of the outsourcer and on the size and structure of the outsourcing deal. 
Based on the statistical evidence, there is strong empirical support for the significance of 
these three variables, particularly for the size of the outsourcer and the size of the deal. 
Moreover, there is also empirical evidence of a combined effect between these variables since 
the effect of the size of the deal appears to be dependent on the structure of the deal i.e. 
whether the deal is alliance or not. In addition to these three firm and event characteristics 
also contractor’s stock market performance and growth opportunities appeared to have an 
effect on the market reaction, although the empirical support is less consistent and somewhat 
mixed. Furthermore, the size effect found in the regression analysis supports the hypothesis 
that the value of the outsourcing deal for the contractor is conditioned based on the degree of 
information asymmetry existing in the market. According to this study the capital market 
placed a higher value on outsourcing announcement information for higher asymmetry firms 
(i.e. small firms) both in the case of contractors and outsourcers. The hypothesis related to the 
rationale for outsourcing, outsourcing type, type of announcement, deal length and contractor 
experience were not supported by the empirical results. The regression results for contractor 
are summarized in Table 19.
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Most of the findings are consistent with what was hypothesized earlier. However, the fact that 
the market reaction is weaker for contractors with strong stock price performance is contrary 
to what was anticipated based on the better negotiation power. Additionally, the profitability 
of the contractor was not anticipated to have an effect on the market reaction, although 
(somewhat mixed) empirical support is found that there is a negative relationship between 
these two. There are only a few studies examining the market reaction of contractors. The 
positive relationship between deal size and market reaction and the negative relationship 
between contractor size and market reaction were confirmed also by Gao (2005). The 
reliability of these findings is reinforced by the fact that the relationship between market 
reaction and both contractor size and deal size were statistically highly significant both in 
Gao’s (2005) and in this study. Gellrich and Gewald (2005) found opposite relationship for 
deal size and market reaction when examining financial institutions only. The impact of 
outsourcing structure has not been studied earlier.
Finally, the fact that models with three-day announcement period [0,2] excess returns as 
dependent variable have consistently higher statistical significance than corresponding models 
with announcement day excess return suggests that the market does not fully capitalize the 
information content in the outsourcing announcement at the announcement day. This is 
consistent with aggregate and sub-sample analysis and also with the findings from the 
outsourcing firms.
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Table 19. Comparison of hypothesis and regression results by explanatory variable for 
outsourcer and contractor
This table presents the original hypothesis for each explanatory variable and compares that to 
the regression results for both the outsourcer and contractor. Expected sign column indicates 
the expected sign of the explanatory variable coefficients based on the hypothesis developed 
in Chapter 2. Actual sign column indicates the sign of the coefficients in the regression 
models. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively using two-tailed 
tests. Since several regression models have been used, significance by coefficient can vary 
somewhat depending on the model. Therefore, the significance reported in this table is an 
average of the models used in the study. (*) denotes that the variable has 10% significance in 
most of the models used but not in all of them.+/- indicates that the sign of the coefficient 
varies between the models. _____
Variable Hypothesis
Outsourcer Contractor
Expected sign Actual sign Expected sign Actual sign
OUTSOURCER REVENUE Size of the outsourcer - -*
CONTRACTOR REVENUE Size of the contractor - + - -**
OUTSOURCER NET INCOME Profitability of the outsourcing firm + +**
CONTRACTOR NET INCOME Profitability of the contracting firm +/-
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION Industry classification + -* -
MANUFACTURING Outsourcing type + +/- -
DEAL SIZE Deal size - tn + +***
RELATIVE DEAL SIZE Deal size - + -
DEAL LENGTH Deal length - + + -
OUTSOURCER STOCK PERFORMANCE Performance + +
CONTRACTOR STOCK PERFORMANCE Performance + -
CASH Level of agency cost + -
DEBT Level of agency cost - + -
INSIDER OWNERSHIP Level of agency cost + +
COST FOCUS Reason for announcement + - - +
TRANSFORMATIONAL ROLE Reason for announcement + -
INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT Type of the announcement + - + -
PRE ANNOUNCEMENT Type of the announcement -
POST ANNOUNCEMENT Type of the announcement -
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY Finn risk + *n +/-
MARKET TO BOOK Growth opportunities + +
ALLIANCE Outsourcing structure - alliances + + + +*
CONTRACTOR EXPERIENCE Experience of contractor + +/- + +/-
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6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1. Discussion of central findings
Evidence presented in this study indicates that outsourcing is a price sensitive event, 
particularly for the contractor, who experiences a significant wealth gain (percentually) from 
outsourcing. Outsourcing does not appear to be a zero-sum game, since both parties and the 
combination experience on average a percentually positive market reaction using the three- 
day period starting at the announcement day, although for outsourcer and combined entity this 
effect is not statistically significant and therefore this conclusion is not fully supported by the 
empirical evidence. However, due to the size effect the combined market reaction is negative 
if measured in absolute dollars. Therefore, it is concluded that outsourcing is not value adding 
per se but depends on the size of the outsourcer and contractor in addition to several other 
firm characteristics.
Accordingly, shareholders of the outsourcing firm experience only a small wealth gain 
(0,46% and 0,21% full and reduced sample respectively) from outsourcing during the three- 
day period starting at the announcement day, whereas the shareholders of the contractors 
experience a much greater wealth gain (1,30% and 1,63% full and reduced sample 
respectively). Additionally, there appears to be a strong size effect in the percentage returns 
leading to negative dollar returns for outsourcers (-$270 million) and only slightly positive 
dollar return for ($18 million) contractors over the same three-day period. Due to this size 
effect the combined entity of outsourcer and contractor experience only a small wealth gain 
(0,33% to 0,53% full and reduced sample respectively) from outsourcing when percentage 
returns are employed. These results are in line with earlier studies reporting positive but 
insignificant market reaction for the outsourcer (Hayes et al. 2001; Gao 2005). Additionally, 
Gao (2005) reported statistically significant positive reaction for contractor consistent with 
the findings of this study.
Significant differences exist with regard to the capital market’s reaction to outsourcing 
announcements among both outsourcers and contractors. Based on the statistical evidence it is 
concluded that investors appear to distinguish between the various deals and base their 
evaluation of the newly formed partnership on the deal characteristics rather than on general 
considerations regarding outsourcing. Consequently, the market value of outsourcing firms
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announcing electronic manufacturing and information systems outsourcing contracts is 
conditioned on the size, profitability and industry of the firm. Based on the statistical 
evidence, there is strong empirical support for the significance of these three variables. For 
smaller firms, market values are significantly positively impacted by the decision to outsource 
manufacturing or information technology, whereas for larger firms the impact is weaker. 
Outsourcing firms with high profitability appear to have greater stock market reaction when 
compared to companies with lower profitability. Additionally the market values of financial 
institutions are more negatively affected by the outsourcing deal when compared to other 
firms. Moreover, there is also empirical evidence of a combined effect between these 
variables since the effect of the size of the outsourcer appears to be dependent on the industry 
of the outsourcer. In addition to these three firm characteristics also the deal size and firm risk 
appeared to have an effect on the market reaction, although the empirical support is less 
consistent and somewhat mixed. The size effect found in this study supports the hypothesis 
that the value of the outsourcing deal is conditioned on the degree of information asymmetry 
existing in the market. According to this study the capital market placed a higher value on 
outsourcing announcement information for higher asymmetry firms (i.e. small firms). Similar 
size effect has been reported also by Hayes et al. (2001) and Gao (2005).
Since outsourcing announcements are one of the few direct signals management can give to 
demonstrate to shareholders that shareholder value is taking precedence over managerial 
objectives related to firm size or employment, they were expected to have strong signalling 
value. However, the statistical evidence does not support this hypothesis. The hypothesis that 
higher agency costs of outsourcer would lead to more positive market reaction to outsourcing 
announcements does not receive any empirical support. Additionally, the size of the mean 
excess return of outsourcers during the three-day period is relatively low when compared to 
the gross amount involved in the average outsourcing deal recorded in the sample (in the 
order of 1% to 5% of the originating companies depending whether median or average is 
used) so that the stock market reaction can be based solely on the direct monetary benefits of 
the outsourcing deal. Juma’h and Wood (2003) used the relatively large magnitude of market 
reaction compared to the average contract value as an evidence of signalling effect. Finally, 
electronic manufacturing outsourcing announcements were anticipated to carry a stronger 
signalling value compared to information system outsourcing announcements due to their 
core nature. However, empirical support for this hypothesis is not found since the stock 
market reaction to these two types of outsourcing does not differ significantly. Consequently,
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there is no empirical support on the existence of the signalling value component of 
outsourcing announcements. In another words, based on the statistical evidence it can not be 
concluded that outsourcing announcement carries a strong signalling effect of enhanced 
shareholder focus. However, based on the statistical evidence outsourcing announcements 
together with firm characteristics carry other types of signalling effects, e.g. related to the 
motives of outsourcing, which have impact on the market reaction.
The strong positive relationship between outsourcing firm’s profitability and the market 
reaction to outsourcing announcement is expected to be a consequence of the fact that the 
profitability correlates inversely with the probability that a company is outsourcing IT or 
manufacturing solely to immediately reduce costs. Consequently, firm’s with low profitability 
are then less likely to separate nonvalue-added functions from value-added core competency 
functions that should remain in the firm leading to worse market reaction. Therefore, it is 
concluded that outsourcing is a highly sensitive business exchange that requires rigorous 
analysis and in-depth understanding on the cost and revenue drivers in order to be successful. 
Furthermore, outsourcing deals are often sweetened with financial incentives, such as stock 
purchases, loans at low interest rates, and postponed payments (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993), 
which increases the short-term attractiveness of outsourcing especially for financially weak 
companies. However, based on the statistical evidence markets appear to understand this and 
see through any short-term attempts to improve cash flow and profitability through 
outsourcing. The impact of outsourcing firm’s profitability on the market reaction has not 
been studied before and therefore this statistically strong result provides new insights into the 
capital markets reaction on outsourcing announcements.
Financial institutions’ market reaction on outsourcing announcements is worse compared to 
other firms. This relationship between the industry of the outsourcer and market reaction is 
opposite to what was hypothesized. This is, however, consistent with the findings of Gellrich 
and Gewald (2005). This result indicates that outsourcing activities closer to the core of the 
company has a worse market reaction compared to outsourcing non-core activities. Following 
the rationale of Gellrich and Gewald (2005), potential explanation for this could be that 
outsourcing non-core activities leads to saving resources to be used in core activities and 
ultimately leading to an enhanced competitive position. Additionally, outsourcing non-core 
processes could be less risky, compared to outsourcing activities closer to the core. 
Alternative explanation for the result observed could relate to the fact that financial industry is
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the second largest buyer of outsourcing services, just after public bodies (Galdwell 2003). 
Therefore, it is more likely that ‘quick wins’ have already been captured in this industry and 
the remaining outsourcing contracts are more complex and challenging in nature, which is 
also recognized by the capital markets.
The hypothesis related to the rationale for outsourcing, growth opportunities, type of 
announcement and contractor experience were not supported by the empirical results.
Similarly to the outsourcers, also among contractors there exist significant differences with 
regard to the capital market’s reaction to outsourcing announcements. Based on the statistical 
evidence the market reaction of contractor of information technology or electronic 
manufacturing outsourcing deal is strongly conditioned on the size of the outsourcer and on 
the size and structure of the outsourcing deal. The empirical support for the significance of 
these three variables is strong. Moreover, there is also empirical evidence of a combined 
effect between these variables since the effect of the size of the deal appears to be dependent 
on the structure of the deal i.e. whether the deal is alliance or not. In addition to these three 
firm and event characteristics also contractor’s stock market performance, growth 
opportunities and profitability appeared to have an effect on the market reaction, although the 
empirical support is less consistent and somewhat mixed. Similarly to the outsourcers, the 
size effect of contractors observed supports the hypothesis on the information asymmetry 
being one of the determinants of the market reaction. The negative relationship between 
contractor size and market reaction were confirmed also by Gao (2005). The reliability of this 
finding is reinforced by the fact that the relationship between market reaction and contractor 
size was statistically highly significant both in Gao’s (2005) and in this study.
Size of the deal has a positive relationship with the market reaction of contractor, which is 
consistent with what was hypothesized earlier. 1 hypothesized that the relationship would be 
positive due to the increased dependency of the outsourcer to the contractor. Additionally, 
since these deals are core business of the contractor, it is only natural that the larger the deal 
the better the market reaction, provided that the deal is attractive for the contractor. This result 
is also consistent with the most recent studies by Gao (2005) and Gellrich and Gewald (2005), 
who found similar relationship. The reliability of this finding is reinforced by the fact that the 
relationship between market reaction and deal size was statistically highly significant both in 
Gao’s (2005) and in this study.
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Outsourcing deals based on an alliance are rewarded by markets for contractors. This is 
consistent with what was hypothesized earlier. However, it is surprising that the positive 
relationship between alliance and market reaction applies only to contractors and not to 
outsourcers. It has been assumed that, if the deal is structured in alliance, it is likely to be 
strategically important and have higher probability of success. Therefore, the positive 
relationship should apply to both outsourcer and contractor. Particularly, since the market 
reaction of outsourcing announcement is clearly more positive for contractors compared to 
outsourcers, one would expect outsourcers to benefit from the alliance, which is hypothesized 
to increase the likelihood for success. Potential explanation for this disparity could be that, 
since alliance based outsourcing contracts are hypothesized to be strategically important and 
comprehensive, the winning contractors of such deals are perceived to be the most 
competitive in the industry, thus resulting in more positive market reaction. However, it is 
difficult to develop solid rationale for this result, without more detailed knowledge on the 
typical terms and conditions in these alliance structures. Moreover, there are no previous 
studies, testing hypothesis related to outsourcing structure.
The failure to observe significant excess returns for pre-announcement date event windows 
suggests that there is little anticipation of the announcement. Similarly, the lack of significant 
returns in the longer post-announcement periods indicate that the market fully capitalizes the 
information content with the outsourcing announcement during the three-day period starting 
at the announcement day. However, although the positive market reaction for contractors is 
clearly largest and statistically significant at the announcement day the results suggest that the 
market does not fully capitalize the information content with the outsourcing announcement at 
the announcement day. Most of the announcements in my database are based on online 
sources, which is probably the main reason for significant reaction still during the two days 
after the initial announcement.
Table 20 below summarizes the results of this study by comparing the initial hypotheses with 
the results of the aggregate, sub-sample and regression analysis.
Table 20. Comparison of results and hypotheses
This table summarizes the results of this study by comparing them with the initial hypotheses. 
All mean cumulative excess returns (univariate analysis) reported are based on market risk 
adjusted excess returns using the full sample size and three day event window starting at the 
announcement day, unless otherwise stated. 10, 5 and 1 percent significances for regression 
variables are based on average significance level in the different regression models similar to 
Table 19._______________________________________________________________________
Hypothesis Results
HI Outsourcer: The mean cumulative excess return 
for the aggregate sample of outsourcing firms is 
significantly different from zero
Contractor: The mean cumulative excess return 
for the aggregate sample of contractors is 
significantly different from zero
Combined entity: The mean cumulative excess 
return for the aggregate sample of combined 
entities is significantly different from zero
Outsourcer: Positive but statistically
insignificant mean cumulative excess return 
(0,43%)
Contractor: Positive and highly significant 
mean cumulative excess return (1,39%)
Combined entity: Positive but insignificant 
mean cumulative excess return (0,33%)
H2
H3
Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or
manufacturing functions will have better impact
on the market values of firms that have high 
profitability than on firms with low or negative 
profitability.
Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or
manufacturing functions will have greater impact 
on the market values of smaller firms than on the 
market values of larger firms
Contractor: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or
manufacturing functions will have greater impact 
on the market values of smaller contractors than 
on the market values of larger contractors
Outsourcer: Positive relation between
profitability and market reaction is supported at 
5 percent level in the regression (multivariate) 
analysis
Outsourcer: Negative relation between
outsourcer size and market reaction is supported 
at 10 percent level in the regression 
(multivariate) analysis. Sub-sample analysis 
with full sample supports this finding (1,50% vs. 
0,12% mean cumulative excess return for small 
and large firm sub-samples respectively)
Contractor: Negative relation between
contractor size and market reaction is supported 
at 5 percent level in the regression (multivariate) 
analysis. Sub-sample analysis with full sample 
supports this finding (2,56% vs. 0,95% mean 





Outsourcer: The market’s reaction to IS or 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements will 
be inversely related to the size of the contractor
Outsourcer: The announcement to contract all 
or portion of a firm’s IS functions will have a 
greater impact on the market values of financial 
service firms than on the market values of other 
firms
Outsourcer: The announcement to contract all 
or portion of a firm’s manufacturing functions 
will have a better impact on the market value 
compared to the announcement to contract all or
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
positive relation.
Outsourcer: Empirical evidence supports 
inverse relation than hypothesized. Inverse 
relation is supported at 10 percent level in the 
regression (multivariate) analysis. Sub-sample 
analysis supports the inverse finding (-0,87% vs. 
1,12% mean cumulative excess return for 
financial institutions and other firms sub­
samples respectively).
Outsourcer: No support is found either in 






portion of a firm’s IS function
Outsourcer: The market’s reaction to IS or 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements will 
be inversely related to the size of the contract
Contractor: The market’s reaction to IS or 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements will 
be positively related to the size of the contract
Outsourcer: The market’s reaction to IS or 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements will 
be inversely related to the proposed duration of 
the contract
Contractor: The market’s reaction to IS or 
manufacturing outsourcing announcements will 
be positively related to the proposed duration of 
the contract
Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have better impact 
on the market value of a firm that has performed 
strongly in the capital markets compared to a 
firm with poor performance
Contractor: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have better impact 
on the market value of a contractor that has 
performed strongly in the capital markets 
compared to a contractor with poor performance
Outsourcer: No support is found. Empirical 
evidence suggests positive relation contrary to 
what is hypothesized. Solid empirical support is 
not found as positive relation is supported only 
at 10 percent level in some regression models.
Contractor: Positive relation between deal size 
and market reaction is strongly supported at 1 
percent level in the regression (multivariate) 
analysis.
Outsourcer: No support is found. Empirical 
evidence suggests positive relation contrary to 
what is hypothesized. Solid empirical support is 
not found as positive relation is supported at 10 
percent level only in some regression models.
Contractor: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
positive relation.
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
positive relation.
Contractor: No support is found. Empirical 
evidence suggests negative relation contrary to 
what is hypothesized. Solid empirical support is 
not found as negative relation is supported at 10 
percent level only in some regression models.
H10 Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact 
on the market values of firms that have high 
agency costs compared to firms with low agency 
costs
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
relations for all variables used as proxy for 
agency costs
Hll Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions driven by long-term cost 
reduction objective will have better impact on the 
market value of the firm than announcement 
driven by revenue side objectives
Contractor: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions driven by long-term cost 
reduction objective will have worse impact on the 
market value of the contractor than 
announcement driven by revenue side objectives
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
negative relation contrary to what is 
hypothesized.
Contractor: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
positive relation contrary to what is 
hypothesized.
H12 Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or analysis indicates statistically insignificant
manufacturing functions driven by negative relation contrary to what is
transformational objective will have better impact hypothesized, 
on the market value of the firm than
из
announcement driven by non-transformational 
objectives
H13 Outsourcer: The initial announcement to 
contract all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have a greater 
impact on the market value of the firm compared 
to the multiple announcements
Contractor: The initial announcement to 
contract all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have a greater 
impact on the market value of the firm compared 
to the multiple announcements
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
negative relation contrary to what is 
hypothesized.
Contractor: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
negative relation contraiy to what is 
hypothesized.
H14 Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact 
on the market value of firm’s with high 
uncertainty
Outsourcer: Solid support is not found. Positive 
relation between outsourcer risk and market 
reaction is supported at 1 or 10 percent level in 
some regression models, whereas in other 
models the relation is insignificant.
H15 Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact 
on the market values of firms with high growth 
opportunities compared to firms with low growth 
opportunities.
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
negative relation contrary to what is 
hypothesized.
H16 Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions in an alliance will have 
a better impact on the market value of firm 
compared to announcements with other 
outsourcing structures
Contractor: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions in an alliance will have 
a better impact on the market value of the 
contractor compared to announcements with 
other outsourcing structures
Outsourcer: No support is found as regression 
analysis indicates statistically insignificant 
positive relation.
Contractor: Positive relation between alliance 
structure and market reaction is supported at 10 
percent level in the regression (multivariate) 
analysis. Sub-sample analysis supports this 
finding (5,38% vs. 1,19% mean cumulative 
excess return for alliance and other structure 
sub-samples respectively).
H17 Outsourcer: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IS or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact 
on the market value of firm when the contractor 
has a track record
Outsourcer: No empirical support is found. 
Contractor: No empirical support is found.
Contractor: The announcement of a contract to 
outsource all or portion of a firm’s IT or 
manufacturing functions will have a better impact 
on the market value of the contractor when the 
contractor has a track record
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6.2. Directions for future research
The area of outsourcing and its market reaction has several alternative avenues for further 
research. As outsourcing has for the past decade been a growing phenomena and is becoming 
a standard management tool for many companies the amount of large deals to be studied is 
significant, enabling larger sample sizes than used in previous studies. In parallel, however, 
the signalling value of outsourcing may also have declined as so many companies have 
already outsourced large parts of their IT and manufacturing. During this process 1 have 
identified three areas that can possibly allow for additional academic enquiry. The following 
three paragraphs briefly present these ideas.
The first potential area for further empirical examination is related to the new findings from 
this study, i.e. the positive correlation between outsourcer’s profitability and market reaction, 
negative correlation between financial institutions and market reaction and positive 
correlation with alliance type contracts and contractor. Firstly, it would be valuable to test the 
consistency of these findings as they have not been tested and reported in earlier studies. The 
positive correlation between outsourcers profitability and market reaction suggests that 
market are able to distinguish the different motives for outsourcing and reward 
announcements where companies are not pressured to outsource, e.g. due to financial 
weakness. However, there are other possible explanations for this relationship and it would be 
interesting to test this by using other proxies for the different motives of outsourcing. 
Similarly, there are several alternative explanations for the negative reaction of 
announcements by financial institutions that would also warrant further research. Finally, the 
positive reaction of contractors to alliance based announcements should be more carefully 
studied to reveal the underlying reason for the somewhat surprising positive reaction only for 
the contractor. Testing this is, however, fairly challenging as it would require detailed 
knowledge of the terms and conditions in these alliance structures and significantly larger 
sample size of alliance based contract, both of which are difficult to obtain.
An alternative area that could prove to be an interesting topic for further research would be to 
study the characteristics of the companies that outsource as well as their long term 
performance. Particularly, it could be interesting to test if the outsourcers are overall more
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focus increasing, e.g. via divestment of non-core assets, than their less outsourced 
counterparts. This type of study is, however, fairly challenging to conduct as it would require 
considerable time to individually examine and categorize the companies for a robust empirical 
study. Both of these topics have been earlier studied only in a few papers with relatively small 
sample size. The last link between outsourcing activity and overall focus increase has not 
been studied before.
The final area that could be an interesting topic for further study is the market reaction of the 
combined entity and possible interactions between the explanatory variables. It could be 
interesting to test the market reaction of the combined entity as a function of all the 
explanatory variables due to the fact that some variables are likely to have a value impact on 
the combined entity, whereas, other variables have an impact on the distribution of the 
benefits between the outsourcer and contractor. Additionally, there has been only limited 
attention to the possibility of interaction between the explanatory variables to jointly alter 
investors’ perceptions in relation to outsourcing announcements in this or other studies, which 
could also be an interesting topic to be studied further.
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Appendix 1. Sample
This Appendix shows the sample by listing outsourcer’s name, announcement date, 
contractor’s name, deal size (in million $), deal length (in years) and annual deal size (in
million $ per year) for the 316 outsourcing announcements.
Number Outsourcer Name Date Contractor Name Deal Size (MS) Deal Length (years) Annual Deal Size (M$)
1 11.12.1996 CSC 4 000 10 400
2 Ericsson 12.2.1997 Flextronics 900 4 225
3 24.3.1997 Solectron
4 HP 8.4.1997 Celestica 800 4 200
5 DuPont 2.6.1997 CSC 4 000 10 400
6 HP 16.6.1997 Celestica 500 4 125
7 Sage Life 19.6.1997 EDS 88 10 9
8 8.7.1997 Solectron
9 HP 5.8.1997 Celestica 800 4 200
10 BellSouth 7.8.1997 EDS 4 000 10 400
11 Commonwealth Bank 13.8.1997 EDS 3 700 10 370
12 HP 2.9.1997 Celestica 500 4 125
13 NCR 19.12.1997 Solectron 1 200 5 240
14 Chevron 22.12.1997 EDS 450 5 90
15 Unisys 6.1.1998 HP
16 Madge Networks 23.2.1998 Celestica
17 GE 4.3.1998 IBM 10
18 26.3.1998 HP 500 3 167
19 Banca di Roma 22.4.1998 EDS 1 500 10 150
20 25.4.1998 Elcoteq 300 3 100
21 NCR 27.4.1998 Solectron 1 200 5 240
22 HP 11.5.1998 Jabil Circuit 600 4 150
23 HP 28.5.1998 Celestica
24 Chiron Corporation 17.6.1998 IBM 139 10 14
25 Chevron 18.6.1998 EDS 400 5 80
26 Silicon Graphics 2.7.1998 Celestica
27 British Airways 28.7.1998 EDS 165 10 17
28 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation 29.7.1998 Solectron 350 5 70
29 Hitachi 31.8.1998 Celestica
30 Cable & Wireless communication 2.9.1998 IBM 3 000 10 300
31 18.9.1998 Elcoteq 300 3 100
32 The Boeing company 30.9.1998 IBM 2 000 5 400
33 Banc One 30.9.1998 AT&T 2 000 6 333
34 Nortel 6.10.1998 Jabil Circuit
35 Consolidated Freightways 3.11.1998 IBM 110 5 22
36 Korean Air 21.12.1998 IBM 120 10 12
37 IBM 6.1.1999 Solectron
38 AT&T 28.1.1999 CSC 300 10 30
39 IBM 1.2.1999 Solectron
40 MCI Worldcom 11.2.1999 EDS 6 400 10 640
41 Budget 22.3.1999 CSC 200 5 40
42 Cabletron systems 22.3.1999 Celestica 800 4 200
43 HP 30.3.1999 Celestica
44 McDermott International 31.3.1999 AT&T 600 10 60
45 12.4.1999 IBM
46 Trimble 13.4.1999 Solectron 250 3 83
47 Ericsson 19.4.1999 Flextronics 900 4 225
48 Glenayre Technologies 21.4.1999 Solectron 350 5 70
49 United Technologies 12.5.1999 CSC 1 200 10 120
50 United Technologies 12.5.1999 CSC 1 200 10 120
51 BCE Mobile Communications 19.5.1999 CGI 450 10 45
52 30.6.1999 Flextronics 900 4 225
53 Galeries Lafayette 7.7.1999 IBM 1 200 15 80
54 ACE INA 7.7.1999 IBM 500 10 50
55 Equifax 14.7.1999 EDS 200 10 20
56 Telecom New Zealand 15.7.1999 EDS 1 500 10 150
57 Nortel 4.8.1999 Sanmina 600 4 150
58 Trimble 11.8.1999 Solectron 250 3 83
59 IBM 17.8.1999 Solectron
60 Mitsui Marine 24.8.1999 IBM 235 10 24
61 IBM 30.9.1999 Solectron
62 Nortel 1.10.1999 Sanmina
63 Mazda 7.10.1999 IBM 480 10 48
64 United Technologies 25.10.1999 CSC 900 10 90
65 MCI Worldcom 25.10.1999 EDS 6 400 5 1 280
66 MCI Worldcom 25.10.1999 EDS 6 400 10 640
67 Nissan 28.10.1999 IBM 1 000 10 105
68 Ericsson 1.11.1999 Solectron 1 150 4 288
69 Nortel 3.11.1999 Sanmina
70 Ericsson 19.11.1999 Flextronics 900 4 225
71 Siemens 29.11.1999 Flextronics 650 4 163
72 Fujitsu 29.11.1999 Flextronics 650 4 163
73 United Technologies 5.1.2000 CSC 507 10 51
74 Alcatel 5.1.2000 Sanmina
75 Alcatel 5.1.2000 Solectron 500 3 167
76 Harris Corporation 10.1.2000 Sanmina
77 Harris Corporation 11.1.2000 Sanmina
78 IBM 12 1.2000 Celestica 3 000 4 750
79 Cabletron systems 19.1.2000 Flextronics 1 000 4 250
80 IBM 29.2.2000 Celestica
81 Harris Corporation 1.3.2000 Sanmina
82 1.3.2000 Solectron 1 150 4 288
83 Harris Corporation 3.3.2000 Sanmina
84 Siemens 27.3 2000 Flextronics 1 000 3 333
85 Alcatel 3.4.2000 Solectron 380 4 95
86 AT&T 4.4.2000 CSC 1 000 7 143
87 Nortel 4.4.2000 Solectron 10 400 4 2 600
88 Nortel 4.4.2000 Solectron
89 Sumitomo Metal industries 13.4.2000 IBM 660 10 66
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90 Saab AB 14.4.2000 CSC 300 5 60
91 Microsoft 19.4.2000 Flextronics
92 A ventis 16.5.2000 IBM 1 500 10 150
93 AXA Group 25.5.2000 IBM 400 10 40
94 Motorola 31.5.2000 Flextronics 30 000 5 6 000
95 IBM 31.5.2000 Solectron 220 4 55
96 IBM 31.5.2000 Celestica
97 Nortel 5.6.2000 Solectron
98 IBM 20.6.2000 Solectron 220 4 55
99 NEC 23.6.2000 Celestica 1 200 5 240
100 NEC 30.6.2000 Celestica
101 Nortel 2.7.2000 Solectron 1 000 4 250
102 CIBC 24.7.2000 HP
103 Nortel 2.8.2000 CSC 3 000 7 429
104 Siemens 3.8.2000 Flextronics
105 Solectron 10.8.2000 IBM 1 800 10 180
106 BP 11.8.2000 IBM 200 5 40
107 J Sainsbury 22.8.2000 Accenture
108 31.8.2000 Sanmina 150 4 38
109 2.10.2000 Sanmina
110 Marconi 5.10.2000 Jabil Circuit
111 Ericsson 9.10.2000 Flextronics 300 4 75
112 Westpac Banking 12.10.2000 IBM 2 300 10 230
113 Siemens 18.10.2000 Sanmina-SCI 350 4 88
114 18.10.2000 Solectron 2 050 4 513
115 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 31.10.2000 IBM 15 000 10 1 500
116 Oxford Health Plans 13.11.2000 CSC 300 5 60
117 Oxford Health Plans 21.11.2000 CSC 300 5 60
118 Motorola 6.12.2000 Celestica
119 J Sainsbury 8.12.2000 Accenture 2 550 7 364
120 Sare Lee 19.12.2000 HP 150 5 30
121 Sun Life Financial 4.1.2001 CGI 90 7 13
122 Marconi 11.1.2001 Jabil Circuit 4 000 3 1 333
123 Rautamukki 15.1.2001 TietoEnator 150 5 30
124 Ericsson 26.1.2001 Flextronics 4 000 4 1 000
125 AstraZeneca 1.2.2001 IBM 1 700 7 243
126 2.2.2001 Solectron 750 4 188
127 Ceragon 13.2.2001 Flextronics
128 21.2.2001 Celestica 4 000 5 800
129 Rautaruukki 27.2.2001 TietoEnator 150 5 30
130 Franklin Resources 28.2.2001 IBM 480 10 48
131 Sabre Holding 15.3.2001 EDS 2 200 10 220
132 Sampo 21.3.2001 TietoEnator 10 4 3
133 Scotiabank 26.3.2001 IBM 578 7 83
134 Kesko 30.3.2001 TietoEnator 235 5 47
135 Alcatel 26.4.2001 Flextronics 850 4 213
136 Avaya 7.5.2001 Celestica 4 000 5 800
137 Fiat 21.5.2001 IBM 6 200 10 620
138 NTL 24.5.2001 IBM 2 000 5 400
139 29.5.2001 Solectron
140 SAGEM SA 31.5.2001 Celestica 500 3 167
141 Schröders 4.6.2001 CSC 240 7 34
142 15.6.2001 Jabil Circuit
143 19.6.2001 Flextronics
144 Japan Airlines 21.6.2001 IBM 664 10 66
145 Alcatel 25.6.2001 Sanmina-SCI 450 4 113
146 Alcatel 27.6.2001 Sanmina-SCI
147 Alcatel 2.7.2001 Flextronics 850 4 213
148 Air Canada 20.7.2001 IBM 908 7 130
149 24.7.2001 Celestica 10 000 5 2 000
150 Alcatel 27.8.2001 Sanmina-SCI 450 4 113
151 28.8.2001 CGI 380 10 38
152 Pitney Bowes 27.9.2001 CGI 25 5 5
153 HP 27.9.2001 Flextronics 250 4 63
154 Xerox 2.10.2001 Flextronics 5 000 5 1 000
155 Sampo 3.10.2001 TietoEnator 300 3 100
156 Sierra Wireless 11.10.2001 Solectron
157 ARRIS 23.10.2001 Solectron
158 NEC 23.10.2001 Solectron 500 4 125
159 United Technologies 19.11.2001 CSC 1 100 5 220
160 28.11.2001
161 Cendant 3.12.2001 IBM 1 400 10 140
162 12.12.2001 Solectron 1 145 4 286
163 21.12.2001 Flextronics 3 000 5 600
164 PacifiCare Health Systems 3.1.2002 IBM 1 200 10 120
165 IBM 8.1.2002 Sanmina-SCI 5 000 3 1 667
166 NEC 8.1.2002 Celestica 2 500 5 500
167 Gulfetream Aerospace 9.1.2002 CSC 510 10 51
168 HP 17.1.2002 Sanmina-SCI
169 PacifiCare Health Systems 22.1.2002 IBM 1 200 10 120
170 Nextel Communications 23.1.2002 EDS 234 5 47
171 Alcatel 24.1.2002 Sanmina-SCI 1 500 4 375
172 Allmerica Financial 28.1.2002 150 7 21
173 31.1.2002 Solectron
174 Ericsson 20.2.2002 Flextronics
175 American Express 25.2.2002 IBM 4 000 7 571
176 Aspect Communications 25.2.2002 Solectron
177 Compaq 27.2.2002 Jabil Circuit 240 3 80
178 Pace Micro Technology 5.3.2002 Solectron
179 Ciena 6.3.2002 Sanmina-SCI
180 Alcatel 7.3.2002 Jabil Circuit 700 3 233
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181 Invensys 22.3.2002 IBM 1 000 10 100
182 Invensys 25.3.2002 IBM
183 Valeo 25.3.2002 Jab il Circuit 900 3 300
184 Lucent 28.3.2002 Solectron 2 000 3 667
185 Altamar Networks 9.4.2002 Sanmina-SCI
186 Ditech Communications 9.4.2002 Sanmina
187 Deutsche Bank 24.4.2002
188 Siemens 25.4.2002 Sanmina
189 Iomega Corporation 2.5.2002 Venture Corporator 200 5 40
190 14.5.2002 Flextronics 1 500 3 500
191 Agilent Technologies 15.5.2002 Venture Corporator
192 Alcatel 23.5.2002 Sanmina-SCI
193 Lucent 31.5.2002 Solectron 2 000 3 667
194 Storage Technology 13.6.2002 Sanmina
195 Procter & Gamble 14.6.2002
196 Boots Company 19.6.2002
197 Deutsche Bank 26.6.2002
198 Elisa 26.6.2002 Flextronics
199 Dot Hill Systems 26.6.2002 Solectron
200 Finnair 27.6.2002 IBM 400 10 40
201 NICE Systems 1.7.2002 Flextronics
202 Alcatel 1.7.2002 Sanmina-SCI
203 Lifestream 15.7.2002 Sanmina
204 Alcan 30.7.2002 CGI 130 10 13
205 BNSF 14.8.2002 IBM 200 10 20
206 ABN AMRO Holding 20.8.2002 EDS 1 500 5 300
207 Royal Philips Electronics 28.8.2002 Jabil Circuit 4 000 4 1 000
208 2.9.2002 Flextronics 2 000 4 500
209 Asyst Technologies 5.9.2002 Solectron 1 000 5 200
210 CIBC 17.9.2002 HP 1 500 7 214
211 Deutsche Bank 24.9.2002 IBM
212 Iomega Corporation 30.9.2002 Venture Corporator 200 5 40
213 Boots Company 1.10.2002 IBM 1 100 10 110
214 N MS Communications 8.10.2002
215 Palm 28.10.2002 Ce lestica
216 J.P.Morgan Chase 4.11.2002
217 Bombardier 4.11.2002 CSC 670 7 96
218 Air Liquide 5.11.2002 CGI 116 10 12
219 JP. Morgan Chase 13.11.2002 IBM 5 000 7 714
220 Royal Philips Electronics 18,11.2002 Jabil Circuit
221 Alstom 20.11.2002 EDS 2 000 5 400
222 Bombardier 21.11.2002 CSC 700 7 100
223 United Technologies 25.11.2002 CSC 143 5 29
224 Bank of America 12.12.2002 EDS 4 500 10 450
225 Deutsche Bank 18.12.2002 IBM 2 500 10 250
226 ABN AMRO Holding 24.12.2002 EDS 1 300 5 260
227 J.P.Morgan Chase 30.12.2002 IBM 5 000 7 714
228 IBM 7.1.2003 Sanmina-SCI 3 600 3 1 200
229 SBC Communications 10.1.2003 Amdocs 500 7 71
230 HP 3.2.2003 Solectron 1 400 5 280
231 Visteon 12.2.2003 IBM 2 000 10 200
232 Telecom Italia 21.2.2003 HP 244 5 49
233 Intuitive Surgical 27.2.2003 Solectron
234 AXA Group 28.2.2003 IBM 1 000 6 167
235 NEC 28.2.2003 Jabil Circuit 250 4 63
236 Agilent Technologies 15.3.2003 Venture Corporator 150 4 38
237 Motorola 27.3.2003 CSC 1 600 10 160
238 Bank of Ireland 7.4.2003 HP 500 5 100
239 Ericsson 11.4.2003 HP
240 Procter & Gamble 11.4.2003 HP 3 000 10 300
241 Bank of Ireland 14.4.2003 HP 600 7 86
242 John Hancock Financial Services 23.4.2003 IBM 254
243 Procter & Gamble 6.5.2003 HP 3 000 10 300
244 Marconi 27.5.2003 CSC 735 10 74
245 ISS 29.5.2003 CSC 450 10 45
246 Electrolux 1.6.2003 IBM 250 7 36
247 Ericsson 4 6 2003 HP 1 000 5 200
248 11.6.2003 IBM 646 10 65
249 Ericsson 24.6.2003 IBM 1 000 5 200
250 TeliaSonera 25.6.2003 TietoEnator 72 3 24
251 Bombardier 14.7.2003 CGI 150 7 21
252 ABB 28.7.2003 IBM 1 100 10 110
253 NEC 30.7.2003 Solectron
254 Tellabs 1.8.2003 Sanmina-SCI
255 Equifax 7.8.2003 IBM 500 5 100
256 DaimlerChrysler 12.8.2003 Deutsche Telekom 1 400 5 280
257 John Hancock Financial Services 5.9.2003 IBM 254 6 42
258 York International 8.9.2003 EDS 426 10 43
259 10.9.2003 Flextronics 1 000 3 333
260 10.9.2003 Flextronics 1 000 4 250
261 Nortel 30.9.2003 Solectron 5
262 1.10.2003 IBM 2 500 10 250
263 Advanced Digital Information Corporation 6.10.2003 Benchmark Electronics 150 4 38
264 TD Bank Financial 16.10.2003 IBM 543 7 78
265 Elizabeth Arden 31.10.2003 IBM
266 Korean Air 3.11.2003 IBM 120 10 12
267 Tellabs 14.11.2003 Elcoteq 200 4 50
268 Advanced Digital Information Corporation 24.11.2003 Benchmark Electronics 150 4 38
269 Bank of Ireland 28.11.2003 HP 600 7 86
270 Commerzbank 29.11.2003 IBM 500 5 100
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271 Canadian Pacific Railway 2.12.2003 IBM 154 7 22
272 3.12.2003 CGI Group 113 10 11
273 Zurich Financial Services 10.12.2003 IBM 450 5 90
274 Michelin 11.12.2003 IBM 1 200 8 150
275 ING U.S. Financial Services 16.12.2003 IBM 600 7 86
276 SAS 18.12.2003 CSC 1 400 5 280
277 BNP Paribas 19.12.2003 IBM 1 200 5 240
278 Sears, Roebuck and Co. 16.1.2004
279 Nokia 16.1.2004 IBM 251 5 50
280 Nortel 22.1.2004 Flextronics 8 000 4 2 000
281 Nortel 22.1.2004 Flextronics 10 000 4 2 500
282 Delta Lloyd 16.2.2004 IBM 255 7 36
283 Sears, Roebuck and Co. 11.3.2004 CSC 2 000 10 200
284 Bharti Tele-Ventures 26.3.2004 IBM 750 10 75
285 McDonalds 31.3.2004 Affiliated Computer Services 219 7 31
286 Best Buy 5.4.2004
287 DSV group 19.4.2004 Accenture 100 5 20
288 Shell 3.5.2004 IBM 1 000 5 200
289 HP 4.5.2004 ВТ 750 7 107
290 ВТ 4.5.2004 HP 750 7 107
291 Cantas 17.5.2004 IBM 446 10 45
292 AMP limited 17.5.2004 CSC 103 5 21
293 TXU 18.5.2004 Capgemini 3 500 10 350
294 Cox Insurance Holdings 20.5.2004 CGI 246 10 25
295 Sears, Roebuck and Co. 1.6.2004 CSC 1 600 10 160
296 Zurich Financial Services 7.6.2004 CSC
297 Wärtsilä 23.6.2004 HP 100 10 10
298 Barclays 23.6.2004 Accenture 400 6 67
299 Cott Corporation 23.6.2004 CGI 155 10 16
300 Nortel 29.6.2004 Flextronics 10 000 4 2 500
301 Nortel 29.6.2004 Flextronics 10 000 4 2 500
302 8.7.2004 IBM 400 5 80
303 Standard register 14.7.2004 HP 53 5 11
304 TD Bank Financial 14.7.2004 HP 320 7 46
305 Best Buy 15.7.2004 Accenture 600 7 86
306 AON 22.7.2004 CSC 600 7 86
307 Zurich Financial Services 26.7.2004 CSC 1 300 7 186
308 The Phoenix companies 29.7.2004 EDS 122 7 17
309 Bank of America 13.8.2004 EDS 1 100 9 129
310 23.8.2004 HP 100 5 20
311 RIM 9.9.2004 Elcoteq
312 Dun & Bradstreet 20.10.2004 IBM 180 7 26
313 Singaporean airlines 26.10.2004 IBM 300 7 43
314 Agilent Technologies 27.10.2004 Flextronics
315 28.10.2004 CSC 1 100 10 110
316 SAS 12.11.2004 CSC 63 8 8
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Appendix 2. Correlation between the variables
This Appendix reports the correlation between the explanatory variables used in this study by 
presenting Pearson correlation and statistical significance (using two-tailed test) for each
variable pair.
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Appendix 3. Sub-sample results
This appendix reports mean cumulative excess returns (MCER) of outsourcers and 
contractors for different sub-samples. Sub-samples are based on two different samples: full 
sample with 316 (outsourcers) and 305 (contractors) outsourcing announcements and reduced 
sample with 223 (outsourcer) and 222 (contractor) outsourcing announcements. Mean 
cumulative excess returns are calculated using market risk adjusted excess returns (MRAR). 
Mean cumulative excess return (MCER), t-test value (t-test) and statistical significance (p- 
value) are reported for 8 different sub-samples and 7 different event windows. *,**,***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively using two-tailed tests.
Reduced sample
Outsourcer's mean cumulative excess return mean cumulative Outsourcer's mean cumulative excess return Contractors mean cumulative excess return
Smaller sized outsourcing firms
Announcement day
10] 3,63 3,68 0.000—
Up to the announcement
M.oi 2,01 2.78 0.006—






Larger sized outsourcing firms
Announcement day
[0] 3.24 0.001 —
Up to the announcement
M.oi 2,26 0.025**




1051 3.28 0,001 —
[050] -1.58 % -2.08 0.03=- »52% 4),58 0.560 -1.6=% -I.H3 0.058- »12% -0.12 0.903
Electronic manufacturing outsourcing p-value
илшши a rucan uuniuiaiivc ехисаа iciuin
MCER t-test p-value MCER t-test MCER Meet p-value
Announcement day
[0] 4.08 0.000—


















[0501 »48% -0.55 0.586 i.«% 1.57 0,118 »71% -0.77 0.443 1.45% 1.5= 0.1,3
Outsourcer's mean cumulative mean cumulative excess return Outsourcer's mean cumulative excess return Contractors mean cumulative excess return
Financial institutions (IT outsourcing)
Announcement day
(01 0,12 0,904
Up to the announcement
0,25 0.806




[051 -2.08 2.10 0.037-
[0,201
Other firms (П outsourcing)
Announcement day
[01 2,78 0.008—






[0.20] 0.20% 0.1« 0.870 1,34% 1.30 0.1=6 ».07% ».06 0.85, 1,39* 1,34 01Ю







[051 4.22 4,22 0,000—
[020]^ 2.»% 0,88 0.378 2.= % 0,88 0,378
Announcement day
[01 4.07 0,000—
Up to the announcement
3,03 0.003—





[050] "0.29 % -0.33 0,741 -0.05% -0.08 0,955
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